

1                                    **Committee on World Food Security**  
2                                    **High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition**

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5                                    **V0 DRAFT REPORT**

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8                                    Submitted by the HLPE to open electronic consultation  
9                                    until 19<sup>th</sup> February 2018

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11                                    This V0 draft is publicly available on the HLPE consultation platform:

12                                    <http://www.fao.org/fsnforum/cfs-hlpe/multistakeholder-partnerships-v0>

13                                    ***Please read the consultation cover letter on pages 2 and 3 of this document***

14                                    Comments can be sent by e-mail to: [cfs-hlpe@fao.org](mailto:cfs-hlpe@fao.org) or to [fsn-moderator@fao.org](mailto:fsn-moderator@fao.org).

15  
16                                    This consultation will be used by the HLPE to further elaborate the report, which will then be  
17                                    submitted to peer review, before its finalization and approval by the HLPE Steering Committee.

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20                                    **DISCLAIMER**

21  
22                                    *HLPE V0 drafts are deliberately presented early enough in the process - as a work-in-progress, with their range of imperfections – to allow sufficient time to give proper consideration to the feedback received so that it can play a really useful role in the elaboration of the report. It is a key part of the scientific dialogue between the HLPE Project Team and Steering Committee, and the rest of the knowledge community.*

23                                    ***This V0 draft may be thoroughly corrected, modified, expanded and revised after the present consultation.***

                                  In order to strengthen this draft, the HLPE would welcome submission of material, evidence-based suggestions, references, and examples, in particular addressing the important questions in the cover letter (pages 2 and 3).

***For this reason we kindly invite you not to cite nor quote elements from this V0. Please only refer to the final publication for quotations.***

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**COVER Letter from the  
HLPE to this V0 Consultation**

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**HLPE consultation on the V0 draft of the Report:**

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**Multi-stakeholder Partnerships (MSPs) to Finance and Improve  
Food Security and Nutrition in the Framework of the 2030 Agenda**

During its 43<sup>rd</sup> Plenary Session (17-21 October 2016), the CFS requested the HLPE to produce a report on “Multistakeholder Partnerships to Finance and Improve Food Security and Nutrition in the Framework of the 2030 Agenda” to be presented at CFS45 Plenary session in October 2018.

As part of the process of elaboration of its reports, the HLPE is organizing a consultation to seek inputs, suggestions, and comments on the present V0 draft. This open e-consultation will be used by the HLPE to further elaborate the report, which will then be submitted to external expert peer-reviewers, before finalization and approval by the HLPE Steering Committee.

HLPE V0 drafts are deliberately presented early enough in the process – as a work-in-progress, with their range of imperfections – to allow sufficient time to give proper consideration to the feedback received so that it can play a really useful role in the elaboration of the report. It is a key part of the scientific dialogue between the HLPE Project Team and Steering Committee, and the rest of the knowledge community.

In order to enrich and illustrate the report with a variety of examples, participants are invited to submit concrete, practical, well-documented and significant case-studies of existing MSPs, as defined in the V0 Draft, through the use of the dedicated Questionnaire provided both as an annex to the V0 Draft, and as a separate editable word file.

The HLPE also encourages the submission of further material, references and evidence on the performance and impact of existing MSPs in the field of FSN.

In order to strengthen the report, the HLPE welcomes all the suggestions, including contributions regarding the following questions:

1. The purpose of the report is to analyze the role of MSPs in improving and financing FSN. Do you think that this draft is striking the right balance and give enough space to finance related issues? What are the constraints to raising funds for FSN?
2. Is the structure of the report comprehensive enough, and adequately articulated? Are the concepts clearly defined and used consistently throughout the report? Are there important aspects that are missing? Are there any major omissions or gaps in the report? Are there topics under-or over-represented in relation to their importance? Are any facts or conclusions erroneous or questionable? If any of these are an issue, please send supporting evidence.
3. The report suggests a classification of existing MSPs in broad clusters, in order to better identify specific challenges and concrete recommendations for each category. Do you find this approach useful for identifying specific policy responses and actions?
4. The report suggests a methodology, and key criteria, to describe and assess existing MSPs. Are there other assessment tools and methodologies that should be referenced in the report?
5. The report has identified some of the main potential and limitations of MSPs, with regard to other non-multistakeholder processes. Do you think that there are other key challenges/opportunities that need to be covered in the report?
6. The last Chapter analyzes the internal factors and enabling environment that could contribute to enhance the performance of MSPs in improving and financing FSN. Could you provide specific

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1 examples of successful or unsuccessful policies and programmes designed to shape such  
2 enabling environment that could contribute to illustrate and strengthen the Chapter?

3

4 We thank in advance all the contributors and we look forward to a rich and fruitful consultation on this  
5 early draft of the report.

6

7 *The HLPE Project Team and Steering Committee.*

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9 *The HLPE Project Team and Steering Committee*

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27 *Experts participate in the work of the HLPE in their individual capacities, and not as representatives of*  
28 *their respective governments, institutions or organizations*

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1 **FOREWORD**

2





## 1 INTRODUCTION

2 More than 800 million people are still hungry (FAO *et al.*, 2017). Malnutrition in all its forms  
3 (undernutrition, micronutrient deficiencies, overweight and obesity) now affects all countries, whether  
4 low-, middle- or high- income. Globally, one person in three is malnourished and, if current trends  
5 continue, one person in two could be malnourished by 2030 (IFPRI, 2015; GloPan, 2016), in stark  
6 contrast with the objective of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN, 2015), to end  
7 hunger and all forms of malnutrition by 2030 (SDG2).

8 The 2030 Agenda, and in particular the Sustainable Development Goal focusing on “means of  
9 implementation” (SDG 17), “encourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society  
10 partnerships”, that “mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to  
11 support the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in all countries, in particular  
12 developing countries”. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA, 2015) stressed the importance of  
13 multistakeholder partnerships (MSPs) to complement the efforts of national governments in ending  
14 hunger and poverty and achieve sustainable development in its three dimensions (promoting inclusive  
15 economic growth, protecting the environment and promoting social inclusion).

16 The growing recognition that complex and multidimensional issues – such as food security and  
17 nutrition (FSN) – require comprehensive approaches and participation of many stakeholders (whether  
18 public, private or from civil society) has also contributed to position MSPs at the centre of FSN  
19 debates. One of the clearest manifestations of this understanding can be seen in the structure of the  
20 reformed United Nations Committee on World Food Security (CFS), and in the CFS’ constant  
21 affirmation of the value of its inclusiveness.

22 The emerging importance of MSPs as a tool to improve and finance FSN does not take place without  
23 controversy. Besides a conceptual debate on the exact meanings of stakeholders and partnerships,  
24 there are critical debates directly connected to the performance of MSPs, on aspects such as  
25 inclusion, transparency, effectiveness, and accountability. MSPs are increasingly formed worldwide,  
26 even though they are differently understood and implemented in diverse contexts, including different  
27 legal and political systems.

28 These questions acquire great relevance in challenges where MSPs are expected to play an  
29 increasing role, such as better allocating the available financial resources for FSN or mobilize  
30 additional funds. With the widespread call to increase the availability and accessibility of financial  
31 resources, including in favour and/or directly to the most disadvantaged actors within food systems,  
32 the role that MSP can play will utterly depend on how issues such as rights, roles and responsibilities  
33 of different stakeholders, as well as conflicts of interest and asymmetries of power are recognized and  
34 addressed.

35 In this context, in October 2016, the CFS requested its High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security  
36 and Nutrition (HLPE) to produce a report on “Multistakeholder Partnerships to Finance and Improve  
37 Food Security and Nutrition in the Framework of the 2030 Agenda” to inform its debates at the 46th  
38 CFS Plenary Session of October 2018.

39 The purpose of this report is to consider the role of MSPs in improving and financing FSN, as well as  
40 on their potential, limitations, and associated risks, in order to raise awareness and propose  
41 recommendations, with the view to progress towards the realization of the right to adequate food. The  
42 point is not to take MSP for granted, nor to dismiss them *a priori*, but to indicate in which contexts and  
43 under which conditions they can significantly advance the achievement of FSN for all in a sustainable  
44 way. The scientific literature on this topic is emerging: available references and data are still scarce  
45 and incomplete. Therefore, the HLPE collected for this report raw material on concrete case studies.  
46 In this context, the purpose of this report is not to assess in detail existing MSPs, but rather to suggest  
47 relevant criteria and methodology to enable governments and non-state actors to perform their own  
48 assessments. This report aims also at identifying broad categories of MSPs that could help in  
49 developing a specific set of recommendations.

50 The report is organized as follows. Chapter 1 briefly discusses the context of emergence and  
51 consolidation of MSPs as a new governance tool and provides a definition of stakeholders,  
52 partnerships and MSPs. Chapter 2 digs deeper into the definition of MSPs by providing a typology  
53 and categorising MSPs by functions and activities, roles and responsibilities of partners, and  
54 institutional arrangements. These classifications are illustrated by concrete examples. Chapter 3  
55 analyses the potentials and limitations of MSPs in financing and improving FSN. A general set of

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- 1 evaluation criteria that can be used to assess the performance of existing MSPs in terms of both
- 2 outputs and processes is presented and discussed. Solution-oriented, the last Chapter discusses
- 3 innovative ways of financing and improving FSN where MSP can play an important role.

# 1 CONTEXT AND DEFINITIONS FOR 2 MULTISTAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS

3 Multistakeholder Partnerships (MSPs) have become a quite prominent policy instrument in recent  
4 decades, often presented as a valuable tool to strengthen sustainable development (Bäckstrand,  
5 2006; Biermann *et al.* 2007; Glasberg *et al.*, 2007) as well as Food Security and Nutrition (FSN)  
6 (Hemmati, 2002; Dentoni *et al.*, 2012).

7 The concept of MSP has been used in so many diverse contexts and referring to such a wide variety  
8 of cases that, before discussing its potentials and limitations, it is necessary to more precisely define  
9 MSPs.

10 Therefore, this Chapter starts by defining stakeholders and MSPs. Then it describes the emergence  
11 of the MSP as a new governance tool for FSN related issues. The last section suggests means to  
12 categorize MSPs that will be further explored in Chapter 2.

## 13 1.1 "Multistakeholder partnerships": towards a definition

14 In order to elaborate a definition of MSPs, this section discuss successively its different elements. It  
15 presents and discusses the term "stakeholder", the appropriateness of the standard three-fold  
16 separation of stakeholders in the public, private and civil society spheres and it provides a definition of  
17 MSPs based on this categorization and on the idea of collaboration to address common public goals.

### 18 1.1.1 "Stakeholders" or "actors"?

19 The term "stakeholder" is increasingly used since the 1960s, particularly in the private sector  
20 (McKeon, 2017). Park *et al.* (2008) indicated that the term "stakeholder" has a historical and legal  
21 definition, which refers to a person who is authorized to represent another party who is absent. Now,  
22 this term is more generally used to designate any person or group, which has a "stake", i.e. an  
23 interest, whether financial or not, in an issue, or "any group of individuals who is affected by or can  
24 affect the achievement of an organization's objectives" (Freedman and McVee, 2001).

25 For instance, when considering a partnership set up to build an important infrastructure (road, rail,  
26 bridge...), the relevant "stakeholders" might be the State which planned the infrastructure, the private  
27 company (its owners and employees) charged to build or exploit it, but also the local communities that  
28 have no direct financial "stake" in the project but whose environment and livelihoods might be  
29 impacted, positively or not, by the construction of this infrastructure.

30 Some people, in particular in civil society circles, (Nyéléni, 2007; McKeon, 2017) privilege the use of  
31 the term "actors", considering that the concept of "stakeholder" hide the immense differences in rights,  
32 roles, responsibilities, interests, motivations, power and legitimacy among the partners. Real  
33 inclusiveness and substantive participation of all actors requires much more than just being invited to  
34 sit at the decision-table (Brem-Wilson, 2015). Not every "stakeholder" has an equal "stake" and each  
35 category of stakeholders faces distinct challenges. In the context of FSN, in a human right  
36 perspective, it is imperative, according to McKeon (2017), to insist on the distinction between the  
37 "right-holders", vulnerable groups that are most affected by food insecurity and malnutrition, and the  
38 "duty-bearers"(Mechlem, 2004), mainly the governments that have the obligation to respect, protect  
39 and fulfil the right to adequate food. Potential violations of this right, whether by State or non-State  
40 actors, should also be considered (Damman *et al.*, 2008). Adopting a rights-based approach carries  
41 important implications about the role of State and other stakeholders in development (Gready 2008,  
42 Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi, 2004), a debate linked to the definition of stakes and interests in FSN  
43 that are explored throughout this report.

44 While using the term "stakeholders" in this report, in line with the CFS request, the HLPE recognizes  
45 the importance of this debate and considers representation mechanisms and repartition of power  
46 within a MSPs as a key element to assess such performance criteria as inclusiveness and  
47 accountability (see Chapter 3).

### 48 1.1.2 "Multi"-stakeholder: different "stakes" for different groups.

49 The AAAA (2015) lists a variety of stakeholders, whose "resources, knowledge and ingenuity" will be  
50 instrumental to help national governments to achieve the SDGs, namely: "the private sector, civil

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1 society, the scientific community, academia, philanthropy and foundations, parliaments, local  
2 authorities, volunteers and other stakeholders”.

3 This section discusses possible classifications of stakeholders, building on a community or similarity  
4 of interests, roles and responsibilities, views and perspectives on the issue at “stake”.

5 The scientific literature commonly defines three broad “spheres” or categories of stakeholders  
6 according to their legal status, namely: the public sector, the private sector, and civil society  
7 (Glasbergen *et al.*, 2007; Van Huijstee *et al.*, 2007, 2008). This categorization may seem overly  
8 simplified, considering the wide variety of stakeholders grouped within each category, and the diverse  
9 way stakeholders could be analytically classified, but it does offer a generally accepted starting point  
10 for categorization:

- 11 • the **public sector** covers all forms of public organizations: intergovernmental organizations  
12 (IGOs), at global and regional levels, including UN agencies; states, government agencies in  
13 different sectors (including health, nutrition, agriculture, environment, finance, economics, trade,  
14 justice); local authorities (at the sub-national level); public research and development (R&D)  
15 institutes; and other organizations, companies or institutions with a public legal status;
- 16 • the **private sector** covers: private individuals (including entrepreneurs, land owners,  
17 farmers...); private companies (local, national and transnational) active at different stages of the  
18 food supply chain (including production, storage and distribution, processing and packaging,  
19 retail and markets); cooperatives and other forms of organizations in the “social economy” with  
20 a private legal status; private foundations; other private organizations, institutions or  
21 federations; this category also includes publicly owned companies with a private legal status.
- 22 • the “**civil society**” gathers all the other non-state actors and non-profit, non-governmental  
23 organizations created around shared values and objectives; this category includes:  
24 organizations created by and/or working on behalf of specific vulnerable groups; organizations  
25 representing, for instance, small food producers, consumers, workers, youth, women,  
26 indigenous peoples; humanitarian NGOs working on emergency situations or on long-term  
27 strategies; geographic, thematic, sectoral, or religious organizations.

28 Depending on the specific context, on the issue at stake, on the form and objective of the MSP  
29 considered, it may be necessary to go beyond this broad classification and define more precise sub-  
30 categories, following the principle that the diversity of interests expressed in each category should be  
31 sensibly smaller than the divergences observed between different categories (Kolk, 2012). For  
32 instance, the AAAA (2015) recognizes the huge diversity existing in the private sector, from micro-  
33 enterprises and cooperatives to multinational corporations. To further differentiate each sector into  
34 specific gender-based representation might be very relevant in many contexts, considering gender  
35 dynamics in areas such as natural resource management (Meinzen-Dick *et al.*, 1997) and intra-  
36 household food security (Quisumbing and McClafferty, 2006; Quisumbing *et al.*, 1995).

37 This broad classification in three spheres, defined mainly by their legal status, suffers from several  
38 limitations. Firstly, it does not offer a clear path on how to classify the knowledge sector – meaning  
39 stakeholders involved in research, education, extension, and the academia. These knowledge  
40 institutions can fall in all three spheres, depending on their legal status. And this legal status is not  
41 always automatically linked with their capacity to handle research projects serving a public or a private  
42 interest.

43 Secondly, farmers organizations might consider themselves or be perceived either as private or civil  
44 society organizations. As illustrated in the HLPE report on sustainable agriculture (HLPE, 2016),  
45 large-scale intensive farms might have very different interests and face very different challenges than  
46 small food producers (such as pastoralists). Where to “classify” farmers – and thus, how to better  
47 represent their crucial “voice” and acknowledge their key contribution to FSN - is still an unsolved  
48 debate in CFS, as indicated by the latest evaluation report (CFS, 2017). In CFS, farmers are currently  
49 represented in both CFS mechanisms, namely the Civil Society Mechanism (CSM) and the Private  
50 Sector Mechanism (PSM) but some organizations, like the World Farmer Organization (WFO),  
51 advocate for a specific constituency to represent farmers.

52 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro,  
53 Brazil, in 1992, went beyond the three spheres of stakeholders defined above, and formalized nine  
54 sectors of society, called “Major Groups” as the main channels through which full and effective  
55 participation of all stakeholders is facilitated in political debates around sustainable development  
56 (UNCED, 1992). These “Major Groups” are: Women; Children and Youth; Indigenous Peoples; Non-

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1 Governmental Organizations; Local Authorities; Workers and Trade Unions; Business and Industry;  
2 Scientific and Technological Community; Farmers. <sup>1</sup> This categorization was further confirmed in the  
3 outcome document of the Rio+20 Conference “The Future We Want” (UN, 2012).

4 Since its reform in 2009, the CFS ensures “that the voice of all relevant stakeholders – particularly  
5 those most affected by food insecurity – are heard”. Beyond CFS “member states”, the Committee is  
6 also open to non-State actors, called CFS “participants”, coming from the five following categories: (i)  
7 UN agencies with a specific mandate in the field of FSN; (ii) civil society and non-governmental  
8 organizations; (iii) international agricultural research systems; (iv) international and regional financial  
9 institutions; (v) private sector associations and private philanthropic foundations (CFS, 2009).

### 10 1.1.3 “Partnerships” or “platforms”?

11 The concept of MSPs have been used to designate substantially different initiatives, sharing few  
12 characteristics but the popular MSP label.

13 Different terminologies have been used to indicate collaborative arrangements between different  
14 stakeholders. While much of policy literature refers to these arrangements as “partnerships”, other  
15 studies use the terms: (i) “platforms” (Warner, 2006; Thiele *et al.*, 2011) to designate collaborations  
16 that have ultimately led to an arrangement with a certain formal legal status, (ii) “processes”  
17 (Vermeulen, 2008); or, (iii) “networks” (Julia, 2008) for more informal or *ad hoc* collaboration or  
18 cooperation arrangements. It is important to note that these terms are very loosely defined and have  
19 often been considered as interchangeable.

20 “Partnerships” create a working and likely long-term relationship and build trust between different  
21 stakeholders that become “partners” for the realization of a shared vision. The more long-term  
22 character of “partnerships” have to be distinguished from a one-time transaction arrangement where  
23 the collaboration ends with the realization of the transaction, which generally brings essentially  
24 economic benefits for the different parties. It also differs from examples where MSPs were developed  
25 for specific purposes and duration, such as Working Group assisting the preparation of global  
26 conference (ex., Working Group on Internet Governance, set by the United Nations Secretary General  
27 for assisting the World Summit on the Information Society – WSIS – that took place in 2003 (WGIG,  
28 2005)). Other examples of time-limited partnerships are those between donors, organizations of the  
29 Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), local civil society organizations  
30 and national agricultural research institutions (Horton et al, 2009; Smith and Chataway, 2009).

31 Multistakeholder “partnerships”, as a tool or a governance mechanism set up, sometimes for a limited  
32 period of time, to achieve a specific purpose, should also be clearly distinguished from more  
33 institutionalized bodies such as the “intergovernmental body” of “CFS or “participatory councils” such  
34 as the Brazilian National Council on Food Security and Nutritional Security (CONSEA)<sup>2</sup> in Brazil  
35 (Zanella, 2017) Those “platforms” facilitate the participation of non-State actors to policy design and/or  
36 policy convergence, by providing advices or recommendations to the governments on a wide range of  
37 issues related to FSN. The CFS, for instance, allow “a broad range of committed stakeholders to work  
38 together in a coordinated manner and in support of country-led processes towards the elimination of  
39 hunger and ensuring food security and nutrition for all human beings” (CFS, 2009). By allowing the  
40 participation and substantive contribution from non-state actors to its discussions, the CFS regularly  
41 reaffirms its inclusiveness as an outstanding feature of its new governance model (Duncan, 2015;  
42 McKeon, 2015). However, those institutions remain “intergovernmental” or “governmental” bodies. For  
43 instance, according to its reform document, the reformed CFS “is and remains an intergovernmental  
44 Committee in FAO”, where “voting and decision taking is the exclusive prerogative” of Member States  
45 (CFS, 2009). At the CONSEA case. Non-State actors do have the majority of seats and even choose  
46 the Council’s President, but the body remains an advisory council linked to the Brazilian Presidency.

47 The distinction between “Multistakeholder partnerships” and “(inter)-governmental bodies” with multi-  
48 stakeholder characters points can be bridge if the concept of multistakeholder participation is adopted  
49 (e.g., Bäckstrand, 2006). In other words, if the “P” of MSP stands for participation, understood more  
50 generally as the act of having different stakeholders involved in a decision-making process, both more  
51 loosely formed partnerships and more structured and institutionalized bodies can be assessed on the  
52 basis of its multistakeholder character.

<sup>1</sup> <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/aboutmajorgroups.html>

<sup>2</sup> <http://www4.planalto.gov.br/consea/en>

## 1 1.1.4 Multistakeholder partnerships (MSPs)

2 Minu Hemmati (2002) defines MSPs as “processes of decision-finding (and possibly decision-  
3 making)” that “bring together a certain number of different interest groups to discuss and reach  
4 agreement on a particular issue or set of issues”.

5 Member states used to be the sole decision-makers when the United Nations (UN) was founded in  
6 1945. During the 1990s, decade of the UN global summits, non-state actors were given more space in  
7 the UN systems (Scholte, 2004; Higgot *et al.*, 2000; Weiss and Gordenker, 1996; Otto, 1996;  
8 McKeon, 2017). In 1995, the UN Commission on Global Governance stated that States remain  
9 primary actors but have to work with non-state actors, building “partnerships – networks of institutions  
10 and processes – that enable global actors to pool information, knowledge, and capacities and to  
11 develop joint policies and practices on issues of common concerns” (UN Commission on Global  
12 Governance, 1995)

13 During the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002 in Johannesburg, MSPs were  
14 defined as “specific commitments by various partners intended to contribute to and reinforce the  
15 implementation of the outcomes of intergovernmental negotiations of the WSSD and to help further  
16 implementation of Agenda 21 and the MDGs<sup>3</sup>” (Kara and Quarless, 2002).

17 The UN Secretary General defines partnerships, including MSPs, “as voluntary and collaborative  
18 relationships between various parties, both State and non-State actors, in which all participants agree  
19 to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks,  
20 responsibilities, resources, competencies and benefits” (UN, 2003). The implication is that, to be  
21 successful, partnerships have to share resources (of all kinds, including knowledge, experience, skills,  
22 and funds), responsibility, risks and benefits (Global Knowledge Partnership, 2003).

23 Similarly, Van Huijstee *et al.* (2007), defines “intersectoral partnerships” for sustainable development  
24 as “collaborative arrangements in which actors from two or more spheres of society (state, market and  
25 civil society) are involved in non-hierarchical process, and through which these actors strive for a  
26 sustainability goal”. MSPs are often presented as valuable tools to address both market failures and  
27 State failures (i.e. regulatory, implementation and participation deficits) (Glasbergen *et al.*, 2007; Kolk,  
28 2012).

29 According to Dobermann (2017), public-private partnerships (PPPs) – a sub-set of MSPs – are  
30 cooperative arrangements between two or more public and/or private organizations. Hartwich *et al.*  
31 (2008), define PPPs as “collaborative mechanisms in which public organizations and private entities  
32 share resources, knowledge and risks, in order to achieve more efficiency in the production and  
33 delivery of products and services”, which implies on reciprocal obligations and mutual accountability.  
34 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, in their recommendations for public  
35 governance of PPPs (OECD, 2012), uses a more restrictive definition highlighting the formal character  
36 of such partnerships: “PPPs are long term contractual arrangements between the government and a  
37 private partner whereby the latter delivers and funds public services using a capital asset, sharing the  
38 associated risks”. Vervynckt and Romero (2017), precise that those “long-term contractual  
39 arrangements” allow the private sector to provide infrastructures, assets and services that are  
40 generally provided by governments. The authors raise a number of concerns when this shift was  
41 observed, such as high delivery costs and budget impact and the lack of transparency and public  
42 scrutiny of these partnerships.

43 All these definitions raise questions, further developed in Chapter 3, around legitimacy and  
44 accountability in such partnerships. What is the appropriate level of risk-, and responsibility-sharing  
45 between state and non-state actors? How and under which conditions the delivery of a public  
46 infrastructure, good or service can be delegated to the private sector? What are the corresponding  
47 accountability mechanisms?

48 Building on those definitions, and bringing together the elements discussed in previous sections, it  
49 becomes possible to suggest a definition of “multistakeholder partnerships” (MSPs) for the purpose of  
50 this report.

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<sup>3</sup> MDGs: Millennium Development Goals.

## Definition 1 Multistakeholder partnerships

In this report, *multistakeholder partnerships* (MSPs) are defined as any “collaborative arrangement between stakeholders from two or more different spheres of society (public sector, private sector, and/or civil society) in order to pool resources together, resolve a common issue, elaborate a shared vision, realize a common objective or ensure the protection, production or delivery of an outcome of collective, and/or, public interest”.

1 In this definition, a “collective” interest shall be understood, in a narrow sense, as a “common” interest  
2 shared only by the stakeholders involved in the MSP and by the institutions, organizations, and actors  
3 that they represent in the MSP. A group of individuals, mutually collaborating for their own common  
4 welfare pursue a collective interest (Baumol, 2004).

5 By contrast, “public” interest is the “general” interest of the whole society, in all its spheres, that has to  
6 be defined at different scales (from local, national, regional to global). Public interest has been defined  
7 in various ways, according to different disciplines. In economic sciences, for example, public interest  
8 generally denotes the general welfare of the whole society, in contrast to private interests reflecting the  
9 welfare of individuals (Bozeman, 2007; Levine and Forrence, 1990; Stiglitz, 1998). Political science, law  
10 and public policy studies are more concerned on how organized society – either through governments  
11 or through other organized associations – debates, assess and seek their public interest (Cochran,  
12 1974). While inclusive intergovernmental or governmental institutions, such as the CFS and the  
13 CONSEA, might have some legitimacy to define what is of “public” interest in the field of FSN, this might  
14 not be the case for other MSPs, depending on their composition (number and types of partners), legal  
15 status, purpose and domain of activity.

### 16 1.1.5 MSPs to improve and finance FSN

17 The right to adequate food was referred to in 1948 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
18 (UDHR) and later again in 1966 in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural  
19 Rights (ICESCR). The human right to adequate food is defined as the right of every individual “*alone*  
20 *or in community with others, to have physical and economic access at all times to sufficient, adequate*  
21 *and culturally acceptable food, that is produced and consumed sustainably, preserving access to food*  
22 *for future generations*” (UNGA, 2014).

23 The World Food Summit (1996) considered that “food security exists when all people, at all times,  
24 have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary  
25 needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”. The World Summit on Food Security  
26 (WSFS, 2009) stated that “the nutritional dimension is integral to the concept of food security”, and  
27 identified four main dimensions of FSN, already described in previous HLPE reports (2016, 2017a):

- 28 • Food availability: the availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied  
29 through domestic production or imports.
- 30 • Food access: access by individuals to adequate resources (entitlements) for acquiring  
31 appropriate foods for a nutritious diet. This dimension includes physical access to food  
32 (proximity) and economical access (affordability) (HLPE, 2017b).
- 33 • Utilization: utilization of food through adequate diet, clean water, sanitation and health care to  
34 reach a state of nutritional well-being where all physiological needs are met.
- 35 • Stability: to be food secure, a population, household or individual must have access to  
36 adequate food at all times.

37 As illustrated in the latest HLPE report (2017b), transformative actions are needed throughout the  
38 whole agriculture and food systems to enhance those four dimensions of FSN.

39 Therefore this report considers all the MSPs acting around food systems and contributing directly or  
40 indirectly to FSN. This broad scope includes MSPs focusing on agricultural development and also,  
41 among others:

- 42 • those engaged in poverty reduction and struggling for a better access of small food  
43 producers to inputs, services and markets;
- 44 • those engaged in humanitarian emergencies, to improve stability in contexts of conflicts,  
45 protracted crises and natural disasters;
- 46 • those acting to improve food availability, through enhanced resource efficiency, or reduced  
47 food losses and waste at different stages of the food supply chain;

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- 1 • those acting on food environment to improve food access;
- 2 • those acting on consumer behaviour to improve food utilization, through, for instance,
- 3 nutrition education, information and knowledge sharing;
- 4 • those promoting sustainable, safe and diversified food production and consumption;
- 5 • those striving for the preservation and sustainable management of natural resources (e.g.
- 6 biodiversity, soil, water) and natural ecosystems (e.g. forests, rangelands, wetlands,...) that
- 7 form the ecological basis, essential for food availability in the future;
- 8 • those focusing on finance for development: smallholders access to finance and credit,
- 9 foreign investments, official development assistance, south-south and triangular cooperation,
- 10 innovative finance mechanisms.

11 In that context, the different stakeholders (see section 1.1.2) could also be categorized with a food  
12 system perspective. Based on the different elements of food systems identified in the latest HLPE  
13 report (2017), such categorization could consider: consumers; stakeholders acting in food  
14 environments; stakeholders directly involved in different stages of the food supply chain (production,  
15 storage and distribution, processing and packaging, retail and markets); and stakeholders indirectly  
16 shaping the food systems, their drivers and their outcomes.

### Box 1 Public vs. private goods: general definitions.

Samuelson (1954) identified four main types of goods and services, based on two properties<sup>4</sup>:

- “public” goods: non-excludable and non-rivalrous;
- “common-pool” resources: non-excludable and rivalrous;
- “club” goods: excludable and non-rivalrous;
- “private” goods: excludable and rivalrous.

An extensive literature (Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990, 2014 and 2015) describes the “tragedy of the commons”, i.e. the difficulty to set up appropriate governance tools in order to manage sustainably shared, “non-excludable” resources (whether public goods or common-pool resources). The HLPE report on forestry (2017a) applied this discussion to the context of forests and trees governance and highlighted the importance of stakeholder involvement for sustainable forest management. More broadly, MSPs might be a suitable governance tool for the sustainable management of such shared, “non-excludable” resources.

17

18 In the context of FSN, the discussion on “public” vs. “private” goods (see **Box 1**), raises the following  
19 question: can FSN or some of its determinants be considered as public goods or common-pool  
20 resources? Food availability depends among others on natural resources and ecosystem health; food  
21 access on food prices, infrastructures and food environment; utilization on information and education,  
22 on consumers’ skills and preferences; and stability, on the political and economic macro-environment.

23 If food in itself share the characteristics of private goods (excludable and rivalrous), some authors  
24 (Dorward, 2003) refer to stable food prices as a public good. Fish stocks could be considered either  
25 as common-pool resources or private goods, depending on the rules and instruments (such as  
26 capture quotas or marine protected areas) in place to protect and sustainably manage those stocks  
27 (HLPE, 2014). Transport infrastructures, indispensable to ensure access to food, particularly in  
28 remote rural areas can be considered whether as a public good or a club-good. Biodiversity, essential  
29 for food production and FSN, now and in the future, is a clear example of public good (HLPE, 2017).  
30 While bottled water is a private good, quality and availability of water resources can have the  
31 characteristics of a public good or of a common-pool resource (HLPE, 2015). At first sight, health,  
32 including human, animal and ecosystem health, can also be considered as a critical public good for  
33 FSN, that deserve a holistic approach popularized with the concept of *One Health* (FAO *et al.*, 2008;  
34 HLPE, 2016). When conflicts and protracted crises leave millions of people hungry (FAO, 2017; FAO  
35 *et al.*, 2017; HLPE, 2017). Nutrition education and public awareness is a common asset that can  
36 shape consumer behavior and improve food utilization and diets (HLPE, 2017) Peace, which can be  
37 considered as a “public good”, is a critical condition for FSN. Appropriate global governance  
38 mechanism to address global food security has also being pointed as a public good, considering that  
39 appropriate global governance is in principle mutually beneficial and non-excludent (Page, 2013).  
40 Finally, FSN in itself, as a prerequisite for the realization of the right to adequate food for every citizen

<sup>4</sup> “*Non-rivalry*”: each individual’s consumption of the good or service leads to no subtraction of any other individual’s consumption. “*Non-excludability*”: no individual can be excluded from consuming the good or service.



1 now and in the future, as a fundamental part of human dignity and of socio-cultural identity, should  
2 certainly be considered as a global public good (Vivero-Pol, 2014; Vivero-Pol, 2017).

3 These examples might help to define domains of action where MSPs are more likely to bring value-  
4 added, in order to improve and finance FSN, with regards to other processes.

## 5 **1.2 Multi-stakeholder Partnerships: emergence and consolidation** 6 **of a new approach to governance**

7 In order to understand how MSPs have become so prominent in FSN debates, this section reviews  
8 the emergence of MSPs pointing to how MSPs feature in important global policy processes related to  
9 FSN and discusses some of the limitations attached to MSPs.

### 10 **1.2.1 Reviewing MSPs prominence in FSN and sustainable development** 11 **discussions**

12 MSPs play an increasing role in sustainable development and FSN related debates. These  
13 instruments were promoted in particular at the 2012 Rio+20 Summit. The final declaration (UN, 2012)  
14 acknowledges the critical contribution of existing and new MSPs, including PPPs, at different scales  
15 (from local to global, south-south, north-south) to the achievement of sustainable development. More  
16 precisely, the declaration highlights the importance of partnerships that facilitate the full and effective  
17 engagement of all stakeholders, in order to: address complex issues and multidimensional problems;  
18 share knowledge and experiences; improve access to relevant education and build capacities at all  
19 levels. This declaration also states that: “new partnerships and innovative sources of financing can  
20 play a role in complementing sources of financing for sustainable development”.

21 As mentioned in the introduction, the use of MSPs is promoted, in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable  
22 Development (UN, 2015), particularly in SDG targets 17.16 and 17.17, as a way to facilitate the  
23 achievement of all the SDGs. Moreover, the 2030 Agenda (UN, 2015) acted the principle of “open,  
24 inclusive, participatory and transparent” follow-up and review processes of SDGs at all levels, thus  
25 opening the door to multistakeholder platforms and partnerships to get engaged in review and follow-  
26 up of the SDGs and the 2030 Agenda (Halle and Wolfe, 2015).

27 The emergence of MSPs can be linked to the evolving roles of public and private actors occurring at  
28 least from the past two to three decades. Reid *et al.* (2014), for example, reviewed significant  
29 changes on how private sector and governments have been defining roles, aligning interests and  
30 engaging in joint activities. In their view, in the past, governments were expected to design and  
31 monitor regulations and the private sector was expected to invest, comply with laws and pay taxes.  
32 Nowadays, the need appears of a more “systematic collaboration” when different interests can be  
33 aligned, for instance to build an infrastructure of public interest. Civil society organizations can also be  
34 involved in such initiatives, giving a voice to those stakeholders most affected by the project, allowing  
35 them to share their expertise and experience (Bezanson and Isenman, 2012; Bulloch *et al.*, 2011).

36 In the field of rural development, participatory research methods and stakeholder involvement have  
37 gained importance by the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century under the concept of “Participatory Rural Appraisal  
38 (PRA)” developed in **Box 2**. MSPs have been experimented with since the 1970s in PRA-based  
39 approaches, as a way to bring national and international government policies into coherence with  
40 “local realities” (Chambers, 1983).

#### **Box 2 Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)**

Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) designates a set of participatory research approaches, tools and methodologies to share and generate knowledge about rural livelihood conditions “from, with and by” local rural people, in order to pave the way for strategic planning and actions. Those methods, that emerged in the 1990’s, are grounded on different participatory approaches such as:

- “indigenous technical knowledge” and “activist participatory research”, strongly influenced by Freire’s (1968) assumption that “poor and exploited people can and should be enabled to conduct their own analysis of their own reality”;
- “agroecosystem analysis”, developed in the 1980’s and closely linked to the science of agroecology that will be explored in more depth in a forthcoming HLPE report on agroecology and other innovative approaches (2019);

- “applied anthropology”, that contributed to better appreciate the “richness and validity of rural people’s knowledge”;
- “field research on farming systems”, and farmer’s participation in agricultural research, that highlighted the complexity and rationality of a wide diversity of farming practices; “rapid rural appraisal” (RRA).

While RRA methods still relied heavily on *outsiders’* knowledge and expertise, PRA methods acknowledge and give a central importance, not only to the deep traditional or experiential knowledge that farmers and villagers have of their environment, but also to their creative and analytical abilities to discover context-specific and culturally adapted solutions for their future.

In the mid-1990’s, PRA methods were applied in different countries, in four major areas: natural resources management; agriculture; poverty and social programs; health and food security.

Sources: Adapted from *Chambers, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c*

1

## 2 1.2.2 MSPs: what value-added?

3 The purpose of this report is to assess under which specific context and conditions, MSPs can bring  
4 value added, when compared to other processes, despite their higher transaction costs. Two main  
5 arguments are generally used to advocate the strategic importance of MSPs.

6 First, as highlighted in the definition above, the primary value added of MSPs is to pool together and  
7 better allocate complementary resources, competencies and know-how from different stakeholders, in  
8 order to preserve and manage collectively a shared resource, or to solve complex and  
9 multidimensional issues that no stakeholder is able to tackle efficiently alone. MSPs are also seen as  
10 a tool able to raise and pool together additional resources – technical expertise, legal knowledge,  
11 financial resources – that would not have been mobilized at first place (Dentoni *et al.*, 2012).

12 Second, the process developed within a MSP to reach its objectives can be, in itself, an important  
13 value-added (see Chapter 3 for further discussion). MSPs reflects the openness of different  
14 stakeholders to discussion, collaboration, and other elements that form the basis of deliberation  
15 (Risse, 2000). This process can build bridges, synergies between different partners that enable  
16 collective action and allow all the partners to progress altogether in the same direction, contributing to  
17 the same objective. It creates the conditions for building trust among categories of stakeholders that  
18 not necessarily have had the chance or willingness to exchange with each other.

19 This process defines the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders. It can also give a voice to  
20 marginalized and vulnerable groups, generally excluded from the decision-making process. This  
21 argument justified, for instance, the use of PRA approaches to empower those stakeholders whose  
22 voice was not otherwise heard. As a consequence, MSPs are likely to lead to decisions considered as  
23 more acceptable and more legitimate by the different stakeholders.

24 However, despite the increasing prominence of PPPs and MSPs in past decades, studies have also  
25 indicated that empirical evidence on their efficiency and effectiveness is still notably scarce  
26 (Bäckstrand, 2006; Biermann *et al.* 2007; Glasberg *et al.*, 2007; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the  
27 Netherlands, 2013). MSPs might not be the appropriate tool in any situation. Reviews of MSPs have  
28 shown limitations and cases where they were counterproductive.

29 In particular, critics question:

- 30 • the real capacity of MSPs to balance power asymmetries between participants in the decision-  
31 making process;
- 32 • the risk of conflicts between public and private interests, and the withdrawal of responsibilities  
33 previously assumed by states or public authorities;
- 34 • the higher transaction costs and supposed lower effectiveness associated with MSPs.

35 In terms of power asymmetries, some experiences have shown the potential for partnerships to  
36 strengthen the position of more powerful actors at the expense of weaker members, as well as to  
37 exclude some populations. These MSPs, therefore, would reproduce already existing power  
38 inequalities, with dominant partners biasing the partnerships to their own course (Faysse, 2006;  
39 Fuchs *et al.*, 2011; Jeroen 2006).

40 Potential for conflicts between public and private interests have also been raised as a concern in the  
41 context of MSPs, especially in partnerships between public and private stakeholders. The argument is

1 that “unchecked and unbalanced” partnerships between those two groups carry the risk of public  
2 actors aligning the public interests with those of the private interests represented in the partnerships  
3 (Global Social Observatory, 2015). This issue has been recognized, for example, on public research  
4 being directed to private and commercial interests mostly, due to the influence of partnerships in  
5 setting funding lines and project approvals. As mentioned before, MSPs are emerging in a context  
6 where private and public interests are increasingly blurred. When these interests are not transparently  
7 communicated and addressed, there are risks that MSPs favour the delegation to private  
8 stakeholders of tasks that generally rest within public institutions (Brot für die Welt *et al.*, 2017).

9 While there has been a proliferation of MSPs created to address numerous sustainable development  
10 issues, some studies that systematically assessed their performance showed that few MSPs manage  
11 to generate outputs matching their own self-report objectives (Biermann *et al.*, 2012; Pattberg *et al.*,  
12 2012). Pattberg and Wideberg, (2016), for instance, analyzed a sample of 340 MSPs related to the  
13 implementation of the World Summit of Sustainable Development (WSSD) and found that 38%  
14 showed low to no measurable output, and about 38% percent of partnership with measurable output  
15 engage in activities with no direct relation to their publicly stated goals, leaving only 24% of MSPs in  
16 which all of the outputs were matching with self-reported functions. In other words, they found that  
17 most MSPs established in the context of the WSSD are not (at least as yet) actually delivering on their  
18 promises, which makes their claims to legitimacy hard to credit. This may because MSPs are  
19 relatively new in most of the contexts in which they are found. Also empirical research is still scanty,  
20 leaving many aspects of MSP operations and achievements undocumented. This has left a gap  
21 between the sometimes strong case made for MSPs and their apparent difficulty in matching the  
22 vision to reality.

23 Finally, different spheres of stakeholders might have different views/perceptions on the  
24 abovementioned value-added of, and risks associated with MSPs. States, facing financial constraints,  
25 might consider them as a useful tool to mobilize additional funding, including private funding, to meet  
26 their own objectives. The private sector might consider them as a place where they can influence  
27 public decision-making. Civil society organizations, might acknowledge the role of inclusive  
28 partnerships in empowering marginalized and vulnerable groups, while raising concerns about the  
29 power given, in some MSPs, to the private sector in the decision-making process.

30 When a MSP deliver an outcome of public interest, for instance when they strive for the realization of  
31 fundamental human rights such as the right to adequate food or the right to water and sanitation, its  
32 outcomes and the legitimacy of its decision-making process might be scrutinized more carefully by the  
33 general public, and by the public authority.

### 34 **1.3 Towards a categorization of MSPs**


35 Before moving into discussing qualities and principles for effective MSPs, it is necessary to be slightly  
36 more precise in defining the wide diversity of MSPs and how they can be categorized.

37 MSPs is still an emerging topic for science. Considering the lack of available and comprehensive data  
38 on MSPs, particularly regarding their finance and budget, it might be difficult to elaborate, for the  
39 purpose of this report, a comprehensive typology, that is an exhaustive and exclusive classification of  
40 MSPs. However, a set of criteria can be suggested, that would help the different stakeholders to map  
41 existing MSPs, gathering in the same cluster MSPs that share the same characteristic or face a  
42 similar constraint or challenge.

43 **Figure 1** raises some of the main questions to be answered when describing and trying to map  
44 existing MSPs.

45

1 **Figure 1 7 step-approach for MSP analysis**



2  
3

4 Building on this figure, and using the set of criteria described below, the HLPE has developed a  
5 questionnaire (see the **Appendix**) that can be used by any stakeholder to describe and assess  
6 existing MSPs.

7 **Thematic domain of action (see question number 2 in the questionnaire):**

8 The CFS request points to the 2030 Agenda (UN, 2015) as the overall framework for this report.  
9 Previous HLPE reports showed that FSN, in its four dimensions, is a cross-cutting condition for the  
10 achievement of all the SDGs<sup>5</sup>. Therefore, MSPs focusing their action on the following thematic  
11 domains (non-exhaustive list), also fall into the scope of this report:

- 12 • FSN, agricultural development (SDG2) and food supply chains; sustainable production patterns  
13 (SDG12);
- 14 • Peace and social justice (SDG16); conflicts, protracted crises, and humanitarian emergencies;
- 15 • Poverty reduction, social protection (SDG1) and social inequalities (SDG10);
- 16 • Economic growth (SDG8), income and employment generation;
- 17 • Health, in particular food-borne non-communicable diseases (NCDs) (SDG3);
- 18 • Education (SDG4), innovation (SDGs 8, 9), knowledge management and knowledge sharing;
- 19 • Gender issues (SDG5) and vulnerable groups;
- 20 • Climate change adaptation and mitigation (SDG13);
- 21 • Natural resources management (including: land, forests and other terrestrial ecosystems, water  
22 and aquatic ecosystems, biodiversity, energy) (SDGs 6, 7, 14, 15);
- 23 • Food environments, including: infrastructures (SDG9); cities (SDG11);
- 24 • Consumer behaviour, including: sustainable consumption patterns (SDG12).

25  
26  
27  
28

<sup>5</sup> See HLPE contribution to CFS for SDG2 review by the HLPF:  
[http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/hlpe/hlpe\\_documents/CFS-Work/HLPE\\_contribution\\_to\\_CFS\\_for\\_SDG-2\\_2017.pdf](http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/hlpe/hlpe_documents/CFS-Work/HLPE_contribution_to_CFS_for_SDG-2_2017.pdf)

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## 1 **Scale and geographical scope (question 5):**

2 Because the concept of MSP is differently understood and implemented across countries and regions,  
3 those MSPs might be classified according to their scale (from local, national, regional to global) and  
4 their geographical scope (specifying, where appropriate, the country or region covered).

## 5 **Structure and organization (questions 6 to 12):**

6 The performance and impact of a MSP are likely to be linked to its structure and organization, and,  
7 more precisely:

- 8 • to its **composition**: what are the partners (number and diversity) involved from each sphere  
9 (public sector, private sector, civil society)? which partner(s) initiated the MSP?
- 10 • to its **legal status**: what is the degree of formalization, and of professionalization of the MSP?  
11 is the MSP an informal arrangement or a formalized agreement between partners? if formal,  
12 has the MSP a full legal personality and, in particular, the legal capacity to own and manage  
13 funds or assets?
- 14 • to its **governance structure**: what are the roles and responsibilities of the different partners?  
15 which is (are) the leading partner(s)? what is the repartition of power among partners? are  
16 there power asymmetries within the MSP?
- 17 • to its **representativeness**: how and by whom are the members chosen? do they speak only  
18 for themselves or represent a broader category of stakeholders? how long is their mandate?  
19 how does the MSP ensure inclusiveness and “fair” representation of the most affected  
20 people?
- 21 • to its **financing**: how the MSP is funded? what is the repartition of funding between the  
22 different partners? what are the financial tools and mechanisms used by the MSP?

23 As discussed in Chapter 3, the structure and organization of a MSP is likely to impact also the  
24 legitimacy of decisions taken.

## 25 **Function and outcome (questions 13, 14)**

26 Partnerships fulfil specific functions, “from advocacy and awareness-raising, knowledge exchange,  
27 research and development, standard-setting and implementation, to service provision, and the  
28 creation of markets” (Schäferhoff *et al.* 2009).


29 **Figure 2** illustrates the different functions MSPs can fulfil along the different steps of the decision-  
30 making process. It distinguishes two broad categories of MSPs: (i) “**policy-oriented**” MSPs, mainly  
31 involved in the elaboration of policies or programmes; and, (ii) “**action-oriented**” MSPs, mainly  
32 involved in the implementation of such policies, programmes and/or projects.

33

34

Figure 2 MSP categories according to their main function

*Inclusive, evidence-based, iterative, political decision-making process*



“Policy-oriented” MSPs – such as the Scaling Up Nutrition Movement (SUN)<sup>6</sup> – might help to build trust, elaborate a shared vision among stakeholders, or design a common strategic framework to orient and organise the actions of different stakeholders at different scales. They might provide advice or policy recommendations to governments at different scales – such as the CFS itself designing policy recommendations to Member States and non-State actors on FSN at the global level. They might be delegated the authority to elaborate prescriptive rules or voluntary standards in a specific domain – such as MSPs involved in designing and implementing sustainability standards. In “policy-oriented” MSP, the decision-making process in itself might be one of the main outcomes.

“Action-oriented” MSPs mainly deliver an outcome of collective or public interest. They protect or manage a common resource (including natural resources) – ex., Locally-Managed Marine Area (LMMA) Network –, or they deliver a “public” good or service – such as Distribuidora CONASUPO, SA or Rural Food Stores (DICONSA) in Mexico. They allow synergies between stakeholders working in the same direction: they might trigger innovative mechanisms to finance a common project, such as

<sup>6</sup> See Chapter 2 for a more refined classification and more information on the MSPs mentioned here as examples.

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1 Initiative for Smallholder Finance (ISF). They can provide a space for conflicts resolution when  
2 divergences appear between stakeholders during the realization of the project.

3 In both categories, monitoring and evaluation, is an important step to improve both the outcomes of the  
4 MSP and its decision-making process, building on lessons learnt. Of course, those two categories are  
5 linked because policies must be translated in concrete actions and because no action can be planned  
6 without common agreed rules or framework. Some MSPs may belong to those two categories.  
7 Nevertheless, these categories may be helpful in assessing the impact, efficiency and effectiveness of  
8 MSPs and suggesting concrete recommendations.

### 9 **1.4 Concluding remarks**

10 The different view and controversies once again reaffirm the need to revisit MSPs critically. In  
11 practical terms, that means not automatically embracing or dismissing them, but rather analysing the  
12 situations and determining which operational principles are most promising if MSPs are to improve  
13 FSN, including through better allocating or generating finance for FSN initiatives.

14 Additionally, considering that MSPs can be a process, learning from mistakes and trust-building along  
15 the way are as important as the right design at the outset. There are potential benefits and evident  
16 costs associated with MSPs that determine their existence in the first place, and their sustainability in  
17 the long run. The creation and maintenance of MSPs carries costs, from forming the rules of  
18 engagement, to ensuring representation and participation of disfavoured groups, among many others.

19 Building on the criteria developed above, the following Chapter will suggest a mapping of existing  
20 MSPs, in order to identify if and how similar characteristics can lead to similar constraints and  
21 challenges.

22

## 2 CLUSTERING MULTISTAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS

Chapter 1 concluded by presenting the different functions of MSPs (**Figure 2**), namely policy-oriented, action-oriented, and learning-oriented MSPs. This Chapter identifies existing MSPs broadly related to FSN (including health) and finance for FSN.

Starting from the MSPs characteristics identified in Chapter 1, the first section defines a possible categorization of MSPs in broad clusters. The following sections describe these clusters, giving concrete examples of MSPs for each category.

### 2.1 Towards Clusters for FSN

#### 2.1.1 Characteristics of MSPs

MSPs are complex and not easy to classify. The following four criteria are used to conduct a preliminary clustering of MSPs.

##### Scale and geography

MSPs can be distinguished by the scale on which they operate and their geographic reach or coverage. These are global MSPs, such as those led by the United Nations (UN) and affiliate organizations; regional MSPs that is, covering a set of countries in a region/continent (say, Latin America and the Caribbean) or a subset of countries in the UN region (such as MERCOSUR in south America or SADC in southern Africa). Many MSPs are national, and some are sub-national, operating in a state or province of a country.

##### Types and diversity of Partners/Leading Stakeholder

MSPs differ not only in the composition of partners but also on the lead partner or the partner initiating the MSP. There are public sector or government led MSPs, private sector led MSPs or Civil society led MSPs. For this report, in addition to public, private and CSO, two other stakeholders are distinguished in Chapter 1, namely the knowledge sector and the banking sector.

##### Main purpose and domain of activity

MSPs can be classified according to their main function (policy vs. action), to their thematic domain of action (see chapter 1), or with a food system perspective (do they involve stakeholders acting in food supply chains, from production to retail; in food environments; and/or consumers).

##### Degree of formalisation

A fourth important characteristic is the nature of the partnership in terms of whether it is a formal arrangement, independent legal entity or an informal agreement between stakeholders.

A key distinction is between partnerships in terms of where the power is concentrated. There may be a MSP but with one strong partner. Now, the key distinction is whether the lead partner is a government or private corporate or a trade union. A quick read of the case studies done for this chapter suggested that the scale of operation, namely global or national or regional or local, is an important feature of MSPs. The first clustering attempted was based on these two criteria, leadership among stakeholders and scale of operation (**Table 1**).



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1 **Table 1 Classification of MSP by scale (columns) and by major stakeholder (rows)**

Scale/Lead Stakeholder	Global/international	National or subnational	Other
<b>Government</b>	UN or related agencies, including regional organisations such as ESCAP. Examples is CFS, PARM, SEED, 10YFP, Food Security Cluster	National or subnational governments including grouping of nations without UN. Example is DICONSA, CONSEA, MERCOSUR REAF, Coral Triangle Initiative, CONSAN-CPLP, AROFIIN, Organopónicos	Public sector enterprises or special/autonomous bodies such as Supreme court in India (not fully under government) or local government
<b>Private</b>	Corporate or MNC, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM initiated MSP such as GROWAFRICA and GROWASIA	Domestic companies. Example Forest Stewardship Council, Food for All – West Africa Bank, Ethical Trade Initiative, AROFIIN	Federations or farmers' association Farmers' or peasant unions and cooperatives
<b>Private foundations</b>	International NGO such as Gates foundation or Action aid. Example is GAIN, SUN, ISF	Domestic NGO or charitable trust. Similarly, can distinguish funders such as Company foundations and those engaged in action. TATA TRUSTS is the charitable arm of the Tata company and has initiated MSP for food fortification	NGO think tanks/charitable NGOs
<b>Research</b>	Group of universities, research institutions across nations. Example is FANRPAN	National level universities, research institutes (public and private), Fishforever was started by an academic institution in the US partnering with NGOs. Another example is SAFL.	Private think tanks
<b>Civil society Community/g rassroots</b>	Multi-country alliance, e.g. of indigenous peoples	National alliances and trade unions, such as Ethical Trading Initiative, LMMA network	Clusters or federations (not as formal as Trade unions) and supported sometimes by an NGO. Kudumbashree is a federation of women's groups.

2

3 This Table should be read as follows. The first column refers to MSPs that operate globally. As we go  
4 down the column, we start with MSPs initiated or led by UN or other Intergovernmental organisations,  
5 then by the private sector, civil society, research and non-governmental organisations. Similarly,  
6 column 2 refers to national organisations. In each box, examples of MSPs and their lead partner are  
7 mentioned.

8 At the global level, the following types of MSPs can be identified.

9 UN-led or multi-country/intergovernmental body-initiated and led such as the Committee on Food  
10 Security of the FAO (CFS) and Scaling up Nutrition or SUN. While there are many stakeholders, there  
11 is clearly a lead role for global intergovernmental organisations.

12 Corporate-led MSPs such as the Marine Stewardship Council where Unilever was a lead initiating  
13 partner or other standard-setting MSPs. Another example is the World Economic Forum initiated MSP  
14 such as GROWAFRICA.

- 15 • Large donor NGO/private Foundation-led, such as the Global Alliance for Nutrition (GAIN) which  
16 was begun with support from the Gates Foundation.  
17 • Civil society led such as International Land Coalition or the Ethical Trading Initiative.

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- 1 • At the national or regional level, the following types are identified.
- 2 • Government-led MSPs with some years of experience include CONSEA in Brazil, DICONSA
- 3 (Rural Food Stores) in Mexico.
- 4 • Corporate-led. There are several large companies that have initiated work in FSN through their
- 5 foundations (charitable arms) such as Tata Trusts in India. The Forest Stewardship Council was
- 6 initiated by Canadian companies along with the World Wildlife Fund.
- 7 • NGO or charitable trust-led (that is, one not closely tied to private companies). One example is
- 8 BAIF (Bharat AGro Industries Foundation), a charitable society started by a social worker cum
- 9 academic, now partnering with governments, private sector, international donors, and others, to
- 10 promote dairy-based rural livelihoods in several States of India.
- 11 • Academic/research-led. The case of partnerships led by the CGIAR institutes or the Global
- 12 Research Alliance on Greenhouse Gases (though not directly in FSN).
- 13 • Civil society led (usually lacking in adequate funds). These are often in the form of platforms that
- 14 build a policy agenda.

15 The assumption in this classification is that the type of partnership (e.g. government-led) is associated  
16 with certain type of strengths and weaknesses.

17 The next step was to bring in the domain of activity and broadly distinguish MSPs in terms of those  
18 related to policy and those related to action, including fund raising. This led to another clustering as  
19 shown in **Table 2**.

20 **Table 2 Towards clustering: combining characteristics from table 1 above**

21 It starts from the idea that an MSP is government plus something (what is the value added over and  
22 above government)

Based on scale and combination of partners	POLICY	ACTION: FSN	ACTION: FINANCE	COMMENT
Government+ Private or PPP Usually National		AROFIIN (food safety); Food fortification; Food and other services delivery through private channels	Private sector contributions to government funds/programmes either voluntarily or through taxes. Innovation: Corporate social responsibility act in India	There is research on the pros and cons of PPP
Government+CSO National or local	Including CSO in advisory bodies such as CONSEA	DICONSA (food distribution), KUDUMBASHREE (food production, processing, etc.) ORGANOPONICOS (Cuba) for organic farming	CSO can contribute through time and other inputs, not usually through finance	Growing literature on people's participation in government policy making and action. Many pros with potential for a good recommendation. Cons is that NGOs take over without accountability to people or civil society
Government+knowl edge sector. National Global/international	Research institutes give policy advice CGIAR has multi-country projects	Some experimental delivery/action, for example, new seed use through participatory trials or new technology, eg FANRPAN, or USAID-NARS partnership in Pakistan	Yes, funds from donor govts or international such at CGIAR	It can include national govt plus donor govt This quite common. That is donor govt gives money to a national govt but implementation through a university or national knowledge partner (s)

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Govt+Pvt+CSO at Global level	SUN (nutrition policy)	SUN, Food Security Cluster	Yes, private finance enters	UN initiated mostly
Financial institution led Global (World Bank, ADB etc)		Initiative for Smallholder Finance or Global Fund	Yes,	Multilateral institution but controlled by donor countries
Corporate+knowledge+NGO+govt		GROWAFRICA initiated by World Economic Forum	Yes, private corporate funds	
Corporate+NGO/CSO but not government	Forest Stewardship council, Marine stewardship council, Ethical Trade initiative		Yes, but not for action only policy/standards	Criticisms
Large private foundation (cannot be termed philanthropic capitalism) plus some knowledge+Govt i) Global ii) National	GAIN	GAIN, GAVI, AGRA	Yes, donor driven	Can set the agenda and national govts implement donor driven agenda because of funding
CSO plus private or CSO plus donor	Ethical Trade Initiative	LMMA (marine conservation)	Not sure what is the additional finance component	

### 1 **2.1.2 MSP Clusters for FSN**

2 By preparing a matrix of stakeholders, geography, purpose or domain and nature of partnership,  
3 some possible clusters of MSPs were identified. There are some commonalities across MSPs in a  
4 given cluster. The clusters were further reorganised through discussion and the literature. Hence,  
5 some clusters don't follow directly from the matrix. The report propose the following four clusters;

6 Knowledge clusters comprising MSPs that primarily generate and share knowledge on food security  
7 and nutrition. This knowledge is presumed to inform future policies.

8 Policy-oriented cluster comprising MSPs dealing with policy design, convergence and advocacy for  
9 FSN. Specifically, this broad cluster consists of two sub-clusters, namely: MSPs dealing with policy  
10 advocacy, design, convergence and recommendation, and MSPs engaged in standard-setting.

11 Action-oriented cluster entails MSPs engaged directly in improving food security. This group includes  
12 those MSPs involved in preserving and managing natural resources, active production and  
13 distribution of food, those involved in livestock and agronomy improvement, those in agribusiness  
14 development, and the public private partnership for improving FSN.

15 The Resource mobilization cluster of MSPs engaged in resource mobilization and creating awareness  
16 about financing for food security and related issues such as water, health and sanitation. These can  
17 involve a partner from the banking sector.

18 The subsequent sections focus on each of these clusters, and describe the main characteristics of the  
19 MSPs in a cluster, drawing on concrete examples.

### 20 **2.2 Knowledge generation and sharing cluster**

21 These are MSPs that generate and share knowledge, information and experience to improve  
22 FSN. They operate regionally (multi-country) and nationally with public sector and knowledge sector  
23 stakeholders, who conduct research with farmers. Some include experimental delivery/action such as  
24 use of new or improved seeds through participatory trials or new technology.

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1 Typically, this cluster refers to partnerships between governments (be it multilateral or  
2 intergovernmental bodies, donor governments or national governments or regional groupings of  
3 governments) and the knowledge sector (usually comprising universities and research  
4 institutes, which are mostly but not necessarily public funded and NGOs engaged in research). To  
5 disseminate the findings and evaluate the impact, other partners may be involved such as farmers'  
6 organizations (or associations).

7 Partnerships with the knowledge sector are mostly for policy and knowledge generation though  
8 sometimes action on a pilot or experimental basis may be initiated. The area of policy can range from  
9 production (such as in the soil health improvement case) to policies for consumption (such as  
10 provision of food subsidy through cash versus kind subsidy).

11 Examples of MSPs in this cluster are FANRPAN, Soil Fertility and Soil Health in Pakistan (SFP) and  
12 Southern Africa Food Lab (SAFL).

13 FANRPAN or the Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Analysis Network, currently operating in  
14 17 countries of sub-Saharan Africa is an MSP that was initiated by the governments (Ministries of  
15 Agriculture) of eight countries, with the objective of giving independent policy advice. In 1994,  
16 Ministers of Agriculture of eight countries from Southern and Eastern Africa met and identified the  
17 need for independent policy advice. The Deans of the Universities of Agriculture of these eight  
18 countries then met and set up FANRPAN. It has now expanded to 17 countries. It is a network of  
19 governments, research universities and National Agricultural Research System (NARS), as well as  
20 civil society organisations (and a few private sector ones). Donor governments and private  
21 foundations are also part of it. FANRPAN is both a knowledge partnership and an advocacy  
22 partnership. It is a formal partnership with a new secretariat based in South Africa since 2005.

23 While the main partners are the governments and policy research institutions, the board of governors  
24 also has representatives of farmer organizations, the private sector, regional donors, etc. Interestingly,  
25 most projects are supported by donor governments (IDRC or USAID) and private funds including the  
26 Gates Foundation, Master Card Foundation, etc.

27 The main success of FANRPAN is its convening power, that is, able to bring non-state actors to the  
28 same table as governments to discuss policy issues, see **Box 3**.

29

### **Box 3 The Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Analysis Network (FANRPAN)**

FANRPAN is an autonomous, non-profit, Pan-African policy research and advocacy organization with a mandate to coordinate policy research and policy dialogue and recommend strategies for promoting food and nutrition security.

The FANRPAN constitution was finalized in 2001, and the regional network was formally registered in 2003 as a non-profit making Private Voluntary Organisation in Zimbabwe. The operation of the network is being led by FANRPAN secretariat which based in South Africa since 2005.

FANRPAN is regulated by its Constitution. Members of the Network (Country Nodes), in an Annual General Meeting (AGM), are the supreme decision-making body of the Network. Each Country Node, as a member of the Network, is represented at each the annual general meeting by one person, with voting rights. Each Country Node carries one vote. The Country Nodes elect the Board Members. The Board of Governors is the highest governing body of FANRPAN and is responsible for providing strategic direction, fiduciary and policy oversight for the organization.

The Board of Governors consists of two Regional Economic Communities seats (COMESA and SADC); two Government Ministries responsible for Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR) seats (Member State hosting the Network and Member State in which FANRPAN is registered); Farmer Organization; Policy Research Institution; Private Sector; Youth; Women and regional Donor.

FANRPAN presents a platform for the articulation of stakeholder priorities and negotiation of disparate positions in a non-formal, non-threatening environment. Emerging positions are informed by research and shared understanding among stakeholders and form the basis for stakeholder advocacy at national and regional levels.

The FANRPAN Annual High Level Regional Food and Nutrition Security Policy Dialogues are hosted on a rotational basis amongst the FANRPAN member countries. The policy dialogues, with an estimated attendance of over 200 participants in recent years, provide an opportunity for all stakeholders, including governments, policy research institutions, universities, farmer organizations, private sector, media and civil society to share best practices, lessons and experiences on a particular theme and come up with tangible resolutions. The policy dialogues also showcase best practices from

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Africa and beyond, in line with FANRPAN's two thematic thrusts of (1) Climate Smart Agriculture and (2) Nutrition-Sensitive Agriculture.

Strategically, FANRPAN builds capacity of: (i) policy makers on appraising research evidence for decision making and action plans; (ii) researchers on better ways to communicate science and engagement of communities to set research agenda; (iii) media on writing compelling stories relating to FANR; (iv) young researchers in trying to build a pipeline of new cadre or generation of researchers; and (v) women on using Theatre for Policy Advocacy (TPA) as a safe communicating tool.

FANRPAN's work is mostly supported by bilateral and multi-lateral public as well as private funding agencies. The bulk of the funding tends to be project-based, with limited core funding.

1 In the area of policy pertaining to adoption of new technology, there are many partnerships led by the  
2 public research system called the CGIAR (Consultative Group of International Agricultural Research)  
3 Institutes, with funds from donor governments (sometimes the private sector too) and partnership  
4 with national governments or National Agricultural Research System (NARS) or universities.

5 There are several examples of this, one of which is the MSP for Improving Soil Fertility and Soil  
6 Health in Pakistan through Demonstration and Dissemination of best practices of farmers (SFP  
7 for short). This is a partnership between USDA (donor government), ICARDA (International Centre  
8 for Agricultural Research in the Dry areas) and various national knowledge partners including the  
9 (NARS) and Social Sciences Research Institute. The objective of the partnership was to demonstrate  
10 and disseminate technologies for better soil health. This is a formal partnership, with clear governance  
11 structure, monitoring of targets, evaluation, etc. The weakness, of course, is that civil society (farmers  
12 in this case) are not formal partners but those receiving knowledge from the partnership. Note also  
13 that while this is a government-knowledge sector partnership, the knowledge sector is predominantly  
14 oriented towards public goods.

15 The case of Southern Africa Food Lab (SAFL) is a little different. While the initial push came from a  
16 donor government (German Technical Co-operation Agency, GTZ) and Development Bank of  
17 Southern Africa (DBSA), this partnership is mainly between the private corporate sector and  
18 academics. There is a formal governance structure. The focus is on the region of southern Africa. The  
19 partnership is mainly for research and capacity building through bringing together diverse  
20 stakeholders, See **Box 4**.

### **Box 4 The Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Analysis Network (FANRPAN)**

The Southern Africa Food Lab (SAFL) established in 2009, fosters collaboration and dialogue between stakeholder groups to raise awareness and foster innovations and experimental action towards a thriving, just, and sustainable food system. It is governed by an advisory board with members from public sector, academia, private sector, and civil society with administrative support from the Faculty of AgriSciences at Stellenbosch University.

The main funding was from German Technical Co-operation Agency (GTZ, now part of the German Association for Co-operation, or GIZ), the German development aid agency, and Reos Partners. In terms of leadership, this MSP is guided by business and academics (each roughly 40 per cent of stakeholders) (Dentoni, D., Bitzer, V., The role(s) of universities in dealing with global wicked problems through multistakeholder initiatives, *Journal of Cleaner Production* (2014).

Over 10 years, the MSP has gone through different phases. It was started after a review of food security by the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and a commission by GTZ on the role of the private sector in enhancing food security in South Africa.

In addition to transformative scenario planning, the MSP has projects to support small holder farms. (McLachlan, M., Hamann, R., Sayers, V., Kelly, C., & Drimie, S. (2015). *Fostering innovation for sustainable food security: the Southern Africa Food Lab*. In *The Business of Social and Environmental Innovation* (pp. 163-181). Springer International Publishing.)

21 As a summary, this cluster of knowledge-oriented MSPs generally comprise partnerships initiated by  
22 governments (USAID with Pakistan in the case of SFP and Southern and Eastern African Ministries in  
23 the case of FANRPAN) or by public research institutes or a consortium of institutes such as the  
24 CGIAR (ICRISAT or IRRI). Later, other partners may be involved such as farmers' organizations in  
25 the case of ICRISAT and FANRPAN, or NGOs as in the case of FANRPAN. SAFL has a strong  
26 private sector presence.  
27

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1 There is a clear governance structure. Usually, there is a formal Memorandum of Understanding  
2 (MoU) or some contract between the parties (as in case of USAID-NARS of Pakistan). In the case of  
3 FANRPAN, a new organization and secretariat was set up with a governing body.

4 These MSPs operate at country level or for a group of countries in a region.

## 5 **2.3 Food policy and advocacy cluster**

6 While there is overlap with the previous cluster in terms of knowledge generation and dissemination,  
7 this group of MSPs lays emphasis on policy advocacy, convergence, recommendation and  
8 development of policy standards for FSN. Policy is critical in driving the direction of these MSPs.

9 There are two sub-clusters and are presented below.

### 10 **2.3.1 Policy advocacy and convergence oriented MSPs**

11 This cluster refers to partnerships at the global or multi-country level with a focus on advocacy and  
12 policy. The three examples we have taken are the Scaling Up Nutrition or SUN MSP, initiated by the  
13 UN; and the Food Security Cluster initiated by FAO and WFP. FANRPAN initiated by 8 countries of  
14 Southern and Eastern Africa also gets involved in policy advocacy and convergence.

15 The common features are that these are led by governments (UN bodies or country governments)  
16 and are on a global or at least multi-country scale. There is a formal structure of governance. The  
17 main objective is advocacy on policy, policy design, policy coordination.

18 SUN was initiated by the UN and World Bank, with funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates  
19 Foundation. It is an example of a MSP with large number of partners, from business, from NGOs,  
20 from CSOs, from donor governments, national governments, academics, private foundations. There is  
21 a formal structure of governance with overall lead group and then networks for business, civil society  
22 and donors separately. SUN has clearly improved the visibility of nutrition in policy discussions and  
23 policy making.

24 The main concern has been the conflict of interest on account of business stakeholders in SUN, who  
25 might benefit from the recommendations such as expansion of food fortification. **Box 5** elaborates on  
26 SUN.

#### **Box 5 Scaling up Nutrition or SUN**

**The Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN)** partnership started in 2008, after a seminal paper in Lancet pointed out the need, urgency, and the possibility of addressing undernutrition in the first 1000 days (from the beginning of pregnancy to the age of two). The UN Secretary General had set up a High Level Task Force on Food and Nutrition Security. In 2009 the World Bank, UN organisations (WHO, FAO, WFP and UNICEF), the Gates Foundation and others created a small committee which hired two experts to draft what became the first SUN document – *Scaling up Nutrition – a Framework for Action (FFA)*

Initially, the SUN Transition Team was chaired by the UN Secretary General's Special Representative for FSN. There is an Executive Committee of 16 persons with current co-chair from government and chair from Gates foundation. Representatives of donor countries, developing countries, world bank, WHO and WFP, large NGO (GAIN), corporate (MNC) and two civil society alliances. SUN has related networks like SUN Business network, civil society network, donor network .

Governments, donors, civil society, business, United Nations agencies provide the financial resources. The major part of annual investment is expected to come from country governments and donors.

*Source:* Bezanson, K., and P. Isenman. "Scaling up nutrition: a framework for action." Food and nutrition bulletin 31.1 (2010).

27 The Food Security Cluster is led by two UN organisations, FAO and WFP, and has large humanitarian  
28 NGOs and also some academics and other partners. It engages in advocacy on humanitarian issues,  
29 and helps develop standard procedures at the country level, and also oversees action (humanitarian  
30 aid).

31

## Box 6 The Food Security Cluster or FSC

The Food Security Cluster or FSC was established in 2011 to coordinate the food security response during a humanitarian crisis, addressing issues of food availability, access and utilisation. It is co-led by FAO and WFP. The FSC works directly with its partners and stakeholders that include NGOs, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, UN organizations, Governments and Donors.

It provides support to 27 countries, and has over 40 partners including NGOs, donors and UN agencies – with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as an observer. A Strategic Advisory Group comprised members of the co-lead agencies and NGOs and governs the work of the global cluster, which is largely focused on ensuring that country-level operations are well staffed and equipped to respond to food security crises.

When the cluster system was activated in Pakistan following the floods in 2010, a Food Aid Cluster was set up rapidly in Sindh Province and an Agriculture Cluster a few weeks later. Subsequently, in an effort to strengthen to response to early recovery needs and in response to NGO requests, food aid and agriculture issues were merged into a government-led Food Security Working Group.

1

2 A third example is of the already discussed FANRPAN or the Food, Agriculture and Natural  
3 Resources Analysis Network, currently operating in 17 countries of sub-Saharan Africa. This was  
4 initiated by the governments (Ministries of Agriculture) of eight countries, with the objective of having  
5 independent policy advice. It is a network of governments, research universities and NARS, as well as  
6 civil society organizations (and a few private sector ones). Donor governments and private  
7 foundations are also part of it.

8 MSPs that are knowledge-oriented are in a way a subset of the policy and advocacy cluster.

## 9 2.3.2 Standards and good practice

10 Another area where MSPs have been active and gained importance is the design and implementation  
11 of sustainability standards. Diverse types of cooperation initiatives have emerged since the 1970s  
12 where private sector and civil society – sometimes also in collaboration with governments and inter-  
13 governmental bodies – have established voluntary and market-based approaches to improve  
14 sustainability practices across agricultural and natural resources industries. The “market-based”  
15 approach is built on the assumption that growing demand for sustainable products will lead to better  
16 prices and higher production of sustainably certified products. It also explains the participation and  
17 leadership of food industry (private sector) in partnership with some civil society organisations, with  
18 few – if any – participation of public/government organisations, contrasting therefore with more public  
19 or government-driven initiatives that are more based on regulation and/or public-policy support  
20 (Fransen and Kolk, 2007).

21 Some examples included cases that were still initiated in the late 20th Century, such as the Forest  
22 Stewardship Council (FSC), the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC), the  
23 Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). Others are more recent, such as Roundtable on Sustainable  
24 Palm Oil (RSPO) and the Round Table on Responsible Soy (RTRS) – see **Box 7**.

## Box 7 Examples of Multi-stakeholder Sustainability Standards

**The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)** was created in 1993, in Toronto Canada, by a group of business, environmentalists and community leaders who saw failure in the 1992 Earth Summit results in curbing deforestation and launched the initiative to establish a “voluntary, market-based approach that would improve forest practices worldwide”. FSC has today more than 1000 members, which a relatively balanced mix of forest producers, retailers, processors, associations, NGOs (international and local).

**The Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC)** was created in 1999, as a split of the FSC movement. According to their website, “PEFC was founded in 1999 in response to the specific requirements of small- and family forest owners as an international umbrella organization providing independent assessment, endorsement and recognition of national forest certification systems.... PEFC responded to the need for a mechanism enabling the independent development of national standards tailored to the political, economic, social, environmental and cultural realities of the respective countries, while at the same time ensuring compliance with internationally-accepted requirements and global recognition.”

**The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC)** was formed by the leadership of WWF and fish industry partner (Unilever) in 1996 and deeply inspired by the experience of FSC. When the MSC idea was being born in 1995, a “binding regulatory regime was being negotiated in the form of the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization’s Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing. As the first global consensus on best practice fisheries management, the voluntary Code would provide the foundation for an international approach to fish stocks, with sustainability at its core... industry partner prepared to support a different approach – a market-driven system that would protect marine fish stocks and operate along the lines of the Forestry Stewardship Council.” Different than other cases, the MSC counts with Board of Trustees as the maximum authority of the initiative. “Trustees are chosen for their knowledge, expertise and support for the MSC. There is no formal membership structure, but it is recognised that the Board should be balanced with representatives from different sectors and geographical regions to reflect the broad mix of people who have a stake in the MSC’s mission... Trustees are nominated in a personal capacity, not as representatives of their organisations. They serve a maximum three-year term and may stand for reappointment.”

**The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO)** was created in 2003, also by the initiative of WWF and contacts with palm oil industry leaders, as a “global, multi-stakeholder initiative on sustainable palm oil. Members of RSPO, and participants in its activities come from many different backgrounds, including plantation companies, processors and traders, consumer goods manufacturers and retailers of palm oil products, financial institutions, environmental NGOs and social NGOs, from many countries that produce or use palm oil. The RSPO vision is to “transform the markets by making sustainable palm oil the norm”.

**The Round Table on Responsible Soy (RTRS)** was created in 2006, also by a mix of major value chain players (Grupo Maggi), development organisations (Cordaid), retailers (COOP), soy/farmer organisations (Fetraf-Sul) and industry (Unilever). They define their philosophy as the following “our ‘Round Table’ philosophy aims at enabling dialogue among different stakeholders, thus allowing each one of them to put forward the agenda they wish to discuss. Through decision-making by consensus, different interests converge into one single common purpose”. Participating members are divided into three different constituencies: Producers; Industry, Trade & Finance, and Civil Society Organizations, with equal voting rights at the General Assembly. But RTRS also allows observing members such as regulatory authorities, government agencies, consulting and audit firms, members of the academia and donor organizations. Their role within the General Assembly does not include the right to vote, but includes having the possibility to propose and take part in the discussions.

*Websites (accessed on December 2017):*

*Forest Stewardship Council – FSC:* [www.fsc.org/](http://www.fsc.org/)

*Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification – PEFC:* [www.pefc.org/](http://www.pefc.org/)

*Marine Stewardship Council – MSC:* [www.msc.org](http://www.msc.org)

*Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil – RSPO:* [www.rspo.org](http://www.rspo.org)

*Round Table on Responsible Soy – RTRS:* [www.responsiblesoy.org](http://www.responsiblesoy.org)

- 1
- 2 All these initiatives claim to have global coverage and application. Still, a standard pattern is found in
- 3 most of them: it’s mostly composed of producers from developing countries (more in soybeans and
- 4 palm, less in fish and forestry products) that join European/North American partners (big NGOs and
- 5 industry) to gain access to the more demanding markets of those countries. Thus, the initiatives have
- 6 little if any involvement of the more growing demand and trade to and between emerging southern
- 7 countries.
- 8 The examples portrayed in the box also show how a MSP can change throughout the time, from
- 9 being informal agreements between partners of different stakeholder groups to become formal and
- 10 institutionalized partnerships with rules of participation, governance structures.
- 11 Generally, the first phase of these standard-setting MSPs was the constitution of the partnership:
- 12 finding organisations that shared similar visions and objectives and that would be interested in joining
- 13 a shared initiative. This also includes developing basic rules of engagement, code of conducts,
- 14 representation, who participates and under which conditions and rights. The second phase was the
- 15 developing of the sustainability standards. The meaning of sustainability has to be precisely defined in
- 16 the context the standard wants to be applied. Principles and criteria have to be developed, as well as
- 17 means of verifying the implementation of those. In other words, partners discuss what does mean to
- 18 be sustainable in their economic activities and how this can be assessed. This has also to be
- 19 translated into a legal and consensual document that can be used in certification activities. More than
- 20 one standard is generally developed (ex. from the RTRS, there is a type of certificate for soy
- 21 production and a type for the chain of custody).



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1 The third phase is the application and diffusion of the standard. As a voluntary instrument, a  
2 sustainability standard produces no effect if it's not widely used by a significant proportion of the  
3 market. This is where most of these initiatives are currently.

4 In sum, multi-stakeholder standards have acquired significance in certain contexts for FSN, but the  
5 concern is relatively low uptake compared to market size.

### 6 **2.4 Action-oriented cluster**

7 The group of action oriented clusters include those set of MSPs involved in implementing food  
8 improvement activity. The cluster comprises about five sub-clusters of MSPs and they include;

- 9 • MSPs involved in preserving and managing natural resources,
- 10 • MSPs for food delivery: active production and distribution of food,
- 11 • MSPs in Livestock and crop improvement,
- 12 • MSPs in agribusiness development, and
- 13 • the public private partnership for FSN improvement.

14

#### 15 **2.4.1 SPs for Natural Resource Management**

16 These MSPs focus on collective management of a shared (public/common pool) resource. Examples  
17 here are MSP in water management, community management of forest resources or protected  
18 areas. For example HLPE (2017) discusses example of private and public partnership in access to  
19 forests. In Finland, Sweden and Norway, there are laws on public access to privately owned forests  
20 (such as for collection of berries). There is also an initiative in Central Africa where six countries have  
21 signed the Yaoundé declaration in Cameroon to jointly/regionally engage in forest conservation  
22 (Sustainable Forestry for food security and nutrition, HLPE June 2017). The Congo Basin Forest  
23 Partnership (CFBP) was created in 2002 with 97 partners willing to invest in the achievement of the  
24 Yaoundé declaration.” (ibid. p 94)

25 The MSP termed Pakistan Water Dialogue-Diffusion and Adoption through Partnership and Action of  
26 the best watershed rehabilitation and irrigation practices and technologies to help rural farmers is an  
27 example here. This is a partnership between USDA (US Department of Agriculture), ICARDA, and the  
28 Pakistan agricultural research system. The main objective is demonstrating and disseminating water  
29 saving practices and technologies.

30 There are MSPS for marine conservation and sustainability such as Fish Forever, and the Locally-  
31 Managed Marine Area (LMMA) Network. The latter MSP comprises practitioners (including  
32 professional resource managers, land-owning community leaders and government representatives)  
33 involved in various community-based marine conservation projects around the globe, primarily in the  
34 Indo-Pacific. The main objectives of the network are to protect biodiversity at specific sites, build  
35 capacity for learning and implementation of community-based adaptive management and develop  
36 policy support and advocacy at local, regional, country and international levels. There is a  
37 membership base that operates under a defined decision-making process and management structure.

38 MSPs already have a long history in domains closely linked to FSN, such as water management (see  
39 examples in **Box 8**). The HLPE report on water (HLPE, 2015) describes the multiplicity of institutions  
40 (whether public or private) and the different categories of stakeholders (governments, private  
41 companies, farmers, fisherfolks, urban users...), having different objectives, that are involved in or  
42 affected by the management of water resources (quantity and quality) and services, at different  
43 scales, for multiple uses. It analyzes power imbalances between different stakeholders regarding  
44 access to and control over water resources. It explores different allocation mechanisms and  
45 governance tools, some of which enable a “multistakeholder” involvement in water management,  
46 including: decentralized governance; collective management of water resources, especially at local  
47 and community level.

48

## Box 8 Examples of international MSPs in the field of water management:

The **Global Water Partnership (GWP)** was founded in 1996 to foster integrated water resources management (IWRM). The GWP is a multistakeholder network with over 3000 partner organizations in 183 countries. This network also counts 86 national and 13 regional water partnerships. In 2015 and 2016, the Global Water Partnership and African governments, conducted 11 country consultations in Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe) followed by a pan-African workshop organized in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia in May 2016. These consultations used the HLPE report on water (HLPE, 2015) to initiate a strong multistakeholder approach between governments, private sector and other stakeholders and to identify, at a practical level, specific national and regional priorities in line with the HLPE and CFS policy recommendations.

The **World Water Council (WWC)**, best known for its flagship annual conference, the World Water Forum, whose mission, presents itself as an “international multistakeholder platform”, representing thousands of people from over 300 organizations in more than 50 countries. It gathers: governments and intergovernmental institutions; private enterprises and professional associations; academic institutions; civil society organizations and water user associations. It was established in 1996 “to promote awareness, build political commitment and trigger action on critical water issues at all levels, to facilitate the efficient conservation, protection, development, planning, management and use of water in all its dimensions on an environmentally sustainable basis for the benefit of all life on Earth”.

Websites (accessed on December 2017):

<http://www.gwp.org>; <http://www.gwp.org/en/we-act/themesprogrammes/Nexus-Water-Food-Energy-Ecosystems/>; [http://www.gwp.org/globalassets/global/about-gwp/publications/briefing-notes/briefing\\_note\\_nexus\\_africa.pdf](http://www.gwp.org/globalassets/global/about-gwp/publications/briefing-notes/briefing_note_nexus_africa.pdf); <http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/en>

1

## 2 2.4.2 MSPs for Food Delivery

3 These MSPs are involved in the actual collective production of food and the distribution thereof.  
4 Some MSPs are working in emergency situations (instead of longer-term actions).

5 They generally operate locally or nationally on agriculture and food for FSN. Good examples here are  
6 DICONSA (Distribuidora CONASUPO, SA or Rural Food Stores in Mexico), and KUDUMBASHREE  
7 (Women’s empowerment programme) in Kerala.

8 This cluster comprises MSPs where governments (be it multilateral or national government offices)  
9 have included members of civil society and civil society organisations in a systematic way to  
10 implement programmes of FSN. The expected outcome is better action or better delivery by including  
11 representatives of the marginalized, food insecure, vulnerably populations. To put it differently,  
12 people’s participation in decision making and delivery of public programmes is expected to improve  
13 the inclusiveness, transparency and effectiveness of such programmes.

14 We elaborate on two MSPs: DICONSA in Mexico and Kudumbashree in Kerala, India.

15 DICONSA is a network of rural food stores selling subsidized food and other goods, started as the  
16 distribution arm of CONASUPO, the Rural Basic Foods Company. While CONASUPO has been  
17 closed, DICONSA stores remain as community-managed stores. The innovation or partnership here  
18 was to get community members/rural citizens to participate in the distribution of subsidized food.

19 Kudumbashree is a government programme for poverty alleviation where local government partners  
20 with women’s groups. The women’s groups engage in various income generating activities including  
21 food production, processing and retail.

22 The following are distinct features of these two MSPs/this cluster.

23 Both have a formalised governance structure, not informal, with elected representation of community  
24 members. In DICONSA, village assemblies elect local store management and oversight communities,  
25 which in turn elect representatives to the regional council to oversee warehouse operations. In  
26 Kudumabashree, there is a three tier structure for the women’s community network, with  
27 neighbourhood groups at the first level, area development societies at the second level and  
28 community development societies at the federated level. There is a clear governance structure with  
29 representation and accountability in both MSPs.

30 The main partners or stakeholders are government and civil society, but other partners especially  
31 finance can be brought in over time. In Mexico, recently, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

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1 partnered with DICONSA stores to provide financial services. In Kerala, the National Bank for  
2 Agriculture and Rural development is a partner, and flow of funds to women's groups has risen over  
3 time.

4 Further, in both cases, government initiated the partnership but engaged in a democratic and  
5 transparent way with CSO leading to change in power relations over time. Both Diconsa and  
6 Kudumbashree began as programmes of the respective government but have grown because of the  
7 democratic process of functioning. The activities of the civil society partners have gone beyond  
8 engagement in one government programme. In both Mexico and Kerala, citizens who have engaged  
9 in these respective MSPs have become engaged politically in a new way. In Mexico, the local food  
10 store movement led to larger regional peasant movements. In Kerala, Kudumbashree women are  
11 standing for election at different levels of local government.

12 Both DICONSA and Kudumbashree have been engaged in food production, processing, storage and  
13 distribution activities. DICONSA was mainly concerned with distribution of subsidized food, but in  
14 some regions the concerned CSO formed a network of producer organizations. In Kerala, the initial  
15 activities were small scale food processing and retail but now the women have initiated collective  
16 group farming, as also production of food products and many other activities (including franchise for  
17 food kitchens at schools and offices). They are also engaged in non FSN activities.

18 Lastly, these MSPs show that partnership can help in the goal of inclusion of vulnerable populations  
19 including women.

### 20 **2.4.3 MSPs for Livestock/Food production improvement**

21 There are MSPs involved in identifying and implementing agricultural production improvement  
22 methods. These are usually at national or regional level, with participation from governments, farmers,  
23 donors and even the private sector. This cluster can be subdivided in two in terms of domain of work.

- 24 1. The livestock improvement MSPs include the Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock; and  
25 Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, Biosciences Eastern and Central Africa (**Box 9**)
- 26 2. The agronomic food production improvements include Enhancing Food Security in Arab  
27 Countries, and the Balochistan Agriculture Project.

28 To illustrate, the Balochistan Agriculture Project is implemented by the FAO, funded by USAID, in  
29 cooperation with the government of Balochistan province of Pakistan. The focus is on crop and  
30 livestock productivity enhancement. There is a steering committee guiding the project. The MSP titled  
31 Enhancing Food Security in Arab Countries is led by ICARDA, a public research centre, with the  
32 objective of promoting improved production technologies for the production of wheat, a major staple of  
33 the region. It operates in ten countries in the region. The partners are the respective national  
34 agricultural research systems (NARS).

#### **Box 9 The Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock development**

In 2010, the FAO Committee on Agriculture recommended that FAO actively engage in consultations on how to accommodate livestock sector growth in a socio-economic and environmentally sustainable manner. Subsequently, a number of countries and international organizations, called the Dialogue group, initiated the process. They recommended the development of a Global Agenda to shape the sector's role in future global food production systems. The Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock (GASL), facilitated by FAO, brings together small- and large-scale producers. It is a partnership composed of seven cluster groups: governments, civil society organizations, the private sector, donors, research/academia, NGOs, intergovernmental and multilateral organizations. Around 200 participants gather once a year in a multistakeholder partnership meeting to address existing and new challenges. Partnerships at regional, national and local levels respond to specific development priorities. A Guiding Group composed of five representatives from each cluster is responsible for the appointment of the Chair and the guidance of the partnership. The Global Agenda supports continuous practice and policy change by: - facilitating policy dialogue between different stakeholders of the sector and building consensus; - conducting and supporting joint analysis to inform stakeholders, identify entry points for practice change and develop harmonized metrics and methods; and - promoting innovation and supporting investments.

One area of work is knowledge generation and dissemination on maintaining, restoring and enhancing the environmental and economic value of grasslands.

A Guiding Group up to five representative from six constituency clusters (Public sector, private sector, Academia/research, donors, NGO, social movements and community based-organizations) provide overall strategic direction and guidance to the Agenda. The leadership is from the FAO.

The Global Agenda for Sustainable Livestock is a UN-led MSP working to enhance sustainable use of livestock resources.

Source: HLPE (2016)

1

## 2 2.4.4 Agricultural development clusters

3 These have been studied in detail recently in a FAO publication (FAO, 2016), which we draw upon  
4 extensively.

5 The FAO gathered material on 70 case studies of PPPs from 15 developing countries, and developed  
6 a typology of four types;

- 7 • Partnerships that aim to develop agricultural value chains (VCD)
- 8 • Partnership for joint agricultural research, innovation and technology transfer (ITT)
- 9 • Partnerships for building and upgrading market infrastructure (IM), and
- 10 • Partnerships for delivery of business development services to farmers and small  
11 enterprises (BDS)

12 Some of these will overlap or belong to the previous clusters.

13 The study identifies the advantages of PPPs such as supplementing public resources, bringing in  
14 private sector operational efficiency to the public sector, strengthening public sector institutions and  
15 so on. They also identified limitations of PPPs such as transparency in selection of private partners,  
16 conflict resolution mechanisms, financial challenges etc. Based on the above analysis the study  
17 identifies factors affecting success of agribusiness partnerships. These include having a clear  
18 delineation of the role of different partners, involving financial institutions in partnership, inclusion of  
19 small holders, sound institutional and regulatory framework, among others.

## 20 2.4.5 Public Private Partnerships

21 Over the last few decades, government facing resource constraints have involved the private sector in  
22 implementation of activities and programmes including in the area of FSN. The Public Private  
23 Partnership (PPP) is a framework that while engaging the private sector, also acknowledges and the  
24 role for government in ensuring that social obligations are met (ADB, 2008:7). The Addis Ababa  
25 Agenda for Action or AAAA (2015) acknowledges the diversity of private sector, ranging from micro-  
26 enterprise to cooperatives to multinationals – and encourages them to engage as partners in the  
27 development process, to invest in areas critical to sustainable development, and to shift to more  
28 sustainable consumption and production patterns. This cluster incorporates those MSPs where the  
29 private Sector is prominent and plays a leading role, working with the public sector.

30 Private sector is reluctant to do business due to high risk (FAO, 2016) and PPP are useful mechanism  
31 for risk sharing. PPP entail reciprocal obligations and mutual accountability, voluntary or contractual  
32 relationship, the sharing of investment and reputational risks, and joint responsibility for design and  
33 execution (WEF, 2005:8). However, other view private sector as responsible for absorbing all the risk  
34 from public sector (ADB, 2008:7, Makofane (2013:118)). The latter applies in instances of  
35 implementing projects. That is, private sector can ensure a consistent supply of good quality material  
36 or output (Boland, 2012), while public sector ensures compliance with food safety and quality  
37 standards (FAO, 2016) and creating enabling environment at all levels (AAAA, 2015: 17).

38 The private sector can be a strategic partner in the drive for economic development according to one  
39 view (WEF, 2005:8, Bothale, 2016). Some examples of PPPs led by private sector are highlighted in  
40 **Box 10**. They include the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN), Asia Roundtable on Food  
41 Innovation for Improved Nutrition – AROFIIN, GROWAFRICA, New Alliance for Food Security and  
42 Nutrition, Global Vision, and Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (Gavi, the Vaccine  
43 Alliance). See **Box 10**.

### Box 10 Examples of MSPs in Private Sector Led (PPP) Cluster

**Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN)** is a global, Swiss-based foundation that mobilises public-private partnerships and provides financial and technical support to deliver nutritious foods to people most at risk of malnutrition. GAIN started as a large-scale food fortification program and later evolved into a broader nutrition programme directed toward improving access and affordability of nutritious foods. From 2002 to 2005, the organization operated within the United Nations system, with its Secretariat in Geneva. It evolved into a Swiss foundation in 2005, honoured with receiving International Organization Status by Swiss Government in 2010. From 2002 to 2005, GAIN funded country-level fortification programs based on periodic competitive requests for proposals. The initial management approach was to maximize the ownership of each country program by national stakeholders, and administrative oversight and monitoring were generally provided through agreements with experienced partners in different areas, such as the United Nations Development Program, the United Nations Office for Project Services, and the World Bank. After 2005, GAIN adapted its structure to become more operational, adding technical and administrative staff and developing a more sophisticated management system to support the scale-up of activities worldwide. GAIN originally welcomed all developing countries to apply to the request for proposal. Despite the fact that mainly countries with the highest malnutrition burdens submitted proposals, GAIN's initial project portfolio also included some relatively low-burden countries based on very strong proposals.

**Asia Roundtable on Food Innovation for Improved Nutrition – AROFIIN** was formed in 2015 to facilitate a multi-stakeholder platform to initiate a dialogue on an integrated approach to solving challenges of obesity, malnutrition and chronic diseases across Asia. These are some of the biggest health challenges of the 21st century. The inaugural AROFIIN Roundtable in 2015 brought together 41 senior practitioners from across Asia to initiate a regional, multi-stakeholder dialogue on the role of food innovation in tackling obesity and chronic diseases.

**The Grow Africa Partnership** was founded jointly by the African Union (AU), The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the World Economic Forum in 2011. It works to increase private sector investment in agriculture. Grow Africa collaboration is between governments, international and domestic agriculture companies, and smallholder farmers in order to lower the risk and cost of investing in agriculture, and improve the speed of return to all stakeholders. The Grow Africa Partnership comprises over 230 companies and governments in 12 countries. These companies have made formal commitments with the government in the respective country to invest in agriculture.

The Partnership is supported by a network of knowledge specialists. Grow Africa does not provide funding for projects. As a convener, it helps partners to connect and develop collaborations, and support the development of innovative multi-stakeholder funding vehicles.

**The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition of the Group of Eight (G8)**, and the **New Vision for Agriculture initiative** promoted by the World Economic Forum are global multi-stakeholder partnerships that aim to accelerate the flow of investments into agriculture. These initiatives have popularized the concept and application of the PPP model in the agribusiness sector of many developing countries. Several countries are participating in the New Vision platform: Ghana, Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania (indirectly through the Grow Africa regional partnership), and Indonesia and Viet Nam (directly affiliated to New Vision). At the country level, New Vision is implemented through multi-stakeholder partnerships. For example, in the United Republic of Tanzania a partnership was formed in 2010 to promote development of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). In Indonesia, the Partnership for Indonesia Sustainable Agriculture (PISAgro), formally established in April 2012, regulates collaboration between the Indonesian Government and a number of domestic and international companies for strengthening smallholder livelihoods, increasing food security and improving sustainable production of target commodities: cocoa, dairy, maize, palm oil, potatoes, rice and soybean. In Viet Nam, the Public-Private Task Force on Sustainable Agricultural Growth, co-led by government and industry, was formed in 2010 to develop and test agricultural models in priority crops with the potential for rapid scaling up (WEF and McKinsey and Company, 2013).

**Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance)** is an international partnership that was created in 2000 to improve access to new and underused vaccines for children living in the world's poorest countries. Based in Geneva, Switzerland, Gavi is the Vaccine Alliance, which brings together public and private sectors with the shared goal of creating equal access to vaccines for children, wherever they live. Its origin follows from the 1998 summit convened by the head of the World Bank James Wolfensohn, attended by WHO, UNICEF, academics, health ministers, international agencies and the pharmaceutical industry; Bill and Melinda Gates dinner with scientist inviting for "breakthrough proposals". At the March 1999 second summit at Bellagio in northern Italy - the key UN agencies, leaders of the vaccine industry, representatives of bilateral aid agencies and major foundations - agreed to work together through a new partnership: the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance). The Vaccine Alliance's dream of delivering

vaccines to millions of the world's poorest children moved a step closer to reality in November 1999, when the Gates Foundation pledged USD 750 million over five years to Gavi.

Source: <http://www.gavi.org>, <https://www.one.org/international/> accessed (31/12/2017)

- 1  
2 The common pattern of the MSPs in this private sector led cluster or PPP cluster is that they  
3 involve creating mega projects (FAO, 2016)
- 4 The private partners are typically investors that have a very strong financial backing. Most of them are  
5 formalised legal entities, although some would consist of stakeholders that are formal legal persons.
- 6 The coverage is usually global, although they focus more on developing economies. In this cluster,  
7 PPPs within countries are not included.
- 8 While these PPPs raise finance, the objective is clearly one of action in respect of food security and  
9 nutrition (be it production of vaccines or fortification of food) and hence their inclusion in this cluster of  
10 action-oriented MSPs and not in the finance cluster that follows.

11

### 12 **2.5 Finance and resource mobilization clusters**

13 Multistakeholder Partnerships for mobilising finance have gained importance due to chronic fiscal  
14 stress that occurred after the recent global economic crisis (Bothale, 2016) and the need to address  
15 market failures in finance in general (Mosley, 1998:13). Several governments such as Botswana,  
16 Nigeria and South Africa have adopted public private partnerships to enable financing of development  
17 projects (Bothale, 2016).

18 While all MSPs do mobilise finance, there are some MSPs or platforms that focus predominantly on  
19 facilitating access to finance in one way or another. Apart from mobilization of public resources  
20 innovative ways of financing are co-finance or blended finance and catalysing finance as well as  
21 managing donor funds (there is more elaboration in Chapters 3 and 4). Some of these MSPs include  
22 Initiative for Smallholder Finance (ISF), The Banking for Food Programme of Rabobank, Global Fund,  
23 The Global Financing Facility (GFF), and Banco Solidario (BancoSol). These are elaborated in  
24 **Box 11.**

25 These MSPs are mostly led by financial institutions such as World Bank, Asian Development Bank,  
26 corporate foundations, and donor countries. They have the common feature of mobilising funds for  
27 development. The MSPs of finance for development facilitate mobilization of financial resources for  
28 development of special groups, such as smallholder farmers, poorer and vulnerable populations that  
29 are otherwise excluded from finance. Some initiatives such as by Rabobank focus on increasing  
30 sustainable and efficient food production. However, other MSPs aim to close the financing gap in  
31 development to increase productivity and improve livelihoods.

32 The MSPs in this cluster either directly raise funds for their partners or work with partners to gain  
33 funds from donors.

## Box 11 Examples of multistakeholder partnerships for Financing Development

**The Initiative for Smallholder Finance (ISF)** is a multi-donor and investor platform for the development of financial services for the smallholder farmer market. ISF works to ensure that smallholder farmers have the right forms of finance to invest in their farms. It was launched in May 2013 with the intention of making marked progress toward closing the gap between the over USD 200 billion in smallholder financing need and the current USD 50 billion supply in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and South and Southeast Asia. Partners and sponsors of the ISF have included the Citi Foundation, Ford Foundation, Gates Foundation, MasterCard Foundation, Skoll Foundation, Small Foundation, and USAID. Root Capital, TechnoServe, the One Acre Fund, CGAP, IDH, Business Fights Poverty, and ANDE provide advisory support.

The Banking For Food is a programme initiated by the Rabobank (Cooperatieve Rabobank UA), together with client/partners to produce more food sustainably with its clients. The cooperative bank focuses on making agriculture and the food supply more sustainable and to strengthening vitality of communities. The Banking for Food vision on food security was launched in 2014, which links with Rabo Development Program started in 2005 and Rabobank Foundation (1974) aimed at increasing people's self sufficiency world wide. Rabobank partnership in Banking for food include FAO, Young farmers organisations NAJK (Netherlands), Nuffield (global farmer scholarship organisation), Agricultural journalist organisation (IFAJ), World-Wildlife Fund (WWF). There is a representation of 118 farmers in supervisory boards of local Dutch Rabobanks. Rabobank Banking for Food is a member of other MSPs round tables (RT) for sustainable production such as Global RT on sustainable Beef (GRTSB), Brazil Sustainable Beef RT (GTPS), 4-C Association (coffee), RT on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), RT on Responsible Soy (RTRS), and Bonsucro (sugar cane).

**Global Fund** focuses on CSOs in developing countries that put into practice the social thoughts of John Paul II as developed by Francis. These causes have to focus on the needy and the otherwise excluded. The Global Fund play facilitative role – by identifying civil society organisations (that include private, not-for profit training centres, hospitals, universities, etc) that work with the needy, that are well run, and that raise money locally. <http://globalfund.org/> accessed 8/8/2017.

The Global Financing Facility (GFF) is a multi-stakeholder partnership that supports country-led efforts to improve the health of women, children, and adolescents. The GFF was launched by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim, at the Third International Financing for Development Conference in July 2015 with a goal of accelerating global efforts to end preventable maternal and child deaths and improve the health and quality of life of women, children, and adolescents by 2030. The GFF focuses on 66 high-burden low- and lower-middle-income countries. National governments lead the process with the involvement of the broad set of stakeholders. The GFF has piloted the model in four countries: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania. At its official launch in July 2015, an additional eight countries were added: Bangladesh, Cameroon, India, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda.

**BancoSol**, originally PRODEM (Fundacion para la Promocion y Desarrollo de la Micro Empresa, or Foundation for the Promotion and Development of Micro enterprises) started in 1985 through USAID funding of the study on possibility of establishing a micro-enterprise lending programme in Bolivia (Mosley, 1998:13). USAID, private business, and Emergency Social Fund, and Canadian Calmeadow Foundation invested in the PRODEM initiative. Due to high demand for developmental finance and the need for self-sustenance, in 1992, PRODEM joined with Accion, Calmeadow Foundation, Bolivian banks and other investors to establish BancoSol, the first private commercial bank in the world dedicated exclusively to microenterprise. Financing of food trading was the highest at 23%, while food manufacturing made 8,2% of the total PRODEM/BancoSol portfolio in the 1990s. The Bank's clients are mostly young people (40% are between 35 and 45 years old) and 46% are women, usually from large families, with a low level of education, and with land in the rural area, in addition to their home in urban centers.

Source: <http://www.initiativeforsmallholderfinance.org/> accessed 30/07/2017; <https://www.rabobank.com/en/about-rabobank/food-agribusiness/vision-banking-for-food/index.html> accessed 22/12/2017; <https://www.bancosol.com.bo/secciones/quienes-somos> accessed 29/12/2017.

- 1
- 2 Most of the post-2008 MSPs involved in finance for development tend to be multi-country, though they
- 3 may have a country emphasis. For example Rabobank is present in 40 countries including the
- 4 Netherlands, USA, Brazil, Chile, Australia, New Zealand and 25 plus developing and emerging
- 5 countries. Global Fund has conducted training sessions in countries in different regions of the world.
- 6 Some MSPs have emerged from social funds such as BancoSol in Bolivia.

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1 In the finance MSPs, the lead and driver is the partner who either facilitates the mobilization of  
2 funding or who end up sponsoring the funds. . However, their role in channeling resources for  
3 development warrant inclusion in this analysis of MSPs. These MSPs act like banks where other  
4 stakeholders are viewed as clients. The most critical public stakeholders for these MSPs is the  
5 concerned Ministry of Finance.

6 The Finance Cluster tends to have a very tight governance structure, normally it is a three-tier  
7 structure with staff and director, steering committee or Board, and finally, Advisory group. The  
8 sponsors or donors dominate one of the layers of governance as illustrated by the four cases. The  
9 ISF Team is led by Executive Director. The Steering Committee consists of 6 donors/sponsors  
10 (MasterCard Foundation; CitiFoundation; FeedTHEFuture (USAID); Small Foundation; Bill & Mellinda  
11 Foundation; Ford Foundation). The ISF also has Advisory Committee: consisting of 7 supporters  
12 (Aspen Network of Development Enterprises; CGAP; Business Fights Poverty; Root Capital; One  
13 Acre Fund; TechnoServe; The Sustainable Trade Initiative).

14 The Rabobank Banking for Food has Rabobank client councils: member councils of 113 local  
15 Rabobanks (in Netherlands) and 15 regional client councils and 100 participating clients in Australia  
16 and New Zealand. There are also Food and Agriculture Advisory Boards: organised by Rabobank in  
17 the US and Asia, and participants who are CEOs of large agri-food companies.

18 The Board of Advisors of the Global Fund is dominated by members of Multilateral Investment Fund-  
19 IDB. Of the 28 seats on the board, ten represent donor constituencies and ten represent implementer  
20 constituencies. The remaining eight seats are non-voting members of the Board.

21 The major function of Finance MSPs is to mobilise funds and raise awareness of the scale of  
22 financing gaps. The ISF estimated a financing gap of over USD200 billion in smallholder financing  
23 needs. Rabobank has a global food and agriculture loan portfolio of 92,3 billion euro, with 54,9 billion  
24 euro to wholesale and international rural & retail banking targeting 2 million farmers in Africa, Asia and  
25 South America via the partner banks of Rabo development. Global Fund linked 29 good causes in 12  
26 countries with US sources that have donated USD31 million. The GFF estimates that there is a  
27 USD33.3 billion funding gap (2015) for RMNCAH in high-burden, low- and lower-middle-income  
28 countries, which amounts to USD9.42 per capita per year.

### 29 **2.6 Concluding remarks**

30 This Chapter has attempted to map existing MSPs based on selected characteristics, namely scale of  
31 operation, composition of lead or main stakeholders, type of partnership and domain or area of  
32 operation. As MSPs are complex, some MSPs tend fit in to more than one cluster. However, the  
33 grouping show that MSPs in a specified cluster do have some commonalities, and thus can be useful  
34 for further analysis.

35

36



### 3 MULTISTAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS: POTENTIAL AND LIMITATIONS

Before suggesting possible pathways and strategies to improve MSPs contribution to FSN in Chapter 4, this chapter aims to assess the potential and limitations of MSPs for improving and financing FSN in the framework of the 2030 Agenda.

This chapter is meant to provide elements of answer to the following questions. What is the value added of MSPs versus government-led decision-making and/or private sector-led implementation processes? What are the prospects of MSPs to act as a potential mechanism of funding FSN? What are the potential and limitations of MSPs? Under which specific contexts and conditions, MSPs can be a suitable tool to improve and finance FSN at different scales?

This Chapter identifies the broad areas where MSPs could bring value-added and the main challenges they face in the realization of their potential. It concludes by describing a set of qualities that could enhance MSPs performance, helping them to achieve their potential and address their challenges. This chapter is illustrated by concrete examples of existing MSPs.

#### 3.1 MSPs: potential and value-added

Building on the discussions in Chapter 1 (section 1.2.2), and on the work done in Chapter 2 to identify broad clusters of existing MSPs, this section identifies two broad areas where MSPs could, in theory, best contribute to improve and finance FSN.

##### 3.1.1 Pool together complementary resources

The AAAA (2015), considers MSPs as an important tool to “mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources” of different partners, in order to “complement the efforts of Governments, and support the achievement of the SDGs, in particular in developing countries”. The AAAA further acknowledges the major contribution of private companies to economic growth and job creation and invites them to apply their creativity and capacity to invest and innovate to the resolution of sustainable development challenges with a long-term perspective.

As highlighted in Chapter 1, and illustrated in Chapter 2, one of the value added of MSPs is the mobilization and coordinated use of complementary human and material resources of different stakeholders. To aggregate resources from different stakeholders is potentially beneficial when collectively managing a shared resource and, or, when addressing complex and multi-faceted challenges. For example, the case of the Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CFBP) mentioned in Chapter 2. While national governments define the legal framework for forest conservation, they might not have sufficient resources to implement ambitious conservation programs. The shared interest of achieving sustainable conservation of forests may lead to international donors to provide financial resources for that effect, and in a coordinated manner. This is also facilitated by private sector involvement in specific initiatives or by coordination of investment areas. Scientific and academic actors facilitate CFBP by gathering and sharing knowledge, while civil society actors act as bridges and check points between national/international ambitious and local realities (CFBP, 2016). In other words, the MSPs aggregates what different actors have as resources (political legitimacy, financial resources, knowledge, social legitimacy) in a coordinated manner that would be highly unlikely to be achieved if stakeholders acted alone.

Also related to management of natural resources, HLPE 2017 report already indicated that more than just pooling resources, stakeholder involvement through MSPs can also provide a value added if it facilitates the management of tensions between stakeholders on the functions and uses of a natural resource (HLPE 2017). Divergence and conflicts on the use of natural resources are frequent in the context of FSN and different methods have been put forward to mediate these – for example, those under the umbrella of Community-Based Adaptive Management promoted by Locally-Managed Marine Area (LMMA) Network mentioned in Chapter 2. Other examples include coordinated agreements between farmers and environmentalists in France that favored an integrated and territorial approach to rural development (Beuret, 1999).

Not only on natural resource management this potential value-added of MSP are observed. Chapter 2 also pointed out to cases where international donors and national government have pulled together resources with local research agencies to promote improved agricultural production technologies –

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1 e.g., the Balochistan Agriculture Project and the Enhancing Food Security in Arab Countries  
2 partnership.

3 On humanitarian aid and south-south and triangular cooperation, the PAA Africa partnered WFP,  
4 FAO, the governments of Brazil, United Kingdom, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal  
5 to implement pilot of home-grown school feeding programs. WFP offered its expertise on local  
6 procurement and delivery of humanitarian aid, FAO technical and agricultural assistance, while the  
7 Brazilian government shared knowledge on nation-wide home-grown school feeding policies. United  
8 Kingdom provided financial resources and facilitation, while different actors from the five African  
9 countries were responsible for delivering and implementing the pilots in practice, in particular local  
10 civil society organizations facilitation for community engagement (PAA Africa, 2015). In sum, these  
11 different examples show cases where the value added of pooling resources from different  
12 stakeholders made possible addressing complex issues that would be extremely challenging without  
13 a MSP.

14 In terms of deriving general messages on the value of pooling resources together, MSPs can  
15 contribute to improve and finance FSN in two main different ways.

16 First, they can influence public agenda (priorities for action) and contribute to convince governments  
17 and IGOs (at national, regional and international levels) to better use existing funding and even to  
18 allocate new public funds to improving and financing FSN. In terms of allocating additional funding  
19 GROWAFRICA has gathered resources from the private sector to jointly investing in rural public  
20 services, such as research and technical extension (Bijaoui, 2017).

21 Second, MSPs can be instrumental in facilitating and strengthening non-state actors' involvement and  
22 contribution to public objectives (Pattberg *et al.*, 2012). MSPs can foster synergies between ideas,  
23 expertise, knowledge, skill, material resources of different stakeholders, and vet decisions more  
24 thoroughly, before moving forward (Hamel, 2017). There is a positive contribution that emerges in the  
25 interaction between State and Non State stakeholders like NGOs and Civil Society. Fox (2005) argues  
26 that a collaboration between these two types of actors can promote pro-poor institutional change by  
27 combining reformers' views within the State with external societal support that sustains those views  
28 against conservative ones. This can be achieved through what the author defines as cross-sectoral  
29 coalitions – in other words, MSPs. This was the case of Community Food Councils (DICONSA) in  
30 Mexico, showing the potential of MSPs in enhancing delivery of services and food. Although there  
31 were unequal power relations that restricted institutional change, the community participation in food  
32 stores did brought some changes in food distribution, also supporting institutional reform beyond the  
33 case itself (de Gortari, 1987). The case showed the strength of MSPs in situations where stakeholders  
34 are unequal, showing the potential to improve service delivery.

35 MSPs can also provide public or private donors better targeted use for their funds. In that  
36 arrangement, clients do not engage directly with the donors, but with the partner organization acting  
37 as its agent. Adopting a Multistakeholder approach in financing can facilitate the needed consultation  
38 that governments and policy-makers must organize for ensuring financial inclusion and better  
39 targeting of available funds (UN, 2014). This is the case of the Initiative for Smallholder Finance (ISF)  
40 mentioned on Chapter 2, that aims to develop financial services to stakeholder that generally have  
41 higher restrictions to access capital. The broad range of stakeholders involved support that financial  
42 services for smallholder farmers be more innovative and better targeted than standard available  
43 funds. Another example is The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), where more than 40  
44 stakeholders including donors and funding organizations share knowledge and discuss options for  
45 financial inclusion (Winter *et al.*, 2017) There are also opportunities to mobilize funds from the people,  
46 through saving and credit associations and multi-stakeholder cooperatives in Northern America (Lund  
47 *et al.* SN; Leviten-Reid and Fairbairn, 2011).

### 48 **3.1.2 Facilitate policy dialogue and policy convergence**

49 MSPs, and in particular “policy-oriented” MSPs, provide an opportunity for policy dialogue,  
50 convergence and potentially consensus-building in policy design - in instances requiring policy  
51 change and for agenda-setting. In cases where MSPs become highly influential in agenda-setting,  
52 impacting on policy-building across different levels, this constitutes what Pattberg *et al.* (2012) refer to  
53 as the new policy network theory (or lobbying theorem), meaning that policies are not only defined in  
54 formal institutions, but rather in a network of stakeholder interactions with different degrees of  
55 formalization.

1 For example, in Scaling-Up Nutrition (SUN), the MSP has been serving as a global platform to  
2 advocate and lobby for increased attention on the nutrition aspects in FSN. It also goes beyond  
3 advocacy by “agenda-setting, increasing opportunities for mobilizing funding, bringing partners on”  
4 (see **Box 5**). SUN also has another dimension of scaling up operationally through related networks,  
5 such as SUN Business network, civil society network, and donor network.

6 Similarly, FANRPAN is a coordinated network of more than 30 participants from different spheres of  
7 society (see **Box 4** on Chapter 2), mobilizing policy actors and promoting convergence in the areas of  
8 agriculture and natural resources in Southern Africa for over two decades. Through the FANRPAN  
9 platform, both governments and civil society have found an expression of their policy preferences  
10 beyond what they would in their relatively smaller consortia or as individual institutions. FANRPAN  
11 scales up the policy agenda from inception, analysis and advocacy among policy decision makers.

12 Consensus-building might bring more legitimacy to the decisions taken and actions engaged through  
13 or with the collaboration of such MSPs. Legitimacy, in general terms, refers to acceptance of the given  
14 order, such as authority, government, institutions, regime, and/or decision-making. Literature is vast  
15 how the terms has been understood, from Max Weber seminal work on the sources of political  
16 legitimacy (traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal; Weber, 1958) to political science authors that  
17 explored how government in the exercise of power have been acquiring or loosing legitimacy  
18 (Rothstein, 2009, Gilley, 2009). Social sciences have extended the analysis of legitimacy to beyond  
19 formal government, also exploring how social groups (Garling et al, 2013) and NGOs (Hudson, 2001;  
20 Steffek and Hahn, 2010; Atack, 1999) acquire acceptance by those that are influenced by their  
21 decision-making. Thus, the concept of legitimacy is understood way beyond just the “quality of being  
22 legal”, but also, in a wider sense, as the “quality of been reasonable and acceptable” – as in dictionary  
23 terms - for the members of a group, and for the society as a whole. Legitimacy has also been a key  
24 concept explored in studies that analyzed MSPs (Bäckstrand, 2006; Mena and Palazzo, 2012; Roloff,  
25 2008; Fuchs *et al.*, 2011; Fransen and Kolk, 2007; Schouten et al, 2012). As further developed in  
26 section 3.3, inclusiveness, accountability and transparency are key conditions to reach this legitimacy.

### 27 **3.2 MSPs: Limitations and challenges.**

28 To realize their potential, MSPs will have to overcome their limitations and address the main challenges  
29 below

#### 30 **3.2.1 Tensions/distrust between partners**

31 In order to work efficiently and effectively together, partners in a MSP often need to overcome initial  
32 distrust and tensions among them, and come to a clear definition and a common understanding of  
33 their respective roles and responsibilities in the partnership.

34 Tensions can appear between partners because of divergences on:

- 35 (i) the diagnosis of the situation: for example, in MSPs for sustainability standards, where NGOs  
36 and civil society organizations see threats on agricultural expansion while private stakeholders  
37 see opportunities for economic growth, but under stricter environmental self-regulation (Hopes  
38 and van der Walk, 2012; Cheyins, 2011);
- 39 (ii) on the short- and long-term objectives and on the priorities for action, for example in the  
40 Purchase for Progress (P4P) of World Food Programme and the PAA Africa, where some  
41 partners were more concerned with the delivery of food aid (local government and WFP), while  
42 others were more concerned with the long-term basis of agricultural development (FAO, civil  
43 society organisations) (Mitchel et al, 2011; Milhorance *et al.*, 2015);
- 44 (iii) on the resources needed and means of implementation of the partnership .

45  
46 These divergences are grounded on: (i) the different interests and motivation partners have to engage  
47 in a partnership and their perception of the value-added and risks associated with this engagement;  
48 and, (ii) their different roles and responsibilities within the partnership.

49 Martens *et al.* (2002) describe three characteristics of the multiple principals and objectives found in  
50 foreign aid funding, an example that can help to understand the different interests, objectives and  
51 motivations partners have in MSPs in general. While cooperatives (Ortmann and King, 2007) and  
52 other private organizations of the social economy (Borzaga and Defourny, 2004) can have other  
53 objectives, private companies, are ultimately accountable to their shareholders and profit is generally  
54 their central objective. They can see their participation in MSPs as a way to influence policy

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1 discourses and decision-making at different scale, while improving their image and reputation and  
2 acquiring a new legitimacy (Roloff, 2008). Private sector can use MSP as a tool of Corporate Social  
3 Responsibility that “tame” external criticism, while offering few if any changes in the economic  
4 objectives and procedures of the company (Mees-Buss and Welch, 2014). Private sector can also use  
5 MSP to bring a brand name while the contribution in funds does not match the benefits it derives in  
6 terms of CSR image – as it has been pointed out as one of the pitfalls of the Fairtrade movement  
7 (Utting, 2015).

8 States are ultimately accountable to their citizens on the way they exert their executive, legislative and  
9 judiciary power, through different governance and representation mechanisms. They pursue multiple,  
10 sometimes competing objectives, (such as enhancing FSN while preserving natural and/or protected  
11 ecosystems: see for instance HLPE (2017). They might see MSPs as a tool to benefit from the  
12 expertise and ideas of non-state stakeholders to set the political agenda, define common rules and  
13 priorities for action. They might also consider MSPs as a way to mobilize non-state actor resources, in  
14 particular private funds, to achieve their public objectives.

15 Civil society organizations are accountable to their members, striving for a shared goal that they  
16 consider of collective, if not public interest. They might strive for MSPs: (i) that effectively empower  
17 marginalized and vulnerable actors, most affected by food insecurity and malnutrition and  
18 counterbalance the influence of private interests in public decision-making; (ii) and that hold States  
19 and private companies accountable for their actions through strong and transparent monitoring  
20 mechanisms.

21 These different tensions increase the risk of MSPs, as most of the formal MSPs are established and  
22 operate under legal arrangements. Partners are jointly and individually liable for the actions of the  
23 other partners (Hamel, 2017). This goes to the reputation, where a single stakeholder or organization  
24 within the MSP can cause reputational damage for the whole MSP. Reputational risk to be associated  
25 with some partners is therefore a consequence of partnering (Martens, 2007).

### 26 **3.2.2 Power asymmetries among partners**

27 As highlighted in Chapter 1, serious risk exists that MSPs reproduce existing power inequalities and  
28 strengthen the position of more powerful actors at the expense of vulnerable and marginalized actors  
29 Faysse (2006) discussed water associations in South Africa, where a colored community invited to  
30 join the water association along with commercial and upstream white communities faced difficulties in  
31 proving their arguments, ultimately abandoning the initiative. The author also points to short-term and  
32 highly heterogeneous MSPs where there was no room, resources or time for capacity-building of  
33 weak members, making those forced to accept decisions contrary to their interests. Fuchs *et al.*  
34 (2011) recalls that many MSPs that intend to have global reach are in fact dominated by stakeholders  
35 in the North – a call that particularly fits the MSPs for sustainability standards mentioned in Chapter 2.  
36 Initiatives to support capacity-building of weaker stakeholders – for example, training, technical  
37 support and, or, funding for smallholder family farmers to access certification – are exceptions rather  
38 than the norm, leading to the conclusion that “vertical inclusion”, that is, power sharing between  
39 stakeholders, is rarely found (Warner, 2006)

40 Many studies (McKeon, 2017 ; McMichael, 2005; Fuchs and Kalfagianni, 2010; Sojamo *et al.*, 2012)  
41 describe the growth of “corporate power” in governance at different scales (from local to global).  
42 Some authors (Fuchs, 2007; Clapp and Fuchs, 2009) distinguish:

- 43 • instrumental power, which reflects corporations’ capacity to directly influence policy processes  
44 and decisions, through, for instance, lobbying or funding political campaigns;
- 45 • structural power, which refers to the influence exerted by corporations on states through their  
46 position in the economy or through their participation to governance mechanisms such as  
47 MSPs or PPPs; and,
- 48 • discursive power, which designates corporations’ capacity to frame the issues, and develop  
49 narratives and norms that reinforce their position and legitimacy.

50 Previous HLPE reports (2016, 2017) described the rapid concentration of power, over the past  
51 decades, in the hands of a few transnational corporations. Three-quarters of the global grain trade are  
52 controlled by only four or five big transnational commodity trade companies: through diversification  
53 and integration, both vertically and horizontally, these companies increase their control across the  
54 food supply chain, from inputs (seed, agrochemicals) to distribution and retail (de Schutter and  
55 Cordes, 2011; Murphy *et al.*, 2012). This entailed a shift in the control of food systems, from farmers

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1 to traders and retailers, and from states to private companies with the emergence of private or  
2 voluntary standards (Lang *et al.*, 2009; Lang and Barling, 2012).

3 For better understanding the impact of power asymmetries on MSPs, it is useful to apply the concept  
4 of effective participation. When analyzing peasant participation at CFS itself, Brem-Wilson (2015)  
5 differentiates "ineffective" from effective participation if stakeholders can: i) be able to intelligibly and  
6 persuasively communicate their views, ii) participate physically and timely at key meetings, iii) be  
7 sufficiently informed, iv) be psychologically comfortable with the MSP, v) have the right to speak and  
8 be heard.

9 These requisites suggest different ways on how power asymmetries can inhibit effective participation  
10 of vulnerable and marginalized stakeholders in MSPs. Unequal resource endowment between  
11 partners is already a differential factor for the ability of partners to always be present and timely at  
12 meetings (requisite iii). MSPs meetings require a priori preparation from staff or dedicated  
13 representative and weaker stakeholders might not have the resources to finance staff, travel and, or,  
14 associated costs with physical presence. At CFS, for example, members of civil society – including  
15 CSM – relies on donor's contributions, while civil society organizations representing the most  
16 vulnerable groups at CONSEA also rely on government funding for traveling to meetings. Weaker  
17 stakeholders may have limited human resources (time and expertise) to engage in MSPs. And  
18 additionally, those partners who bring more funds, will seek to have a determinant influence on the  
19 MSP agenda (see section 3.2.4). Large private foundations such as Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation  
20 and Rockefeller Foundation have been increasingly investing in policy platforms, many of those MSPs,  
21 funding not only the activities proposed by these, but ultimately influencing agenda-setting and policy-  
22 making (Sridhar, 2012; Moran, 2007, Utting, 2001).

23 The ability to engage in intelligible and persuasive communication can also be restricted by power  
24 asymmetries. Discourse modalities at MSPs tend to follow technocratic and rational patterns. And in  
25 most global or international MSPs, English is generally the standard language. Not only having skills  
26 in English is an enormous challenge for many representatives from vulnerable groups from non-  
27 English speaking countries, but also the necessity to "translate" all communication modes into  
28 technocratic discourses (McKenna and Graham, 2000) does increase the difficulties weaker  
29 stakeholders face when engaging in discussions – as the case of RSPO illustrated by Ponte and  
30 Cheyns (2013).

31 The challenge for MSPs in the field of FSN, is to balance this power asymmetry and to ensure a full  
32 and effective participation of vulnerable and marginalized groups more affected by food insecurity and  
33 malnutrition to decision-making. Inclusiveness, accountability and transparency will be key to address  
34 this challenge (see section 3.3).

### 35 **3.2.3 Transaction costs**

36 Decision making in MSPs is more complicated than in other non-multistakeholder processes: (i)  
37 because responsibilities are shared between partners, as is the control over the utilization of  
38 resources and over activity planning; and, (ii) because divergences and disagreements might appears  
39 between partners that may slow down or stop the process (Hamel, 2017).

40 Involving different stakeholders in a MSP is a demanding process that require to engage time, specific  
41 skills and expertise, and financial resources. MSPs such as those identified in the knowledge-oriented  
42 cluster and the food policy and advocacy cluster of Chapter 2 meet constantly (from one annual  
43 meeting to more than 4 times a year). MSP involved in developing sustainability standards - such as  
44 the RSPO and RTRS - took more than 3 years in designing principles and way of operationalizing  
45 them, before they even could move to define other issues such as monitoring, branding, market  
46 development, etc. CONSEA was re-established in 2003, but many of its most innovative policies only  
47 came some years later into place, more towards the end of the past decade. These examples show  
48 that MSPs' initiatives demand both time and commitment of partners as well as some time maturity to  
49 become operational. Expert knowledge is also essential for effective engagement in a MSP (Ponte  
50 and Cheyns, 2013; Cheyns, 2011), and this also requires that stakeholders invest in expertise,  
51 preferably in a communication mode in line with technocratic discourse mode referred in the previous  
52 section. That means, local expertise and local knowledge generally needs to be translated into more  
53 technical (and likely English) language, a process that not only entail transaction costs, but also is  
54 biased against weaker and more vulnerable stakeholders that do not count with these resources.

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1 Vervynckt and Romero (2017), consider the costs associated with PPPs as one of their main  
2 weaknesses. They distinguish:

- 3 • direct costs associated with delivering the output requested, including: the cost of capital  
4 (usually more expensive for a private actor than for a government); the rate of return (profit that  
5 a private company, unlike public actors, is expected to make on their investment); construction  
6 costs<sup>7</sup> (usually higher in a PPP because of the explicit pricing of the risks transferred to the  
7 private partner);
- 8 • indirect costs, including: transaction costs (associating with negotiating, setting the contract,  
9 and running the project); renegotiation costs when needed. Due to the complexity of the  
10 mechanisms, and the size of the projects, few companies have the capacity (skills and  
11 resources) to a PPP, which may limit competition and raise the final cost.

12 Vervynckt and Romero (2017) also distinguish:

- 13 • “explicit payments”, fixed in a formal contract and usually spread over its lifetime, that can be  
14 easily included in public budget planning; and,
- 15 • “contingent liabilities” (or hidden costs), whose timing and magnitude depend on the occurrence  
16 of uncertain future events, that create a budget risk for the government in the future. Some of  
17 these liabilities can be specified in the contract (such as minimum income streams, guaranteed  
18 rates of return, guaranteed currency exchange rates...) and provisioned in the public budget.  
19 Others are highly unpredictable and might appear only if the PPP fails to deliver on time the  
20 expected output.

21 A clear definition of the respective roles and responsibilities of different partners, as well as clear and  
22 efficient mechanisms to allocate, use and monitor the resources engaged in a partnership is likely to  
23 reduce the transaction costs as well as the fiscal impact of MSPs and PPPs, that is, the risks that their  
24 hidden costs might impose on public budget planning (OECD, 2012; Vervynckt and Romero, 2017).

## 25 **3.2.4 Funds mobilization**

26 At the global level, in the UN system, two main sources of funds are usually distinguished: regular or  
27 core budget vs. extra-budgetary or non-core revenues. While the former gather the contributions  
28 received by UN agencies in support of their mandates or programmes, the latter gather earmarked  
29 contributions for which the use have been specified by the donor.

30 Whereas, in 1997, core resources funded 48 percent of UN's operational development and  
31 humanitarian assistance activities, this ratio decreased to only 25 percent in 2013 (Adams and  
32 Martens, 2015). In this context of increasing constraints on public funding for FSN and sustainable  
33 development at global, but also national and regional levels, MSPs, and in particular PPPs, are seen  
34 as a way to leverage additional funds, in particular private or philanthropic funds, to complement  
35 governments efforts to achieve the SDGs (AAAA, 2015; McKeon, 2017).

36 There are more expectations for private sector to commit more financial resources in agriculture and  
37 food investment. However, private sector stakeholders' commitment and release of fund tends to be  
38 conditional on the returns that are supposed to be financially profitable, even if MSP funding remains  
39 largely public, with private sector accounting for only one percent of the new funding (Biermann et al,  
40 2012).

41 Another concrete challenge is related to the time sometimes occurs for funds to be actually available  
42 once the decision to disburse them is made. Hartwich *et al.* (2007:31) illustrates how the partnership  
43 for good agricultural practices in Venezuela failed to deliver when the funds which to be delivered to  
44 the programme where delayed.

45 This evolution, observed not only at the global, but also at regional and national levels, raises the two  
46 main following questions:

47 Are MSPs actually effective in mobilizing additional funds for FSN and sustainable development?  
48 Biermann *et al.*, (2012) concede that it is difficult to estimate the percentage of total funds that is  
49 genuinely new and brought about by the MSPs. Some studies highlight the low overall private sector

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<sup>7</sup> Comparing the cost of 227 new road sections, financed by the European Investment Bank (EIB) between 1990 and 2005 in 15 European countries, Blanc-Brude *et al.*, (2009) found the ex-ante cost of construction to be 24% higher through PPPs than through traditional public procurement.

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1 involvement in PPPs, suggesting that limited additional funding is raised through these partnerships  
2 (Hale and Mauzerall 2004; Biermann *et al.* 2007 in Dellas (2012).

3 While it is difficult to get a global picture, some examples of additional resources have been leveraged  
4 through MSPs in the field of FSN.

5 FAO (2016) stresses that it is even difficult to assess the repartition of investments between public  
6 and private partners in PPPs for agricultural development because of the lack of available data  
7 (limited disclosure of financial information by public and private partners) and lack of comprehensive  
8 methods (in particular to value in-kind contributions in a partnership).

9 FAO (2016) found that the scale of investment varied significantly depending on the type and  
10 complexity of the PPP project implemented. The report provided several example in that regard. Say,  
11 the value of the investment for the Asian PPPs ranged from USD14 3007 for a partnership pilot  
12 project in the seed industry in Pakistan, to USD178 million for the construction and operation of a  
13 flower trading centre in Beijing, China. In Latin America, the value of national partnership programmes  
14 was high, ranging from USD 25 million for the Programme of Support Services to Promote Access to  
15 Rural Markets (PROSAAMER) in Peru, designed to support SMAEs in increasing competitiveness  
16 and market access; to USD 100 million to support the Productive Partnerships Support Project in  
17 Colombia over a period of more than 12 years; and USD126 million for Ecuador's National Inclusive  
18 Rural Businesses Programme (PRONERI), which began in 2010. The individual PPP projects within  
19 these programmes also varied significantly, from small projects of approximately USD 13 000 in  
20 Ecuador to support an SMAE developing new products made out of bamboo, to a total investment of  
21 USD 30 million in the Nestlé coffee partnership in Colombia. In Africa, investments ranged from  
22 USD 200 000 to set up a laboratory for the production of organic fertilizers in Kenya, to USD 156  
23 million to increase domestic vegetable oil production in Uganda.

24 The Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund (AECF) is "a USD 50-100 million challenge fund established in  
25 2008 and financed by several donor agencies. In 2011, IFAD contributed a grant of USD1 million to  
26 AECF, which provides grants and interest-free loans to private companies to promote innovative  
27 business models that expand market opportunities for the rural poor. It is expected to run for six years  
28 and to stimulate over USD 200 million in private-sector investments." (IFAD, 2012)

29 Between 2011 and 2014, SUN Secretariat had attracted some USD 10,087,658 from Multi-Partner  
30 Fund and USD 20 721 951 in Donor contribution (Adams and Martens 2015: table 21 & 22). As  
31 indicated in Chapter 2, Finance MSPs mobilized a range of funds and raised awareness of the scale  
32 of financing gaps.

### 33 **What are the risks associated with the growing influence of private funds in public** 34 **governance?**

35 According to Adams and Martens (2015), the proliferation of partnerships to deal with different  
36 challenges and the increasing reliance on private and non-core funds to deliver outcomes of public  
37 interests might, under certain conditions:

- 38 • increase corporate influence on political discourse and agenda-setting and weaken  
39 representative democracy;
- 40 • contribute to the fragmentation of governance and accountability mechanisms;
- 41 • threaten the stable delivery of public goods and services when funding become increasingly  
42 privatized and unpredictable.

### 43 **3.3 MSPs: qualities that shape their performance.**

44 MSPs' capacity to realize their potential and overcome their limitations depends on their actual  
45 performance. Many studies on political science and public policies have suggested criteria to evaluate  
46 the performance of political decision-making processes and of governance mechanisms (OECD,  
47 1991; Vedung, 1997; Dahler-Larsen, 2011). Some authors applied explicitly those criteria to study the  
48 performance of MSPs (Bäckstrand, 2006; Thabrew *et al.*, 2009; Hämäläinen *et al.*, 2001), including  
49 PPPs (Yuan *et al.*, 2010).

50 Making MSPs work requires balancing different qualities. As highlighted in the previous section, one  
51 of the main value added of the MSPs is to bring stakeholders together, so that they become efficient  
52 partners. This process determines the performance and the results of the MSPs but is often also a  
53 result in itself. Therefore, any assessment of a given MSP must cover not only its tangible results, but

1 also its process itself. In that perspective, this section describes the qualities that determine/impact  
 2 MSPs' performance:


- 3 • “process-related” qualities: inclusiveness; accountability; transparency; efficiency; and,  
 4 reflexivity.
- 5 • “result-related” qualities: effectiveness; impact; and, capacity to mobilize resources.

6 Verified and detailed data on a given MSP may not be publicly available, in particular when it comes  
 7 to the legal and financial aspects of the arrangement which grounds the MSP. Therefore, the purpose  
 8 of this section is not to provide detailed assessments of individual MSPs, but rather to raise the  
 9 important questions, and to suggest relevant assessment methods. The qualities discussed in this  
 10 section are also reflected in the third part of the questionnaire developed by the HLPE (see the  
 11 **Appendix**) that can be used by governments and non-state actors to develop their own assessments  
 12 of existing MSPs.

### 13 3.3.1 “Result-related” qualities

14 Since the 1970s, many social scientists are focusing their work on evaluation research, or theory-  
 15 based evaluation, in order to improve the rationality of policy decision-making. Evaluation research  
 16 aims at measuring the effects of a program against its expected goals, in order to improve future  
 17 programming (Weiss, 1972, 1997; Wholey, 1979). They developed “logic models” (Wholey, 1994;  
 18 Cooksy *et al.*, 2001; Knowlton and Phillips, 2013) and “program theories” (Bickman, 1987, 1989,  
 19 1990) that describe the causal and logical links between the resources needed for a program and its  
 20 outcome. In their simplest versions (see **Figure 3**), those models usually articulate: the inputs  
 21 (resources engaged in a program), the activities (actions undertaken in the program), the outputs,  
 22 directly produced through these activities, and the intended or unintended impacts/outcomes that  
 23 result from the program.

24 **Figure 3 MSPs for FSN: a logic model<sup>8</sup>**



25

<sup>8</sup> This example is not meant to be exhaustive, rather to give an idea of the general blocks of the logic model underpinning any MSP.



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In line with these logic models, this section considers three “results-related” qualities: effectiveness, impact (outcomes) and capacity to mobilize resources. While effectiveness denotes the realization of immediate outputs, impact refers to broader outcomes. These qualities might be easier to assess in more “action-oriented” MSPs.

## **Effectiveness**

Effectiveness denotes the extent to which a system achieves its objectives and delivers its expected outputs. Effectiveness has been assessed, for example, in relation to how international environmental agreements can deliver the objectives that partners signed up to (Victor *et al.*, 1998; Young, 1999). Some political science studies address if the political engagement of a particular group – for example women – can entail changes in policy dynamics (Goetz, 2003; Paxton *et al.*, 2010). In agricultural sciences, effectiveness is widely used to evaluate inputs use (Cherry *et al.*, 2008) or the changes in nutrition patterns brought by agricultural interventions (Berti *et al.*, 2004).

To assess effectiveness, the first step is to clearly identify the main strategic objectives, the roadmap, and the specific targets - including both tangible and intangible outcomes, immediate and intermediate results - collectively defined by the partners of a MSP. Almost all MSPs tend to articulate their expected outputs and outcomes in their objectives.

For example, when assessing its performance, Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) set targets on four areas: (i) reach and coverage of interventions; (ii) public health impact; (iii) affordability and sustainability of solutions; and, (iv) leverage of additional investment in nutrition (GAIN, 2015).

The Initiative for Smallholder Finance (ISF) instead measures its own effectiveness based on the activities partners organize to close the funding gap, setting its target as a catalyzer of initiatives that aim to mobilize funds, thus seeing fund mobilization/raising as its performance indicator (ISF, 2016). The ISF estimates as USD 150 billion funding gap in smallholder financing distributed across informal/community-based financial institutions, formal financial institutional and value-chain financing. “Credit provided by informal and formal financial institutions, as well as value chain actors, currently only meets an estimated USD 50 billion of the more than USD 200 billion need for smallholder finance” (ISF, 2016).

A common strategy that orients and organizes the roles, responsibilities and contributions of the different partners is generally an intermediate target towards achieving common objectives. Some questions that are derived from this are: do partners share a similar understanding of the causes of food insecurity and malnutrition? Do they agree on a strategy, on an implementation plan and on a methodology to assess the results?

While there has been a proliferation of MSPs created to address numerous sustainable development issues, some studies that systematically assessed their performance showed that few MSPs manage to generate outputs matching their own self-report objectives (Biermann *et al.*, 2012; Pattberg *et al.*, 2012). Pattberg and Wideberg, (2016), for instance, analyzed a sample of 340 MSPs related to the implementation of the World Summit of Sustainable Development (WSSD) and found that 38% showed low to no measurable output, and about 38% percent of partnership with measurable output engage in activities with no direct relation to their publicly stated goals, leaving only 24% of MSPs in which all of the outputs were matching with self-reported functions. In other words, they found that most MSPs established in the context of the WSSD are not (at least as yet) actually delivering on their promises, which makes their claims to legitimacy hard to credit. This may be because MSPs are relatively new in most of the contexts in which they are found. Also empirical research is still scanty, leaving many aspects of MSP operations and achievements undocumented. This has left a gap between the sometimes strong case made for MSPs and their apparent difficulty in matching the vision to reality.

## **Impact**

Impact is conceptually distinct from effectiveness (Hulme, 2000). While effectiveness deals with short- and medium-term, immediate and intermediate direct outputs, impacts designates broader outcomes, ultimate results, including indirect and/or long-term, intended or unexpected. Those ultimate results are more affected by exogenous factors. In the context of improving or financing FSN, effectiveness could be measured, for instance, by the quantity of food provided through humanitarian assistance in a context of emergency, with regards to the initial target. Impact analysis would assess the improvement in FSN status of the vulnerable groups targeted by this humanitarian assistance.

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1 One of the main debates in the literature on impact analysis and development projects focuses on  
2 attribution, meaning how to attribute specific impacts to specific actions and decisions. How to identify  
3 the specific direct and indirect contributions of a MSP to FSN and differentiate it from the effects of  
4 other exogenous factors, beyond its control? Some authors have developed techniques to identify  
5 and measure attribution (see **Box 12**). Others have questioned the feasibility and even the relevance  
6 of measuring attribution (Pawson, 2013), preferring to use impact analysis to improve development  
7 practice instead (Roche, 1999).

### **Box 12 Different methods to measure attribution**

**Randomized control trials (RCTs):** (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011).

**Participatory Impact pathways analysis (PIPA)** (*first used in January 2006 in Ghana with seven projects funded by the Challenge Program on Water and Food*).

...

**(To be developed)**

8  
9 When evaluating the impact of MSPs for FSN, it might be important to clearly communicate which  
10 perspective is adopted: one more concerned with measuring the impact of MSP's interventions or one  
11 more concerned with understanding the processes of change and how to improve MSP actions and  
12 activities. Put differently, there are both external changes to look for (more money raised; standards  
13 with more buy-in established) and also internal changes (such as trust among MSP participants rises;  
14 informal interaction among previously distant actors increases; etc.)

### **Capacity to mobilize resources:**

16 This third "outcome-related" quality, which could be considered as part of the effectiveness of a MSP,  
17 deserves, however, a specific attention when assessing the contribution of MSPs to improve and  
18 finance FSN. Resource mobilization is understood as the process and activities involved in securing  
19 new and additional resources for an initiative, organization, or partnerships – the case of MSP - as  
20 well as making the best use of existing resources.

21 Resource mobilization theory (RMT) emerged during the 1970s, building on the insights of  
22 organizational sociology, to better understand the dynamics and tactics of social actors and social  
23 movements and, in particular, how they were able to effectively mobilize resources to pursue their  
24 goals and desired social changes (see for instance: Lipsky, 1968; Gamson, 1975; McCarthy and Zald,  
25 1977; Jenkins, 1983; Zald and McCarthy, 1987; Edwards and Gillham, 2013).

26 McCarthy and Zald (1977) define a social movement as a set of preferences for social change: they  
27 call social movement organization (SMO), any complex or formal organization which strives for this  
28 change. Then they call *adherents* those actors who share the goals of a SMO; *bystanders* those non-  
29 adherents that are not opponents; and, *constituents* those engaging their resources in the SMO and  
30 struggling for its goals. From that perspective, any resource mobilization strategy should aim to  
31 convert opponents and bystanders in adherents and adherents in constituents.

32 For the *Partnership for agricultural water for Africa* (AgWA, see **Box 13**), mobilizing resources is  
33 essentially about mobilizing: "money, people and political will".

## Box 13 AgWA: Partnership for agricultural water for Africa

AgWA is an autonomous partnership between FAO, IFAD, IGOs at global and regional level, governmental agencies, international financial and development institutions, networks of universities and research institutes and civil society organizations, “who have a common interest and important capacities” to scale-up investment in Agricultural Water Management (AWM) in Africa, that are socially equitable, profitable at the farm level, economically viable, environmentally friendly and sustainable. Its Secretariat is hosted by FAO Sub-Regional Office for Eastern Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

AgWA focuses its actions on five priority areas:

- **advocacy:** disseminating information on AWM and push forward this topic on national and international political agendas;
- **partner harmonization** through a platform for closer collaboration, policy dialogue and coordination between partners;
- **generating and sharing knowledge** around issues related to AWM;
- **capacity building,** for informed decision-making on AWM at all levels.

Source: <http://www.fao.org/aqwa/home/en/>; <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5537e.pdf> (Accessed December 2017).

1 More precisely, Edward and McCarthy (2004) identified five types of resources that can be mobilized  
2 through a social movement:

- 3 • moral resources, including: legitimacy, integrity, support and celebrity;
- 4 • cultural resources, including: cultural and communication products, tools and knowledge  
5 advocating for the goals of the SMO;
- 6 • human resources, including: labour, experience, skills, expertise and leadership;
- 7 • material resources, including: financial resources, buildings, equipment...
- 8 • socio-organizational resources, including infrastructures, social networks and organizations.

9 RMT suggests that the capacity of a SMO to achieve its goals, which determines its impact, is  
10 correlated with its capacity to mobilize resources – part of its effectiveness. This capacity to mobilize  
11 resources is, in turn, related to different criteria, including: SMO’s size, as well as its degree of  
12 formalization and professionalization (McCarthy and Zald, 1973; Staggenborg, 1988; Edward and  
13 Gillham, 2013).

14 In its earlier formulations, RMT devoted more attention to the mobilization of material resources from  
15 external sources. The attention now have shifted from this issue of resource availability towards the  
16 more pressing question of resource access and overcoming resource inequality (Edward and Gillham,  
17 2013). Edwards and McCarthy (2004) identified four main mechanisms of access to resources in  
18 SMOs:

- 19 • “self-production” through the activities of the SMO;
- 20 • “aggregation” of the individual resources of its constituents into collective resources;
- 21 • “co-optation or appropriation” of external resources through the relationships they have with  
22 other organizations;
- 23 • “patronage” of a SMO by an individual or organization through private donation, foundation  
24 grants, or contracts.

25 This issue of access to resources raises two main questions: what is the proportion of internal or  
26 external resources? To what extent, external supporters constrain the agenda and activities of a  
27 SMO, thus impacting its capacity to achieve its goals? (Edward and Gillham, 2013)

28 These resource mobilization concepts and theories could be adapted to the study of resource  
29 mobilization in MSPs. Resource mobilization is a critical element of MSPs and most of them have  
30 resource mobilization program, plan or portfolio.

31 In many instances, developing countries may be keener to take part in a MSP because they expect it  
32 to provide them with additional resources they can no longer obtain from traditional channels  
33 (Compagnon, 2012). Further there is a tendency to assume that the private sector will bring more  
34 resources into the partnership (Dellas (2012). This can be problematized – for example by recognizing  
35 the diversity of the private sector, including small and medium enterprises, cooperatives and others  
36 private sector actors in financing and policy (CONCORD, 2017) or by recognizing the tensions and  
37 limitations described in previous sections on the instrumental use of MSP for branding and CSR.

1 Partnerships may use income-generating activities to ensure that more consumers could afford  
2 services (Dellas (2012) either provided by the MSP itself or other FSN service provider. For eg,  
3 PROASNE funded community projects such as a tilapia fishery and sewing cooperative (PROASNE  
4 2005a, b; 13 in Dellas (2012). The activities have been successful at generating a sustainable income  
5 source for participating families. For example, while the basic fishing equipment was provided by the  
6 donors, the participants could afford to invest in additional equipment themselves after one season  
7 (PROASNE 2005b)

### 8 **3.3.2 “Process-related” qualities**

9 The “process-related” qualities reflect the extent to which MSPs efficiently facilitate the discussions  
10 between stakeholders, enabling them to work together for a shared objective. The 2030 Agenda (UN,  
11 2015), underline the need to “promote peaceful and *inclusive* societies for sustainable development”  
12 and to “develop *effective, accountable and transparent* institutions at all levels”<sup>9</sup> (SDG16, and target  
13 16.6). These “process-related” qualities, highlighted in the 2030 Agenda, strongly impact the  
14 legitimacy of a given MSP, of its processes, actions and decisions.

#### 15 **Inclusiveness**

16 Legitimacy is grounded on rights, justice and equity. Therefore, as a condition for legitimacy, a MSP  
17 has to be inclusive and to give a voice to all the relevant stakeholders. One of the key objectives of  
18 the CFS reform in 2009 was to improve its inclusiveness, ensuring “that the voices of all relevant  
19 stakeholders – particularly those most affected by food insecurity – are heard” (CFS, 2009).

20 In the field of FSN, at least three broad categories of stakeholders could be considered as “relevant”:

- 21 • States (as well as IGOs and governmental agencies) that, as “duty-bearers”, have the  
22 obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right to adequate food;
- 23 • The “right-holders”, people that are most affected by food insecurity and malnutrition, and their  
24 organizations, including vulnerable people with specific nutrient requirements (such as young  
25 children, adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating women, the elderly and ill people), or  
26 marginalized people with less control over their diets (such as the urban poor, as well as some  
27 poor small food producers and indigenous peoples) (HLPE, 2017b);
- 28 • Non-state actors, involved in the different elements of food systems, and influencing directly or  
29 indirectly food supply chains, food environments and/or consumer behaviour. This includes for  
30 instance not only private actors but also actors of the knowledge sector.

31 It is important to stress the difference between including all “relevant” stakeholders versus just  
32 including all stakeholders. Some MSPs might potentially support certain groups or purposely want to  
33 exclude other stakeholders, if such exclusion is considered necessary to achieve desired objectives.  
34 MSPs that try to fill a democratic deficit, for example, might consider giving more space to those  
35 stakeholders that are typically marginalized in standard political processes, as a way to  
36 counterbalance the power of more influential actors. Some marginalized populations may not feel  
37 comfortable entering a mixed forum at first, especially if it includes traditional rivals or those in a  
38 position of power over them. They might prefer to meet first among themselves or with “like minded”  
39 actors, to develop a shared agenda before embarking on negotiations with others who may hold more  
40 power. This has been the strategy of bodies with multi-stakeholder participation rooted in human-  
41 rights approaches, such as the CONSEA and its adoption of the right to food framework. CONSEA  
42 composition as a participatory and consultative body between public officers and local civil society  
43 organizations – many representing marginalized populations – indicates this strategy of keeping the  
44 Council as a body of the “like-minded”, at least until recent reforms (Mendonça Leão and Maluf,  
45 2014). Private sector is included, but it remains instrumentally at the borders of the Council, also in  
46 terms of representation (2 seats to private sector in a 60 seats Council). This strategy “implies that  
47 more critical and progressive thinking manages to flow more easily within the Council, shifting the  
48 challenge to the design and implementation of public policies that would be needed to make those  
49 transformative ideas reality” (Zanella, 2017).

50 Beyond the representation of stakeholders, some studies (Chambers, 2003, Dryzek, 2012) have  
51 focused on the “fair” representation of marginalized discourses in contexts where representation by  
52 election is unlikely, unfeasible or irrelevant.

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<sup>9</sup> Words in italic in the quotations are highlighted by the HLPE.

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1 Assessing a MSP’s inclusiveness raises the following questions:

- 2 • Does the MSP include all “relevant” stakeholders?
- 3 • Who can participate to the discussions? Who takes the final decision?
- 4 • Do the rules and representation mechanisms of the MSP ensure a full and effective
- 5 participation of all stakeholders (especially those actors most affected by food insecurity and
- 6 malnutrition) and a “fair” representation in the decision-making and implementation process?
- 7 • If an equal voice is not given to each stakeholder, are any mechanisms to, at least, identify and
- 8 acknowledge power asymmetries with the MSP?
- 9 • If the main objective of the MSP is to exchange knowledge and share lessons, is it using
- 10 diverse forms of knowledge to inform the debate?

## 11 **Accountability**

12 Accountability is usually understood as the responsibility that a representative or a group acquires  
13 with the action of speaking or deciding on behalf of someone else. According to Swinburn *et al.*,  
14 (2015) “accountability is ultimately about governance and power and determines how and why  
15 decisions are made, who makes decisions, how power is used, shared, and balanced, whose  
16 opinions are important, and who holds whom to account”.

17 Some authors, such as Keohane (2003), differentiate internal from external accountability. Internal  
18 accountability refers to the responsibility that a representative acquired vis-à-vis the group of actors  
19 represented. External accountability refers to the wider responsibility acquired vis-à-vis all actors  
20 potentially impacted by the representative’s decisions and, more broadly, vis-à-vis the whole society.

21 In political science, the concept of accountability has been widely used, applied and scrutinized in  
22 democratic and electoral contexts (Przeworski *et al.*, 1999; Bovens *et al.*, 2014). Democratically  
23 elected representatives are ultimately held accountable by their electorates through the mechanism of  
24 elections. The assumption is that, to be reelected, a representative needs to provide satisfactory  
25 account of his actions and decisions to his electorate.

26 Challenging this view as a simplistic and over-optimistic assumption found in western-liberal  
27 democracies, other authors have investigated the notion of accountability in non-democratic contexts.  
28 They studied diverse political regimes (He, 2006; He and Warren, 2011), as well as contexts where  
29 electoral procedures are not used, such as in global governance regimes (Scholte, 2004; Dryzek and  
30 Stevenson, 2011; Biermann and Gupta, 2011).

31 These authors provide useful insights for assessing accountability in MSPs where representatives are  
32 not selected through democratic elections. According to them, when assessing accountability in these  
33 cases, it is important to check whether the representatives have institutional (formal or informal)  
34 obligations to:

- 35 • give an account of their actions and decisions to their constituencies (the stakeholder they
- 36 represent), or more widely to the whole society;
- 37 • be held responsible for the possible consequences (positive and negative) of their actions and
- 38 decisions.

39 In this sense, the analysis moves from a focus on the selection procedures of representatives, as an  
40 indirect way to assess accountability, to a direct evaluation of accountability, questioning the effective  
41 obligations imposed on the representatives and assessing the way they implement the mandate they  
42 received.

## 43 **Transparency**

44 Transparency implies that all relevant stakeholders have open or easy access to the best available  
45 information on a MSP’s governance, rules, processes, costs, activities and decisions (OECD, 2012).  
46 At a deeper level, access to information might not only be ensured to the stakeholders participating in  
47 the partnership, but also more generally to all the affected groups and to the general public,  
48 particularly when the MSP is delivering an outcome of “public” interest, as defined in Chapter 1. For  
49 example, debates and decisions taken by the MSP could be posted in publicly accessible sites.

50 Transparent rules are also needed for dispute resolution among partners (OECD, 2012) .

51 Transparency is considered, by some authors, as an important condition for legitimacy (Hale, 2008;  
52 Fox, 2007) and for accountability (AAAA, 2015; Vervynckt and Romero, 2017).

53 Questions that assist in evaluating transparency of MSPs include:

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- 1 • Are there transparent rules for decision-making?
- 2 • How stakeholders involved and the wider public are informed of the MSP's decisions and
- 3 actions?
- 4 • Does the MSP provide transparent information on its funding: origin and utilization?
- 5 • Who can request additional information on a MSP's processes or outcomes?
- 6 • Is this information provided in different relevant languages?

### 7 **Reflexivity**

8 Reflexivity is a term that is increasingly used in governance studies to denote the capacity of a given  
9 system to learn from mistakes, to assess long-term trends, and to react accordingly (Rhodes, 1997;  
10 Voss *et al.*, 2006; Marsden, 2013). Instead of avoiding shocks, reflexive systems can learn from them  
11 and adapt themselves in response. Reflexivity thus appears as a condition of resilience and, more  
12 broadly, of sustainability (OECD, 1991). Reflexivity is grounded on regular monitoring and evaluation  
13 of the situation (context, trends, challenges and opportunities), of the objectives, processes, outcomes  
14 and impacts. One example is found in MSPs involved in setting policy standards and regulations (see  
15 Chapter 2). Such MSPs initially focus on conceptualizing the meaning of the policy standards, and  
16 then evolve to become more involved in implementing standards or certification schemes, thus slightly  
17 broadening their role with a view to staying relevant in changing markets.

### 18 **Efficiency**

19 In system studies, efficiency is understood as the relation between the benefits produced and the  
20 resources engaged (material, human and financial resources). The question here is the extent to  
21 which a given MSP makes the best use of its limited resources to achieve its objectives. A MSP might  
22 be very effective while not necessarily efficient, which would imply that it requires the consumption of  
23 a great deal of resources for achieving its objectives on time.

24 Another question is how to measure those benefits of the MSP that are intangible or only observable  
25 in the long run. In “policy-oriented” MSPs, when the main objective is to engage stakeholders who  
26 would not normally interact with each other, to build trust among different groups, or to increase  
27 participation in policy design and implementation, many benefits and outcomes might not be easily  
28 measurable. Similarly the time and resources, directly or indirectly engaged in discussions to reach a  
29 consensus among stakeholders might be difficult to assess. In these conditions, a social cost-benefit  
30 analysis might be complicated to execute.


31 Efficiency of MSPs should also be compared, where appropriate, to the efficiency of other non-  
32 multistakeholder processes pursuing similar objectives. This assessment is essential for stakeholders  
33 to make a decision on the resources they wish to engage in a MSP collaborative process. Making this  
34 decision, stakeholders have also to consider that the apparent lower efficiency of MSPs, with regards  
35 to other processes, reflect the higher transaction costs generated by the inclusiveness of the process.

### 36 **3.3.3 MSPs: the logic of collective action**

37 **Figure 4** below, illustrates the logical links, the synergies and trade-offs between those eight qualities  
38 and can provide a logic model to assess the performance of existing MSPs, i.e. the extent to which  
39 they realize their potential and overcome their limitations.

40

1 **Figure 4 MSPs: the logic of collective action**



2  
 3 For example, if a process is too inefficient, no matter how inclusive it is, people are likely to opt out.  
 4 Although greater inclusiveness, transparency and accountability appear to increase costs, the participation  
 5 of excluded groups can bring benefits not just in terms of process but lower cost of outcomes too. For  
 6 example, in India the Kudumbashree network of women was used successfully for a vaccination campaign  
 7 at a much lower cost than would have been incurred if all the women in the network had to be reached  
 8 individually. The challenge for the MSP is to find the right balance so that MSP outcomes, particularly  
 9 for FSN, may be realized over a long time, while the costs are incurred immediately. It is important for  
 10 the successful design and implementation of MSPs that tradeoffs over time are also well understood  
 11 and considered.

12 **3.4 Conclusions**

13 When the potential of providing and managing finance for improving FSN seems great, however,  
 14 there are real challenges to attract private finance, levels of which currently remain extremely low.  
 15 MSP' taking the role of catalyzing financial resources mobilization via innovative modes of funding  
 16 appears the best practice to follow to attract private and public investment in FSN infrastructures and  
 17 social enterprise including food consumption and related investment in home.

18 The question is what can we expect from them and what can we learn to improve outcomes in the  
 19 future? Most of the answer to this question rest on how MSPs take full advantage of the Partnership  
 20 SDG 17 and effectively merge it with the new FFD modality of financing, targeting FSN positioning  
 21 and operational effectiveness strategies.

22  
 23

## 4 PATHWAYS TO IMPROVE MULTISTAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS' CONTRIBUTION TO FSN

Starting from the logic model presented in the previous chapter, this last solution-oriented chapter suggests ways to optimize the contribution of MSPs to FSN and sustainable development.

The chapter starts by discussing internal factors that could contribute to improve the performance of MSPs. It then discusses how states and IGOs could build an enabling environment that would help MSPs to achieve their potential and overcome their limitations. The last section focuses on the innovative funding mechanisms that could better mobilize financial resources for FSN in the framework of the 2030 Agenda.

### 4.1 Improve MSPs' performance: internal conditions

Chapter 3 identified some limitations and challenges of MSPs. They included tension and distrust between partners, power asymmetries, transaction costs, and funds mobilization. This section proposes internal issues that could improve MSPs performance.

The following factors are identified to improve performance;

- Stakeholder engagements
- Power symmetry pathways
- Reducing transaction costs
- Improved skills to manage MSPS
- Alignment between MSPs

USAID and CED (2016) also shows some areas of risks and associated mitigating strategies (see **Box 14**).

**Box 14 Risks associated and mitigating strategies in PPPs**

	RISKS	MITIGATING SRATEGIES
REPUTATION	Potential loss of reputation because of a partner reneges on agreement	Implement a thorough pre-screening of partner(s) Clearly articulate the limits to engagement (timeframe, resource commitment, etc.)
EXPECTATION	Unrealistic expectations from the community	Include community leaders in stakeholder consultations Use media to communicate with the public about project
PROJECT	Potential partners face irreconcilable interests Complementarities among partners lacking Financial weakness of the project may lead to unsustainability Other business competitors benefit from outcomes of the partnership (Free Rider problem)	Select a partner that has the ability to bring comparable amount of resources Develop a budget accounting for various contingencies Invite competitors into the partnership
LEGAL	US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act which prohibits all forms of bribery by US firms Intellectual property (IP) issues	PPP is an appropriate way of bestowing benefits to government Discuss upfront and agree on any IP issues and put in agreement
POLITICAL	Potential disruption of project due to government intibility, unexpected changes in legislation, and inadequate security of investments Project becomes target of strong political opposition	Partner with local business and social institutions; obtain political risk insurance Postpone partnership activity until change in political climate

Source: Adapted from USAID and Committee for Economic Development (2016:16-17)



## 1 4.1.1 Building Trust and Synergies

2 Chapter 3 illustrated the instances under which stakeholders can have tensions and mistrust that  
3 could even be detrimental to the MSP itself.

### 4 Stakeholder engagements

5 Stakeholder engagement can be useful to build trust, foster synergies among partners. It also assists  
6 to address the issues of decision making, transparency and accountability. Stakeholder involvement  
7 in the governance mechanisms at different scales is increasingly recognised as an enabling condition  
8 and a way to manage tensions between different objectives and between different stakeholders  
9 (HLPE, 2017). Effective stakeholders' engagement also involves putting into place an effective  
10 communication strategy and providing ongoing outreach to the public and private sector and  
11 beneficiaries (USAID, 2015).

12 Different approaches are followed to create synergies

13 At global level, the UN has been using the "Partnership Fairs" to accompany the meetings of the  
14 Commission on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in order to provide space for networking, create  
15 synergies between partnerships and learn from each other's experience, and thus opening political  
16 space to for closer association between UN, NGOs and business (Mert and Chan, 2012).

17 The HLPE (2017) report illustrates how different countries are progressing to introduce measures to  
18 involve and engage traditional and indigenous stakeholders in forests management. It cites how  
19 different countries such as Central African Republic, Peru and Ecuador incorporated stakeholders'  
20 involvement in the codes, laws and constitutions. Countries such as South Africa developed  
21 regulations that guided how to engage with stakeholders, particularly private sector through the Public  
22 Private Partnership Unit (National Treasury, 2007).

23 MSPs also develop stakeholder engagement framework. **Box 15** illustrates Gavi's Partnerships'  
24 Engagement Framework (PEF), which came into effect in 2016. The framework is supposed to clarify  
25 the role of each partner, brings countries together with their partners to identify the support they need.

### 26 Mitigating Reputational Risk

27 Reputational risk is viewed as an inherent risk of partnering (Martens, 2007), which entails potential  
28 loss of reputation because of a partner or two renege on agreement (USAID (2016). USAID (2016)  
29 suggests overall mitigating strategy for such risk is to; (i) Implement a thorough pre-screening of  
30 partner(s), and (ii) clearly articulate the limits to engagement (timeframe, resource commitment, etc.).

31

#### **Box 15 Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI): The Partners' Engagement Framework (PEF)**

Gavi provides funding to partners. This allows them, in turn, to support countries' immunisation programmes. Support under PEF is divided into three areas. These are: targeted country assistance, strategic focus areas and foundational support. Most PEF funding is allocated to targeted country assistance. PEF came into force in 2016, marking a significant evolution in the way Alliance partners, particularly WHO and UNICEF, work together. It clarifies the role of each partner, brings countries together with partners to identify the support they need, and enforces accountability for results.

- In **leveraging comparative advantages**, PEF clearly defines the type of support that each Vaccine Alliance partner provides. It reduces overlaps and leverages the comparative strengths of each partner.
- **Country-centric**: Countries are at the heart of the partner activities funded by PEF. For example, countries themselves identify the technical support they need to overcome key immunisation bottlenecks. Countries also regularly assess the support they receive from partners. PEF dedicates most of its resources to technical assistance to countries. This is a major shift from Gavi's previous approach, where activities were largely defined and funded at the global and regional levels.
- **Priority countries**: PEF gives priority to the 20 countries\* that face the most severe immunisation challenges. Partner activities funded through PEF aim to meet the specific needs of each country.  
\*PEF priority countries in 2016 were: Afghanistan, Chad, Nigeria, Uganda, Pakistan, Indonesia, DRC, India, Kenya, Ethiopia, Niger, CAR, Myanmar, Haiti, Somalia, Yemen, Mozambique, PNG, Madagascar, South Sudan.

- **Making partners accountable:** The PEF accountability framework defines key performance indicators for activities at all levels. An example of a country-level indicator is the requirement to reach a certain level of coverage with a newly introduced vaccine.

Progress is monitor against all indicators to ensure our investments deliver results.

## 1 4.1.2 Balancing Power asymmetries

2 Partnering is more likely to succeed when there are equal power resources, or interdependence,  
3 between collaborating parties (Chicksand, 2015). Chapter 3 (3.2.2) showed how power asymmetries  
4 inhibit effective participation of vulnerable stakeholders in MSPs. Several options have been  
5 considered to address such asymmetries. Closing the power gap to create a more symmetric power  
6 relations within MSPs will requires two way actions from the less powerful and the more powerful.

### 7 Action from the Vulnerable: collective awareness

8 In response to continued shift in the control of the food systems, there has been growing collective  
9 awareness to contest power concentration in food policy. These has drawn interest of some  
10 researchers (Gaarde (2017), Brem-Wilson, 2016)

11 According to Brem-Wilson, 2016) the emergence of the global social movement La Vía Campesina  
12 indicates the intensity of the contestation of transnational food policy making and the quest for power  
13 symmetry. The author identified different activities undertaken by these social movements and food  
14 sovereignty activists (including the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC)) in  
15 the quest to shape the direction of food and agricultural global governance and they include;

- 16 • mobilisations and demonstrations before the meetings of international food and agriculturally  
17 relevant bodies;
- 18 • speaking at the meetings of United Nations (UN) bodies, such as the General Assembly, or the  
19 Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN; and
- 20 • convening autonomous spaces of civil society deliberation, such as four- to five-yearly  
21 International Conferences,
- 22 • collaborations with other allies, through logistical and personnel support, in the creation of  
23 international civil society fora and meetings. These include the Nyéléni Forum for Food  
24 Sovereignty (2007), and the People's Food Sovereignty Civil Society Forum (2009).

25 Gaarde (2017) also indicates how the social movements exerted their presence through their  
26 participation in the 2009 reformed CFS via the Civil Society Mechanism (CSM) that made their  
27 subsequent participation more equitable. They social movements also got involved in the drafting of  
28 the Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas in the UN Human  
29 Rights Council in order to build support for the defense and protection of the rights of peasants and  
30 other rural actors.

31

### 32 Action from the more powerful: building capacity

33 *(To be developed)*

34 The range of interventions need to be considered to build capacity of the weaker stakeholder. Open  
35 Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness (2017) suggests several options that can be considered in  
36 preparing MSPs capacity to improve FSN. These include a) creating funding mechanisms that ensure  
37 that MSPs improve FSN, b) developing regulations and norms to promote MSPs transparency and  
38 accountability to their stakeholders, c) urging government and other support programmes for  
39 developing MSPs capacity of aid effectiveness, and d) develop measures to promote philanthropy  
40 and corporate social responsibilities.

41

## 42 4.1.3 Transaction costs management

43 The emphasis on multi-stakeholder partnerships can be in conflict with strengthening public  
44 administration and UN institutions due to Partnerships' often high transaction costs, resulting from the

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1 need to manage the partnership (Adams and Martens (2015). These costs are generally  
2 underestimated and often the adequate recovery of institutional costs associated with partnership  
3 activities is not guaranteed. (AAAA, 2015:20) and UN (2015) acknowledges the need to reduce or  
4 manage transaction costs. Transaction costs refer to the costs of establishing and maintaining a  
5 partnership; more specifically, they encompass legal, financial, and technical advisory costs incurred  
6 by stakeholders in the partnership (GeDudkin and Timo Väilä, 2005).

7 Stakeholders or partners are already being encouraged to manage transaction costs.  
8 Adams and Martens (2015) suggest that UN Member States should ensure that partnerships with UN  
9 involvement are not subsidized by core UN resources with consequent negative effects on the  
10 availability of remaining core resources. Accordingly, it is important to guarantee cost recovery for  
11 multilateral management and demonstrable compliance with UN standards with comprehensive cost-  
12 benefit analyses of any individual partnership with UN involvement, taking into account not only the  
13 direct costs but also the opportunity costs of its engagement.

14 In a different study, GeDudkin and Timo Väilä (2005) estimated that the transaction costs of the PPP  
15 related to the procurement amount on average to well over 10 percent of the capital value of the  
16 project in selected countries in Europe. Both public and private sectors experienced about 7 percent  
17 and the losing bidder experienced about 5 percent. They found that the transaction costs (in percent  
18 of projects' capital value) to the partners vary between countries (legal systems) and sectors, and they  
19 are significantly higher in small projects (below £25 million for the public sector) and in projects that  
20 take long (over 50 months) to procure.

21 As such, to reduce transaction cost in executing MSPs development projects will require attention to  
22 cross country and sector differences, to encourage bigger projects and minimize time spend in  
23 procurement process.

24 Other transaction costs occur in executing financing for development (AAAA, 2015). The cost of  
25 remittances in certain low volume and high cost corridors are higher than 5 percent (AAAA, 2015 and  
26 UN, 2015). (AAAA, 2015) and UN (2015) further express commitment to work towards reducing the  
27 average cost of transaction cost of migrant remittances (or financial flows) by 2030 to less than 3 per  
28 cent of the amount transferred. This also involves ensuring that no remittance corridor requires  
29 charges higher than 5 per cent by 2030, in consideration of the need to maintain adequate service  
30 coverage.

### **Box 16 Collective Action for Agri MSPs to reduce Transaction costs**

Collective action is an essential feature of all agri-PPPs and helps to promote inclusion and to reduce transaction costs. The study found that while agri-PPPs aim to encourage inclusive growth, the transaction costs associated with sourcing from numerous smallholders are high. Fostering collective action and capacity building increases the participation of smallholders in modern value chains while reducing the transaction costs for lead private partners. The four types of agri-PPP identified in the review aimed to foster collective action. Public partners, including the donor community and civil society actors, often provided support to the formation of groups and the capacity building of smallholders to help them become more equitable partners for the private sector.

*Source:* FAO (2016:x)

### **31 4.1.4 Skills Improvement to manage MSPs**

32 There is a need for management skills to manage MSPs. According to Makofane (2013:118),  
33 management skills and creativity are important as far as managing the process of partnerships  
34 implementation is concerned, as the process in itself may be convoluted where officials would be  
35 required to have some requisite skills. This could among other things, require of managers to have  
36 acquired the ability to specify the expected outcome that is commensurate to the input used.

37

### **38 4.1.5 Alignment between MSP**

39 The AAAA (2015) acknowledges the results achieved by MSPs. It further encourages MSPs working  
40 in similar focus areas to align better in order to improve their contribution in different areas of FSN.  
41 The AAAA (2015) identifies Global Alliance for Vaccine and Immunization (Gavi), the Global Fund to

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1 Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and Global Financing Facility in support of Every Women,  
2 Every Child to align their activities in improving the health issues, which are very related to FSN.  
3 Similarly, the activities of such cluster of health MSPs should be aligned with food related MSPs.

## 4 **4.1.6 Increasing sources of income**

5 There is a growing need for increasing the sources of funding MSPs in order to improve predictability  
6 of income flows (Adams and Martens, 2015). There is inclination to improving additional sources of  
7 public financing and innovative funding to complement the regular contributions.

8 One source is taxation. Adams and Martens (2015) identify two areas of taxation;

- 9 • Taxation based on the “polluter pays principle,” which holds that the costs of pollution have to be  
10 borne by those who cause it, could be extended to a range of global problems, all of which the UN  
11 is asked to address.
- 12 • Introduction of a financial transaction tax internationally coordinated and performed by the  
13 responsible national fiscal authorities.

14 In the case of knowledge and innovation MSPs, Hartwich et al (2007:31) suggest a commodity fund  
15 as mandatory tax or a voluntary fee that government or a commodity association imposes on all  
16 producers. The fund could be used for technical assistance, marketing, information, training and R&D.

## 17 **4.2 Improve MSPs’ performance: enabling environment**

18 (AAAA, 2015) and the 2030 Agenda identify several enabling conditions that could help MSPs to  
19 better achieve their potential for improving and financing FSN: These are similar to the business  
20 environment (BE), which is the supporting or limiting factors exogenous to the MSP itself and vital to  
21 MSPs existence and performance, serving both as absorbing the unintended consequences of MSPs  
22 activity and providing inputs for the operation of the MSPs (Thirlwall, 2011 and Thindwa, 2001).

23 This section presents general conditions for all MSPs and specific conditions for different categories of  
24 MSPs.

### 25 **4.2.1 Promote peaceful society for sustainable development**

26 The SDG16 provides targets for peaceful society for sustainable development. HLPE (2017:76)  
27 illustrates extensively the effect of lack of peace on the human development and FSN in particular.  
28 There are many countries currently struggling with destabilized governments, social unrest, conflicts  
29 and humanitarian crises. The scale of the challenges, the costs as well as expected investments  
30 require contribution of different clusters of MSPs.

31

32 According to the HLPE (2017), conflicts impact on two areas of food security;

33 Increased instability of food that can even make physical access difficult,

34 Risk of acute hunger or famine and possibility of many children facing severe acute malnutrition .

35

36

### 37 **4.2.2 Develop sound institutions at all levels**

38 The UN (2015) SDG16 stresses the need for institutions that can enable MSPs. The related targets  
39 include:

- 40 • 16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access  
41 to justice for all
- 42 • 16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels.
- 43 • 16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision making at all  
44 levels

45 In addition, AAAA (2015) proposes a strengthened and enhanced global (economic) governance, and  
46 committed to develop coherent and mutually supporting world trade, monetary and financial systems  
47 (transparency, exchange of information).

48 Institutional efforts are identifiable at country level. Bothale (2016) and Seeletse (2016) illustrate  
49 some countries that have created institutional frameworks for partnerships in development. Major  
50 advancements in developing countries such as US, UK and Canada were made through Partnerships

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1 (Seeletse, 2016). Canada used PPPs to benefit its economy. In Canada, the Canadian Council for  
2 Public-Private Partnerships (CCPPP) is an organization founded to help government to meet its  
3 current and future infrastructure, as well as service obligations through PPPs (Thomas, 2005). Ryan  
4 (2007) in (Seeletse, 2016) points at several PPP successes in Canada, which were visible in all the  
5 entire Canadian PPP scope.

6 Several developing countries also established frameworks for partnerships. The Foundation for PPPs  
7 in Nigeria (FPPPN) as a forum for ideas and innovations (Seeletse, 2016). PPPs in Nigeria are  
8 targeted large infrastructural projects (NIAF, 2012), employment creation through a range of activities  
9 including agricultural production (Adebayo and Adegbusi, 2017), and disaster reduction (Olokesusi,  
10 2005), which can create synergies to enhance poverty alleviation and general development. In  
11 Nigeria, sustainable access to health and other socio-economic services and products was  
12 accomplished through PPPs (PPP, 2010). India acknowledge the partnership roles in its plans  
13 (Planning commission, 2008). The use of PPPs in Chile was enabled in 1991 by Decree 164, which  
14 set out much of the framework still in use today and was updated in 2010 by the Concessions Law  
15 (PPP Knowledge Lab). The Concessions Law sets out the institutional responsibilities and processes  
16 for developing and implementing PPPs. The Concessions Unit of the Ministry of Public Works (MOP)  
17 acts as implementing agency for all PPPs in Chile. South Africa and Botswana have also developed  
18 frameworks led by government national treasury or ministry of finance (Bothale, 2016)

### 19 **4.2.3 Policy coherence and support**

20 The SDG 17.13 suggests enhancing global macroeconomic stability, including through policy  
21 coordination and policy coherence, with 17.14 Enhancing policy coherence for sustainable  
22 development. 17.15 Respect each country's policy space and leadership to establish and implement  
23 policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development.

24 Some of the policy issues are country specific. For example, several factors that are critical to  
25 ensuring the success of PPPs in South Africa are referred to (United States Agency for International  
26 Development, 2005:34). The critical factor worth mentioning is the commitment at the highest level to  
27 create an environment where the provinces have strong support from the national government  
28 through the National Treasury's PPP Unit (Makofane, 2013).

29 Makofane (2013:118) identifies other critical factors are: i. creating a sound financial management  
30 structure; ii. establishing a solid regulatory framework; iii. creating a dedicated PPP unit, which drafts  
31 and updates guidelines, screens projects and carries out regular training of Public Sector officials; iv.  
32 placing strong, visionary personnel in key government departments, who understand the critical role  
33 of the private sector in promoting economic development; v. promoting access to international  
34 expertise, particularly in the early stages of the project; and vi. putting into place an effective  
35 communication strategy and providing ongoing outreach to the private and Public Sector  
36 beneficiaries.

### 37 **4.2.4 Support knowledge sharing and capacity building**

38 Especially in developing countries (see AAAA, 2015; UN (undated) UN, 2014) proposes a range of  
39 approaches to enhance knowledge sharing and capacity building in developing countries (LDC,  
40 landlocked developing countries and small island developing States).

- 41 • Promotion of the development and use of information and communication technology  
42 infrastructure, as well as capacity-building to drive economic growth and sustainable  
43 development.
- 44 • Enhanced international support and establishment of multistakeholder partnerships for  
45 implementing effective and targeted capacity-building to support plans to implement all  
46 sustainable development goals. Such capacity development should be country driven and support  
47 FSN specific needs.
- 48 • Use of public funding to enable critical research and technological development projects to remain  
49 in public domain, and strive for open access to research for publicly funded projects.
- 50 • Encouragement of development, dissemination and diffusion and transfer of environmentally  
51 sound technologies to developing countries on favourable terms.
- 52 • To reach food security, invest through enhanced international cooperation, in earth observation,  
53 rural infrastructure, agricultural research and extension services, and technology development by  
54 enhancing agricultural productive capacity by developing plant and livestock gene banks.

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- 1 • Encouragement of specialised agencies and funds and programmes with technology intensive  
2 mandates to promote the development and diffusion of relevant science, technologies and  
3 capacity building.
- 4 • Use the Technology Facilitation Mechanism, based on a multistakeholder collaboration including  
5 a collaborative multi-stakeholder forum on science, technology and innovation for sustainable  
6 development.

## 7 **4.2.5 MSPs Specific Enabling Conditions**

8 *Still need to be developed in line with the clusters.*

## 9 **4.3 Financing for development (FFD)**

10 Strategies to finance FSN, at national, regional or international levels, have to be inserted in the  
11 broader framework of the 2030 Agenda (UN, 2015) and the Adis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA, 2015)  
12 on Financing for Development (FFD). Following, the economic crisis, innovative financing became  
13 even more important when traditional forms of financing for development were under threat with  
14 economies contracting and official development assistance (ODA) facing increased budgetary  
15 pressure (Ban Ki-Moon).

### 16 **4.3.1 Financing needs for sustainable development**

17 The UN intergovernmental committee of experts on sustainable development financing (ICESDF)  
18 identifies three categories of financing needs for sustainable development (UN, 2014) revisited below.

19 Based on various sources, the ICESDF (UN, 2014) gives rough estimates of those financing needs,  
20 acknowledging that those estimates provide only indicative orders of magnitude, rather than precise  
21 figures. The ICESDF also highlights the fact that financing needs vary hugely across regions and that  
22 the needs are often greatest in countries where the capacity to raise resources is weakest, in  
23 particular in least developed countries, small island developing states, landlocked developing  
24 countries and countries facing or emerging from a conflict or a natural disaster.

#### 25 **Investments needed to address basic needs**

26 States and international community must first focus on the most vulnerable and address the  
27 fundamental needs related to poverty and malnutrition, health and education, energy and gender  
28 equality.

29 There are close to 1 billion number of people living in extreme poverty: (UN, 2014). “More than 800  
30 million people are still hungry (FAO *et al.*, 2017). Malnutrition in all its forms (undernutrition,  
31 micronutrient deficiencies, overweight and obesity) now affects all countries, whether low-, middle- or  
32 high- income. Globally, one person in three is malnourished and, if current trends continue, one  
33 person in two could be malnourished by 2030 (IFPRI, 2015).” *Still to be developed*

34 According to HLPE (2017) over 40 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance: This include  
35 4.4 million children in Nigeria (due to the violence from Boko Haram), about 6.2 million people in  
36 South Sudan, 1.2 million Somalian children under five are acutely malnourished, and over 20 million  
37 people, including around 11 million children in Yemen.

38 According to the ICESDF (UN, 2014), addressing those basic needs would cost annually: USD 66  
39 billion to eradicate extreme poverty<sup>10</sup>; USD 50 billion to eliminate hunger by 2025; USD 42 billion to  
40 achieve universal primary education and increase access to lower secondary education; USD 37  
41 billion to set up universal health care. According to Shekar, Meera, Jakub Kakiemek, Julia Dayton  
42 Eberwein, and Dylan Walters (2017) an additional investment of \$70 billion over 10 years is needed to  
43 achieve the global targets for stunting, anemia in women, exclusive breastfeeding and the scaling up  
44 of the treatment of severe wasting (Shekar, Meera *et al.*, 2017). The expected impact includes 65  
45 million cases of stunting and 265 million cases of anemia in women would be prevented in 2025 as  
46 compared with the 2015 baseline (Shekar, Meera *et al.*, 2017).

47

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<sup>10</sup> Amount needed to increase the income of the poorest to the standard USD 1.25 per day.

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## Investments needed to address national long-term development needs

Beyond addressing basic needs and emergency situations, sustainable development need to embrace a broader perspective and consider longer-term financing needs to develop appropriate infrastructure at the national level. Those long-term investments would require much more funds than the basic needs mentioned above.

The ICESDF (UN, 2014) estimates that USD 5 to 7 trillion would be needed globally to develop infrastructure in different sectors, vital for FSN and sustainable development, including: water, agriculture, forestry, telecommunications, energy, transport, industry, construction. Moreover, USD 3.5 trillion could be needed globally, of which USD 2.5 trillion in developing countries, to provide access to credit to for micro-, small- and medium-enterprises, which are an important source of employment.

## Investments needed to address global challenges, at different scales

Investments are needed to address global challenges related to FSN and sustainable development at different scales (from local to global). Many of these challenges have been illustrated in previous HLPE reports. They include: price volatility, land tenure systems and investments in agriculture, protection and restoration of biodiversity and ecosystems, climate change adaptation and mitigation, social protection for food security, biofuel and food security, investing in smallholder agriculture, sustaining fisheries and aquaculture, minimizing food losses and waste in the food system, water for FSN, sustaining agricultural development through livestock systems, nutrition and food systems.

The IPCC (2014) estimates that USD 343 to 385 billion are invested each year to reduce Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and/or to enhance resilience to climate change and climate variability. Out of this, public climate finance directed to developing countries is estimated to reach USD 35 to 49 billion per year (in 2011 and 2012) while international private finance accruing to developing countries amounted to between USD 10 and USD 72 billion per year (over 2008-2011), including foreign direct investment and loans. Globally, according to the limited available evidence, between two-thirds and three-fourths of the total climate mitigation finance is estimated to come from the private sector (IPCC, 2014). Advanced economies have formally agreed to raise USD 100 billion per year till 2020 from a variety of sources, in order to support the pressing mitigation and adaptation needs of developing countries.

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a global fund to support the developing countries in responding to the challenge of climate change, with the goal of keeping climate change well below 2 degrees Celsius. GCF catalyzes a flow of climate finance to invest in low-emission and climate-resilient development. GCF seeks to catalyse funds, multiplying the effect of its initial financing by opening markets to new investments. Following the launch of its initial resource mobilization in 2014, GCF gathered pledges worth USD 10.3 billion. The funds come mainly from developed countries, but also from some developing countries, regions, and one city (Paris)."

The GCF signed an accreditation agreement with the Development of Southern Africa in 2016.

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) was established in 1994 as an independent financial mechanism for providing grants and concessional for the costs of measures to assist in the protection of the global environment and to promote environmental sustainable development (GEF Trustee, 2017) funding to support the projects is contributed by donor countries. The funds are available to developing countries to meet the objectives of the international environmental conventions and agreements. Between 2014-17, GEF supported 16 projects investing approximately \$60 million of GEF grant resources to address Land Degradation Neutrality (GEF). About USD 103 million has been received between 2014 to 2017.

Other funds include the Adaptation Fund (AF), the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the GAVI Alliance, and the Global Partnership for Education.

*To be completed*

## **4.3.2 Sources of financing**

As illustrated in the previous section, the needs for FFD are huge, but: (i) all the SDGs are deeply interconnected and integrated approach can foster synergies across sectors and reduce the financing needs; (ii) the cost of inaction is likely to be much higher than the cost of corrective measures (HLPE,



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1 2017; UN, 2014). At the global level, global savings, including public and private sources, are  
2 estimated to reach about USD 22 trillion a year, and the stock of global financial assets about USD  
3 218 trillion: even a small change in the allocation of those resources would have a huge impact for  
4 FSN and sustainable development (UN, 2014).

5 Four main and complementary sources of FFD are usually distinguished (UN, 2014; AAAA, 2015)

### Box 17 Financing Structure of Agricultural MSPs studies by FAO

The financing structures associated with the PPP cases can also be classified into four categories:

- **Co-equity investments**, in which the total value of the financial contribution (both actual and in-kind) made by each partner is clearly specified (40 percent of cases);
- **Grants/concessions for the private sector**, in which in-kind contributions from the private sector remain largely unvalued in monetary terms (15 percent);
- **Development projects** involving financial contributions from donors and in-kind contributions from other partners – most prevalent in Africa, with some in Asia (22 percent);
- **Nationally funded**, PPP programmes driven by the public sector and involving grants and co-equity investments that target FOs and SMAEs – a common approach in Latin America (23 percent).

Source: FAO (2016)

6

### 7 Domestic public finance

8 Domestic public finances are the most critical for development. Governments collect revenues, mainly  
9 through taxes, so as to divert spending power away from private purposes in order to make room for  
10 claims of the public sector on the economy's productive capacity (Cluénies-Ross *et al.*, 2009). UN  
11 (2014) distinguishes three primary roles that domestic public finance serve:

- 12 • to provide public goods and services that markets would not provide adequately. They also serve  
13 to crowd in and incentive private actors into government policy direction;
- 14 • increases equity or ownership, including through poverty reduction;
- 15 • enable management of macroeconomic stability by providing government fiscal space.
- 16 • It reinforces a country's ownership of public policy, by allowing countries to move toward financial  
17 autonomy.

18 Public finances are generally viewed as resources that can be used to address developmental  
19 objectives.

20 According to the UN (2014), public domestic finance in developing countries more than doubled  
21 between 2002 and 2011, increasing from US\$ 838 billion to US\$ 1.86 trillion – although it mainly  
22 reflected developments in middle-income countries. This increases are still perceived as  
23 insufficient to meet sustainable development needs. For R&D, public funding are general assigned  
24 to ministries responsible for agricultural development and/or science and technology - to be  
25 assigned to parastatal organizations, public research entities and universities (Hartwich *et al.*,  
26 2007), According to FAO (2016), 23 percent of agri-partnership programmes in Latin America are  
27 nationally funded driven by the public sector and involving grants and co-equity investments.

28

### 29 Domestic private finance

30 In the context of financing sustainable development or FSN, the private sector includes a range of  
31 diverse actors, from households to multinational corporations and from direct investors to financial  
32 intermediaries, such as banks and pension funds (UN (2014). Private resources drive domestic  
33 growth and job creation – within parameters of profit-orientation and productive investment.

34 UN (2014) further identifies four groups of domestic private finance for

- 35 • The banking sector credit, which is primarily short-term, which in some countries in Africa,  
36 short-term credit accounts for up to 90 per cent of bank financing, The gross domestic savings  
37 rates in most of the developing countries remain significantly below the amount necessary to  
38 drive sustained domestic investment.



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- 1 • While domestic bond markets have also grown (driven primarily by sovereign debt issues),  
2 corporate bond markets remain small. Average private debt securities were only 5 per cent of  
3 GDP in middle income countries, compared to 34 per cent in high income countries in 2010.
- 4 • The UN recognises the growth of institutional investors in developing countries, which could  
5 potentially increase resources available for long-term investment in sustainable development.  
6 Emerging market pension funds are estimated to manage \$2.5 trillion in assets, and are  
7 expected to increase significantly.
- 8 • More companies have signed on to initiatives such as the Principles for Responsible  
9 Investment and the UN Global Compact and are reporting on environmental, social, and  
10 governance impacts of investments (ESG reporting). The share of investment subjected to  
11 ESG considerations remains small relative to global capital markets (at 7 per cent or USD 611  
12 trillion of investments in the USD 12 143 trillion global capital market in 2010)

13 In relation to FSN, Hartwich et al, 2007) conclude that the private sector tends to invest in R&D on  
14 three conditions; (i) when the results can be appropriable (such as in the seed sector and in the  
15 development of processing technology, both of which are protected through intellectual property  
16 rights), (ii) when the results can be achieved in shorter rather than longer timeframes, and (iii) when  
17 the investment looks as if it will have a positive cost–benefit ratio. Hartwich et al, 2007) further found  
18 that in 101 partnerships studied in 12 Latin American countries, private funds constituted 34 percent  
19 (an average of USD 171 000 per partnership) of the total amount of funding of the projects of \$27.5  
20 million (with 55 percent from businesses and the remaining 45 percent coming from producers  
21 associations). They also recognize the significant in-kind contributions in the form of time and the use  
22 of private-sector facilities, which FAO (2016) estimate at 15 percent for agri-business partnerships.

### 24 **International public finance**

25 International public finance (IPF) is recognized to play a complementary role to the efforts of countries  
26 in mobilizing public resources domestically (AAAA, 2015; UN 2014), and recently, most of these have  
27 also introduced private-sector development policies that stress the private sector's role in  
28 complementing public-sector investment in R&D (Hartwich et al, 2007). The IPF is required the most  
29 in the poorest and most vulnerable countries with limited domestic resources to address poverty  
30 eradication and development.

31 The IPF comprises of official development assistance (ODA), south-south and triangular cooperation  
32 and International development cooperation, and Development Funds.

33 The ODA constitute a critical source of external public financing for developing countries, particularly  
34 LDCs. According to the UN (2014), ODA still remains below the internationally agreed target of 0.7  
35 per cent of GNI, averaging 0.3 per cent of GNI in 2013. Similarly, despite commitments to allocate  
36 0.15 - 0.20 per cent of GNI as ODA to LDCs in the Istanbul Programme of Action, ODA to LDCs  
37 amounts to only 0.09 per cent of GNI, on average.

38 The international development cooperation entails involvement of South-North and South-South  
39 cooperation. There is recognition a for increased contributions of South-South cooperation to poverty  
40 eradication and sustainable development (AAAA, 2015)

41 Development Funds from Development Organizations and International Foundations also contribute  
42 substantially in development and FSN. Hartwich et al, (2007) identifies three categories to include;

- 43 • The multilateral donor institutions (MDIs) such as the World Bank, the European Union, and the  
44 Inter-American Development Bank, which also channel funds for agricultural R&D through  
45 specifically developed government programs involving state agencies and ministries.
- 46 • Funds that are obtained through bilateral development cooperation agencies, which target  
47 specific development problems prioritized by the agencies.
- 48 • Foundations such as the Rockefeller, Kellogg, or Gates Foundations, among others which  
49 dedicate private funds to non-profit development purposes.

51 Hartwich et al, (2007) gives a case of lasting effect of Competitive Fund for the Improvement of Rice  
52 in Mexico. “*The Fundación Produce in the Mexican state of Morelos receives funds from the*  
53 *government on the national and state levels, from private sources within the state of Morelos, and*  
54 *from international sources. It assigns those funds to research and technology-transfer projects*

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1 through open bidding processes. One project the Foundation has financed is the creation of hybrids in  
2 the rice sector, which has faced the effects of recent free-trade agreements where lower market  
3 prices require lower production costs. In 1998, the Morelos Rice Research Board (Patronato para la  
4 Investigación del Arroz en Morelos A.C.) established a partnership with plant breeders from the  
5 experimental research station Zacatepece of the National Institute for Forestry, Agriculture, and  
6 Livestock Research (Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Forestales, Agrícolas y Pecuarias, INIFAP)  
7 to seek financing from the Fundación Produce's competitive grant scheme for the production of  
8 hybrids. The Rice Research Board—a private producers' organization conscious of the need to  
9 reduce production costs—contributed funds to the partnership by collecting voluntary contributions  
10 from its producers of fifty cents per ton of rice produced. For five consecutive years, the Rice  
11 Research Board/ INIFAP partnership competed annually for and received funding from the Fundación  
12 Produce, paving way toward the establishment of a successful rice-improvement program that  
13 produced its first hybrid seeds in 2004.funding.”

### 15 **International private finance**

16 *Still to be developed*

### 17 **Blended finance**

18 *Still to be developed*

#### **Box 18 How GAAVI is funded**

Gavi's unique funding model draws heavily on private sector thinking to help overcome the historic limitations to development funding for immunisation

Gavi's two funding streams, innovative finance and direct contributions account for 25% and 75% respectively of the Vaccine Alliance's overall funding portfolio.

1. Innovative finance includes the International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) and the Advance Market Commitment (AMC).
2. Direct contributions include grants and agreements from donor governments, foundations, corporations and organisations.

#### Direct contributions

- Multi-year pledges and commitments are crucial to sustaining Gavi's ongoing programmes and its ability to fund new vaccines.

#### Public-private partnerships

- Public-private partnerships Corporations, private individuals & foundations play a vital role in meeting Gavi needs, accounting for 21% of 2000 to 2020 funding.

#### Gavi's resource mobilization process

- Cultivation of key public & private donor relationships, co-financing, shaping vaccine markets and mobilising civil society advocacy.


Source: <http://www.gavi.org/funding/how-gavi-is-funded/> Accessed (31/12/2017)

### 21 **4.3.3 FFD: an analytical framework/a strategic approach**

22 In order to inform the preparation of the 2030 Agenda, the ICESDF was requested by the Rio+20  
23 Conference (UN, 2012) to develop, building on the Monterrey Consensus (UN, 2002) and on the  
24 Doha Declaration (UN, 2008), “options for a sustainable development financing strategy to facilitate  
25 the mobilization of resources and their effective use in achieving the SDGs” (UN, 2014).

26 The ICESDF concluded that there is no one simple policy solution and suggested a strategic  
27 approach based on the 9 precepts illustrated in **Figure 5**.

1 **Figure 5 FFD: a strategic approach**




17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22 *Source: Adapted from UN, 2014*

23  
24 **Figure 6** explains the suggested three-pronged pathway to improving and financing for FSN  
25 development through inclusive financing taking the modes of mobilization of financial resources, co-  
26 financing (blended finance between public and private sector) and catalysing finance via social capital  
27 enterprises. Social capital enterprises might include infrastructure & decarbonisation, De risking  
28 insurance, catastrophic bonds and R&D in agriculture. Mobilizing resources through contract farming,  
29 smart family farms and agricultural insurances, while, co-financing takes the modes of bio and climate  
30 bonds and insurance and De carbonization social enterprises as well.

31 The three pronged inclusive finance outlined above shall pave the road for MSP to undertake  
32 intensive financing of their endeavours to improve FSN using mobilizing, co-financing and catalysing  
33 modes of finance. MSPs could borrow money from nation wealth and pension funds to finance social  
34 protection food safety nets which are very helpful in increasing food intake of the poor and assets  
35 creation by smallholder farmers (Hidrobo et al, 2018). MSP could also directly access government tax  
36 revenues using co-financing and or catalysing modes of credit loans to support production and  
37 consumption of food by rural and suburb poor.

38 Catalysing financing, the most important financial technology suggested, could be used to improve FSN  
39 by borrow funds from the public providers - MDBs and Donors - and manage them through humanitarian  
40 assistance and development project in project preparation facilities calling or and monitoring  
41 interventions in infrastructure & De carbonization, De risking and agricultural insurance, social  
42 protection safety nets, catastrophic bonds .etc.

1 **Figure 6 FSN-Inclusive Financing For Development (FFD) Framework**



2  
3 Source: Compiled from various readings in the neoclassical WBG modality in **F4D01x: Financing for Development** a course of study offered by the Open  
4 Learning Campus, an online learning initiative of World Bank through edX., 2017.

1 **4.3.4 FFD: the role of MSPs/Innovative funding mechanisms**

2 *Still to be developed*

3 “Solutions can be found, including through strengthening public policies, regulatory frameworks and  
4 finance at all levels, unlocking the transformative potential of people and the private sector, and  
5 incentivizing changes in financing as well as consumption and production patterns to support  
6 sustainable development” (AAAA, 2015) .

7 **4.4 Conclusion**

8 MSPs at different levels have considered several strategies and options to address the limitations.  
9 Stakeholder engagements efforts by all partners seems to transcend most of the limitations. There are  
10 also global efforts to create enabling environment that can improve performance of MSPs. Some solid  
11 commitments to upscale mobilization and innovation in financing of FSN are emerging. Most of these  
12 efforts are visible at global level – and require judicious deployment to make a difference in FSN.  
13 Innovations exist in inclusive finance that MSPs can undertake to intensify financing FSN – and  
14 include using mobilizing, co-financing and catalysing modes of finance. There are potential source  
15 funds from wealth and pension funds and to access tax generated revenues using co-financing and or  
16 catalysing modes of credit loans to support production and consumption of food.

17

## 1 **CONCLUSION**

2 The growing recognition that complex and multidimensional issues – such as FSN – require  
3 comprehensive approaches and participation of many stakeholders (whether public, private or from  
4 civil society) has contributed to position MSPs at the centre of FSN debates. One of the clearest  
5 manifestations of this understanding can be seen in the structure of the reformed United Nations  
6 Committee on World Food Security (CFS), and in the CFS’ constant affirmation of the value of its  
7 inclusiveness. Further, the 2030 Agenda, “encourages and promote effective public, public-private and  
8 civil society partnerships”, that “mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial  
9 resources, to support the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in all countries, in  
10 particular developing countries”. However, the emerging importance of MSPs as a tool to improve and  
11 finance FSN takes place with controversies around the exact meanings of stakeholders and  
12 partnerships, as well as the performance of MSPs. MSPs are increasingly formed worldwide,  
13 understood and implemented in diverse contexts.

14 This report considers the role of MSPs in improving and financing FSN, as well as their potential,  
15 limitations, and associated risks, in order to raise awareness and propose recommendations, with the  
16 view to progress towards the realization of the right to adequate food. The widespread call to increase  
17 the availability and accessibility of financial resources for FSN and sustainable development,  
18 particularly in favour of the most disadvantaged actors within food systems, amplifies the need to  
19 understand the role that MSP can play. This will depend on how issues such as rights, roles and  
20 responsibilities of different stakeholders, as well as conflicts of interest and asymmetries of power are  
21 recognized and addressed.

22 The different views and controversies reaffirm the need to revisit MSPs critically. That is, not to  
23 automatically embrace or dismiss them, but rather analyze the situations and determine which  
24 operational principles are most promising if MSPs are to improve FSN, including through better  
25 allocating or generating finance for FSN initiatives. MSPs can be a learning process, progressively  
26 building trust among partners. There are potential benefits and evident costs associated with MSPs  
27 that determine their existence in the first place, and their sustainability in the long run. The creation  
28 and maintenance of MSPs carries costs, from forming the rules of engagement, to ensuring  
29 representation and participation of vulnerable groups, among many others.

30 The report suggests a classification of MSPs based on selected characteristics, including scale of  
31 operation, composition of lead or main stakeholders, type of partnership and domain or area of  
32 operation. Four clusters that emerged included, Knowledge Generation and Sharing Cluster, Food  
33 policy and advocacy cluster, Action-oriented cluster, and Finance and Resource Cluster. As MSPs are  
34 complex, some MSPs fit into more than one cluster. However, this classification shows that MSPs in a  
35 specified cluster do have some commonalities.

36 The primary value-added of MSPs, with regards to other non-multistakeholder processes, lies in the  
37 potential to pool together complementary resources and facilitating policy dialogue and convergence.  
38 This report suggests a methodology and a set of criteria to assess the performance and impact of  
39 MSPs in improving and financing FSN as well as possible pathways to address weaknesses and  
40 challenges inherent to MSPs, namely: tensions and distrust between partners, power asymmetries  
41 and transaction costs.

42 The challenges of MSPs are not beyond redress. MSPs at different levels have considered several  
43 strategies and options to address the limitations. Stakeholder engagements efforts by all partners  
44 seems to transcend most of the limitations. There are also global efforts to create enabling  
45 environment that can improve performance of MSPs. Some solid commitments to upscale mobilization  
46 and innovation in financing of FSN are emerging. Most of these efforts are visible at the global level –  
47 and require judicious deployment to make a difference in FSN. Innovations exist in inclusive finance  
48 that MSPs can undertake to intensify financing FSN – and include using mobilizing, co-financing and  
49 catalysing modes of finance.

50

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1 **APPENDIX**

2 **Existing MSPs: Case study questionnaire**

3 The following questionnaire aims at collecting detailed inputs on existing MSPs. This material is to be  
 4 used where appropriate by the HLPE to illustrate its abovementioned report #13 with concrete examples.

1. Name of MSP:	# (for HLPE use only):
2. Thematic domain of activity: (...) Food production; food supply chain; (...) Natural resource management; (...) Education, information, knowledge sharing; (...) Resource mobilization; (...) Other (specify):  Brief description of mandate / activities / objectives:	
3. Website (official website of the MSP and, or, relevant web sources):	
4. Year of Origin / Creation:	
5. Scale/Level of operation (choose one option): ( ) Global (Specify major areas/regions of presence:.....) ( ) Regional (Specify region <sup>11</sup> :.....) (...) Sub-regional (Specify sub-region <sup>12</sup> : .....) ( ) National (Specify country.....) ( ) Local (specify country: ..... )	

5

6

<sup>11</sup> For the answer to this question, please use the 7 “FAO regions”: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Near East, North America, Southwest Pacific, as described online:<http://www.fao.org/unfao/govbodies/gsbhome/council/council-election/en/>

<sup>12</sup> In some cases it might be relevant to specify a sub-region or a regional intergovernmental organization such as African Union, European Union, MERCOSUR, ASEAN...



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### I) STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

6. Number of main partners:

7. Composition of the MSP: list of main partners: names and/or categories (i.e.: public sector, private sector, civil society, *others*<sup>13</sup>)

8. Which partner(s) initiated the MSP? How the MSP may have evolved?

9. Degree of formalization: does the MSP result of an informal agreement, or is there a formal structure of decision-making?

(...) full legal entity: legal personality

(...) formalized agreement among partners, but no legal personality for the MSP

(...) informal arrangement

Describe the decision-making process (including frequency of meetings of the governing bodies...)

10. Governance structure: describe the roles, responsibilities and level of involvement of the different partners in the partnership. Describe, the case being, power asymmetries between partners. Which partner(s) lead the MSP?

<sup>13</sup> See V0 draft for a more detailed description of the three first broad category. For “others”, please specify.

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11. Representativeness: How and by whom are the members chosen? Do they speak only for themselves or represent a broader category of stakeholders? How long is their mandate? How does the MSP ensure inclusiveness and “fair” representation of the most affected people?

What are the channels of communication between the MSP and the government(s)? Are the decisions/recommendations of the MSP to the government(s) are prescriptive or consultative? What public strategies/priorities this partnership supported at different scales?

12. Finance: How and by whom the MSP is funded? Who underwrites the partnership? Add relevant data about the budget, and budget share of each category of partners (public, private, civil society). Is the budget sufficient for work plan implementation? What are the financial tools and mechanisms used by the MSP?

### II) OUTCOMES

13. What is the main function of the MSP? Is it mainly:  
 (...)“policy-oriented”  
 (...) “action-oriented”  
 (...) Other (specify):

14. What are the main areas of contribution of the MSP? Please tick in the table below the main, secondary and tertiary areas of contribution of the MSP.

Outcome Area	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
1. Policy design, policy implementation, laws, advocacy and awareness			
2. Increased participation/inclusiveness: priority given to women as well as to marginalized and vulnerable groups.			
3. Capacity building, among the MSP partners, and beyond			
4. Resource mobilisation and fund raising			
5. Activities related to facilitating improved FSN outcomes (e.g. environmental stewardship towards biodiversity/ water conservation...)			
6. Outcomes that directly contribute to FSN (e.g. increased production, economic growth, income			

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and employment generation, improved diets, better nutrition education and information...)			
7. Monitoring and evaluation			
8. Other (Specify: _____)			

For each of the areas of contribution mentioned above, please give examples of the MSP outcomes and impacts:

What are the main organizational and collective benefits gained from setting-up this MSP?

### III) OVERALL ASSESSMENT

15. Please rank your overall assessment of the MSP, ranking from 1 to 5 (with 1 being lowest to 5 highest)

16. Explain your above ranking

17. How do you assess the MSP according to the following criteria (*high, medium, low*)? Why?

Criteria / Assessment	Low	Medium	High
<b><i>Inclusiveness</i></b> (the intention to include everyone affected by decisions, especially those who are routinely ignored)			
<b><i>Accountability</i></b> (assigned responsibility that a representative or a group acquires with the action of speaking or deciding on behalf of someone else)			
<b><i>Transparency/Access to Information</i></b> (openness to public scrutiny, availability of information)			
<b><i>Reflexivity</i></b> (capacity of a MSP to learn from mistakes, to assess long-term trends, and to react accordingly)			
<b><i>Effectiveness</i></b> (assessment of the achievement of MSP's objectives)			
<b><i>Efficiency</i></b> (comparison between the use of resources with the potential benefits the MSP can generate, including intangible benefits)			

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<b>Resource mobilisation</b> (raising of financial resources, and other enabling resources to improve FSN)			
<b>Impact</b> (impact on FSN in its four dimensions at different scales)			
18. Any comments on the above ratings:			
19. How do you rate the power relations between participants? (choose one option) <input type="checkbox"/> More Equal <input type="checkbox"/> Equal <input type="checkbox"/> Less Equal <input type="checkbox"/> Un-equal			
20. Explain your above rating			
<b>IV) THREATS, OPPORTUNITIES, LESSONS LEARNED AND WAYS FORWARD</b>			
21. Could you identify current strengths supporting and/or weakness challenging the MSP?			
22. Could you identify projected threats and/or opportunities that the MSP would cause/offer, (included for those stakeholders that are not included in the MSP)?			
23. Which conditions could enable the MSP to better function?			
24. What is the potential of this MSP to influence public priorities across sectors and allocation of budget for improved FSN? What is its potential to mobilise further funds for improving food security and nutrition?			
25. What is the potential of this MSP to address the specific needs of marginalized and vulnerable groups most affected by food insecurity and malnutrition?			

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26. How can other regions/countries use this experience to organize similar spaces? what are the necessary conditions to extrapolate/adapt/scale-up this MSP experience?

1

2

### REFERENCES

27. The HLPE is interested by any article, mainly scientific references but also practical experiences on MSPs you would like to share (scholarly articles, reports, reviews, analysis, etc):

28. Any other observation.

3

4